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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1780

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 5-6, March 1983

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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Nos. 5 and 6, March 1983

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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 83 (signed to press 18 Feb 83) pp 15-22

[Article by Doctor of Economic Sciences, Col S. Bartenev: "On the Level of Economic, Scientific and Technical Progress"*]

[Text] The dynamic development and on-going strengthening of economic potential and the indisputable achievements of Soviet science and technology convincingly demonstrate the advantages and capabilities of the socialist economic system and the realism of the policy of the Communist Party which is leading the Soviet people along the path of communist creation. The path followed by the Soviet Union over the 6 decades is an impressive example of a rapid flight from backwardness and chaos to the might of a great industrial power with a high cultural level, an advanced social organization and secure defense.

The experience of history has unconditionally affirmed that precisely due to the leadership of the Leninist party, our people in a most complex international situation have been able to build and defend socialism. As was pointed out in the report "Sixty Years of the USSR" by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, that powerful creative, mobilizing force which ensures the continuous advance in all areas of social progress.

The party's course confirmed by the 26th Congress of building communism and strengthening peace expresses the unity of its domestic and foreign policy, the organic link between the successes in the area of economic construction and strengthening the material and spiritual bases for the nation's defense potential and the successes in the struggle for peace and against the forces of the imperialist reaction and aggression.

The Soviet people are carrying out the tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan under difficult conditions. The imperialist leaders of the Western world, having proclaimed a "crusade" against communism, are endeavoring to brazenly intervene into the internal affairs of the socialist countries and are utilizing perfidious methods to undermine their unity and weaken their economic might.

*The article is recommended for use in studying the subject "The Concern of the CPSU for the Technical Equipping and Material Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces."

The military preparations of the United States and its partners in the aggressive NATO bloc have assumed unprecedented scope. The record U.S. military budget planned for the 1984 fiscal year of some 280.5 billion dollars provides increased allocations primarily for the development of new strategic offensive weapons systems (the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines with Trident missiles, long-range cruise missiles, new types of ammunition, radiation [laser] weapons and so forth) by which the American imperialists count on altering the balance of military forces in their favor.

U.S. policy to an ever-greater degree is being determined by the groupings of monopolistic capital. Having unleashed an unprecedented arms race, they are endeavoring to shift its center of gravity into the sphere of a qualitative improvement of the weapons and military equipment and are planning on achieving fundamental superiority in the given area over the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. This is the aim of the military strategic plans of the Pentagon and the programs for increasing military preparations and the military might of the United States and NATO as a whole. American pressure is increasing on its allies in the military-political blocs. New military bases are being built around the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries and the existing ones are being modernized.

All of this has forced the Soviet Union to pay unflinching attention to strengthening its defense capability, to further developing the Armed Forces and to improving their technical equipment and material support. The allocating of the necessary resources in the aim of solving the questions of military development has been caused exclusively by external factors and is determined by that danger represented by the aggressive preparations and provocative actions of the imperialist circles.

In unmasking the attempts of the United States to justify the qualitative changes and growth of nuclear weapons, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, has convincingly shown the baselessness of the arguments by the Washington administration and has firmly stated: "The programs for further increasing weapons do not force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. To the American challenge we will be forced to reply by deploying our own corresponding weapons systems: against the MX our own analogous missile; against the American long-range cruise missile our own long-range cruise missile which we are already testing." The new weapons systems cannot be used by Washington as a "trump" in the talks. Attempts to engage in dialogue with the Soviet Union from a so-called "position of strength" and pressure are absurd and hopeless.

The achievements of Soviet science and technology and the unstinting labor of all the people have made it possible for our Armed Forces to have--and in the required number--any weapons which the potential enemy possesses or wants to possess. At the conference of the Soviet Army and Navy leadership in the Kremlin it was pointed out that the struggle in the military-technical area has intensified sharply and has often assumed a fundamentally new character and that a lag in this struggle is inadmissible.

In this regard, the interests of securely defending the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries demand the complete utilization of the results of the

scientific and technical revolution for developing prospective types of weapons and military equipment. One of the chief means for the actual implementation of this task is CPSU military-technical policy as a system of scientifically sound views on the questions of developing weapons and military equipment. This has been formed considering all the experience of Soviet military development and should primarily ensure the preferential development of those areas in the scientific-technical revolution within the military field which are capable of most completely and thoroughly satisfying the growing needs of national defense for effective means for conducting modern combat operations.

CPSU military-technical policy provides an alliance between industry and science in the interests of developing types of weapons and military equipment which would be highly efficient and not become obsolete for a long time. The task of this policy is to be concerned with the rational modernizing of the weapons and military equipment for all the Armed Services and branches of troops in accord with their role and purpose in modern warfare.

Our party's military-technical policy pays constant attention to developing those weapons and military equipment which make it possible to save military labor and to more fully automate and mechanize it. Finally, CPSU military-technical policy has oriented the defense industry and the military personnel at the greatest possible improving of the existing control methods and the elaboration of new ones as well as further improving the communications system.

The constant carrying out of our party's military-technical policy is possible only with a high development level of heavy industry, primarily machine building which meets the demand for highly productive equipment, machine tools, machinery, instruments and means of transport. The development of machine building the output of which virtually doubles every 7-8 years serves as a prerequisite for the industrialization of all the sectors, for the technical re-equipping of the economy as a whole and for further strengthening and improving the military-technical base of the Armed Forces.

By the reconstruction and modernization of production as well as by new construction, the technical base of machine building itself is constantly being up-graded. The machine tool building enterprises produce various types of machine tools for virtually any production processes. During the current five-year plan there is to be the accelerated growth of automated machine tools, including machine tools with numerical program control, automatic and semi-automatic lines, machine tools and machinery for low-waste production methods as well as other highly productive equipment.

The development of modern technology has been accompanied by an increase in the size of the units and by the development of machinery and mechanisms with large unit capacity. This has provided a major impact. New installations of continuous-action mining-transport equipment are being developed with a productivity of 5,000 m³ an hour. Rolling mills with automated control systems are being prepared for production. The output of cross-country and heavy duty motor vehicles is being expanded. By the end of the five-year plan, the proportional amount of large capacity vehicles will almost double in the nation's motor vehicle fleet. Large steel casting converters are being developed as well as units for chemical and petrochemical production and the world's largest thermal and hydroturbines and nuclear reactors.

We must also note such an area of scientific and technical progress as full mechanization and automation of production on the basis of the mass employment of industrial robots. Robot production is developing at a rapid pace. During the current five-year plan, we intend to manufacture over 30,000 automatic manipulators and this surpasses their output in the previous 5 years by 8-fold. Robots are to be employed not only in machine building, but also in other sectors, replacing man in labor-intensive and heavy operations. In contrast to traditional automation, the robots which have the corresponding control system are capable of performing various functions and can easily be reset to perform diverse manual operations.

These are only some of the promising areas for scientific and technical progress which is a major reserve for further raising the economy and constantly improving it. All that is advanced and progressive which has been created by scientific and engineer thought is being embodied in metal by machine building and converted to highly efficient and dependable machines, instruments and production lines.

The intensification of production has meant a changeover to the use of new, predominantly qualitative factors for economic growth. Such a changeover presupposes the use of modern equipment and production methods which necessitate less manpower and accompanied by increased worker skills. Intensive production methods make it possible to shorten the time for mass output of products and lower the material and financial expenditures. Prerequisites are created for better balancing in the economy and for carrying out structural shifts in the national economy.

Structural shifts in the economy contribute to the primary growth of the most progressive sectors. Instrument building, nuclear power and the chemical and gas industries are developing at an accelerated pace. The comparatively young industrial sector of radio electronics is progressing rapidly. It serves as the basis for the automated control systems and for the retrieval and transmission of data. The degree of technical advancement and the introduction of radio electronics is rightly considered one of the most important indicators for the development level of the productive forces as well as for the efficiency of modern weapons systems and military equipment.

The development of social production has been accompanied by shifts in the nature of labor and by changes in the consumption structure. The easing of heavy labor and the reduction of low-productive manual labor make it possible to increase the efficiency of production, to raise the productivity of military labor and to ensure the most rational forms of the organization of labor in the Armed Forces.

One of the major reserves for further strengthening economic potential is the rational use of fuel, raw materials and metal. For example, the protecting of metal against corrosion, the use of progressive production methods and the utilization of secondary resources open up broad opportunities. From secondary metallurgical raw materials we annually produce around 50 million tons of steel. For obtaining the same amount of metal from natural raw materials, we would have to mine and process 190 million tons of iron ore, 75 million tons of coking coal and limestone. The expenditures on collecting and processing secondary metal are 25-fold less than smelting it from ores.

Let us give another example. By the extensive use of plastics, light alloys and low-alloyed steels in motor vehicle construction, the weight of the produced trucks can be reduced by 300-350 kg. Each year the nation produces over 600,000 basic model trucks. A reduction in their weight within the designated limits would be the equivalent of raising the carrying capacity by approximately 200,000 tons and in practice this would mean obtaining and additional 40,000 motor vehicles of the ZIL-130 and ZIL 131 types.

A substantial improvement in the location of the productive forces is of important defense significance. The geography of the new construction projects envisages a movement of industry to the East, the integrated development of new industrial areas and a more even distribution of industry and population across the nation's territory. Our nation is the only state in the world which bases its development on its own fuel-energy and other natural resources. The developing of new deposits and the construction of manufacturing enterprises in the areas of Eastern and Western Siberia and in the European North strengthen the raw material, fuel and energy base of the nation. Energy-intensive types of production such as aluminum and nonferrous metals smelting, the wood-working, chemical and other industries are being successfully developed in the eastern regions.

The economic and scientific-technical potential of the Soviet Union is characterized by an enormous scale and by major qualitative shifts. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the increased energy-to-labor ratio, expanded output of the most progressive and economic machines, instruments and mechanisms and the integrated development of transportation increase the possibilities and raise the overall level of social production and its leading sectors. Enterprise modernization and reconstruction are being carried out widely and the completion of new factories and plants is being accelerated. All of this serves as the essential prerequisite for strengthening foundations for the Soviet state's defenses and for reinforcing the military potential of the Armed Forces.

The active proponents of the militaristic course in the United States and the other capitalist nations are endeavoring to justify the policy of increasing international tension and the growth of weapons and at the same time are concealing the actual scale of military-economic preparations and are endeavoring to obscure their negative consequences for the economy. Certain bourgeois theoreticians assert that the increase in military expenditures has incentive effect on market conditions and helps to overcome the crisis drops (the concept of the so-called "military budget accelerator"). A theory is also being propagandized according to which it is not the policy of the ruling imperialist circles, but rather scientific and technical progress itself which serves as the reason of the arms race, in "forcing" the United States and its partners to follow a path of cutting back on social expenditures and programs.

It is quite obvious that the measures being carried out by the socialist state to strengthen and improve the material and technical base of defense have nothing in common with the aims and plans of the imperialist politicians and strategists. It is not the preparation for aggressive wars accompanied by an absurd squandering of material and spiritual riches, but rather the restoration of the atmosphere of detente and the strengthening of the principles of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation which serve as the leading idea

and the determining feature of our foreign policy. In following Lenin's legacy, the Communist Party and the Soviet government ensure strict centralization and the greatest savings of resources being allocated for defense interests.

With progress in the productive forces and the improvement of social production, changes also occur in the social and professional composition of the Armed Forces, in their organization, methods of formation and development. Technical progress has forced a revising of the methods of training and indoctrinating the personnel and has placed ever-higher demands on the servicemen. As the troops and fleets receive new weapons, they must be studied thoroughly in order to completely know their combat properties and capabilities and in order to be employed with maximum effect in various types of combat. These are the tasks which have been posed by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, and which must be carried out by all categories and ranks of servicemen.

The use of scientific and technical achievements in defense purposes broadens the capabilities of the Armed Forces and helps to increase their combat might. For example, in the postwar period the technical equipping of the Ground Forces has been markedly broadened and their fire power and mobility have increased. The armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles make it possible to conduct an offensive without the dismounting of the personnel. The firing range, rate of fire and mobility of the artillery have increased and new, more effective types of ammunition have appeared. Modern tanks are capable of hitting a target with the first round, even firing at a significant range.

A revolution in the material basis for conducting a war has occurred out of the scientific and technical progress. A fundamentally new means of armed combat has been developed, nuclear missile weapons. As a result, strategy has obtained a powerful means for directly influencing the course of combat operations. A new Armed Service has been formed, the Strategic Rocket Troops, and the role of air and antimissile defense has increased. The strategic nuclear weapons are in constant combat readiness and serve as the basic factor impeding the aggressor. The combat performance of these weapons has been improved and the accuracy and effectiveness of the nuclear missile strikes have risen.

The Air Defense Troops are armed with modern warning devices, highly efficient antiaircraft complexes (missile and artillery), aviation for intercepting airborne targets and advanced communications and control equipment. The tasks and capabilities of the traditional Armed Services have changed as well as the relationship between them. Qualitative shifts have also occurred in the methods of conducting operations as well as in the tactics of combat operations and in the forms and methods of troop cooperation. In the past, the development of military affairs was chiefly influenced by individual discoveries or inventions. At present, the relationship between scientific-technical progress, weapons production and the organizational development of the Armed Forces has become immeasurably more diverse and profound than was the case previously. At present, not only the individual discoveries or inventions but primarily the common front of scientific-technical progress and its material basis are assuming decisive significance and have a growing influence on the development of the Army and Navy. The new scientific-technical discoveries and advances encompass literally all types of weapons and military equipment, forming an unique causal chain between science and production.

Scientific and technical development is a very dynamic factor and under its impact changes occur in the various areas of military affairs. For example, let us take aviation. Over a short interval of time, piston airplanes have been replaced by jet ones. Then a new leap occurred, the aircraft crossed the sound barrier and have continued to increase speed, altitude and range. Fighters from the World War II period had a speed on the order of 600-750 km an hour. The speed of modern fighters is twice the speed of sound. They have powerful weapons, onboard radars and are capable of destroying the probable enemy's aviation in the entire range of flight altitudes and speeds. The capabilities of military transport have also been widened. Soviet science and designers have created vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The production of various types and classes of helicopters is developing successfully.

The Navy has also undergone qualitative changes. A modern fighting ship is a very complex organism of diverse technical and engineering devices and systems, embodying the most advanced achievements of science, design thought and highly developed industry.

Soviet shipbuilders have developed ships capable of conducting combat operations in any area of the world's ocean. Nuclear missile-carrying submarines, in possessing a number of indisputed advantages, in their effectiveness are the equal of ground and air nuclear weapons. The capabilities of the surface missile and ASW ships have increased substantially and they have first-class weapons and diverse military equipment. The Navy has also received aviation-carrying ships and long-range aviation. Radio electronic control and counter-measure system are being evermore widely employed and the missile and artillery weapons, the means of communication and landing equipment are being improved.

Progress in military affairs has been accompanied by a change in military requirements and at the same time a revising of the demands made on science and the national economy.

In the first place, the revising of the requirements has occurred as a result of the precipitous growth of the needs of the armed forces for various materiel and services. New types of weapons, new machines and mechanisms, as a rule, are much more complicated and expensive than the earlier models. Thus, the expenditures on the weaponry and technical equipping of an American armored division in 1942 were 30 million dollars, in 1950 they reached 199 million, in 1970 from 350 to 450 million and at present are approaching a billion dollars.

Secondly, under the impact of scientific and technical progress there has been an on-going change in the structure of the demand for materiel and services. Thus, while in the past the basic mass of material resources supplied to an army was made up of food and fodder, in World War II military equipment, ammunition and fuel comprised a predominant share of these resources. At present, the share of military equipment and fuels and lubricants is increasing even more. Here the ratio of expenditures for the various types of equipment is changing. For example, there has been a marked rise in the share of electronics, missile weapons, with a relative decline in the expenditures on certain types of conventional weapons.

A modern, motorized rifle division has been virtually completely mechanized. It has a large number of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, motor vehicles and other equipment. In comparison with the 1940's, the amount of energy available to one serviceman (the total power of the motors divided by the number of personnel) has risen by more than 10-fold. The weight of a formation's fire volley has increased by many-fold. If one compares the fuel load of a fighter air regiment, its weight is approximately equal to the weight of a fuel load of one large formation from the period of the Great Patriotic War. All of this greatly expands and complicates the tasks of operating the weapons and military equipment as well as the organization of rear and technical support for the troops. It requires the seeking out of new, more effective decisions, high skills and exceptional teamwork among the personnel.

Thirdly, the demands on the scientific-technical developments and the quality of weaponry have continuously risen. As was pointed out by the Deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Weaponry, Army Gen V. M. Shabanov, the unified military-technical policy focuses our scientists on working out the long-range problems of military affairs in order, both today and in the future, to most fully and thoroughly satisfy the needs of national defense for modern weaponry. This policy ensures the alliance of industry with science in the interests of developing highly efficient types of weapons and equipment with the best performance.

The up-grading of equipment is a concern not only of the designers and production workers, but also of the men in the Armed Forces who do a great deal to improve the combat properties of the weapons and to develop original devices which ease equipment repairs and improve the reliability of its operations.

Also directly related to the Armed Forces are the party and government instructions on strengthening savings and economy, for the level of combat readiness depends not only on the volume of allocated resources, but also upon how rationally and completely they are utilized. Under present-day conditions, it is important to instill in command personnel the ability and readiness to take bold, nonroutine decisions and to firmly and steadily carry them out. A high rate of advance makes it possible to carry out a combat mission with the least expenditures of materiel. The results of the combat employment of the rocket troops and artillery are ensured not only by the massing of the weapons, but also by bold maneuvering and high accuracy of fire. In other words, the more effective the carrying out of the combat missions, the more fully the combat capabilities of the weapons are employed and the more profitably the material and technical resources are consumed.

The efficient and economic consumption of the allocated resources and the intelligent operation of equipment are an indicator of the high professional skills of the personnel as well as proper clarity and organization in the work of all elements of the troop organism. The technical aspect of economy and thriftiness is inseparably linked to the political and organizational work and to the truly scientific organization of military service.

The demand formulated by V. I. Lenin to account for money accurately and conscientiously and to manage rationally, in a Soviet manner, as before is very timely and pertinent. This Leninist demand defines the basic content of

economic work in the troops and causes a state, truly efficient approach to the job. Here, in all instances, the determining thing is to ensure the high quality of the equipment and high combat readiness with minimum expenditures. To effectively carry out the task of combat training, and to thriftily and efficiently utilize the wealth of the people means to strengthen the economic bases for our motherland's might as well as to develop and improve the material and technical base of its Armed Forces.

The Communist Party and the Soviet people are doing everything necessary to strengthen the nation's defense capability and to maintain the technical equipping of the Army and Navy on a level of advanced scientific and technical achievements. As a result, the technical equipping of the Armed Forces has constantly increased and been improved and their logistical support has been bettered. The powerful and modern equipment is in dependable hands and when necessary will be successfully employed to decisively and securely rebuff aggression from wherever it may arise.

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LECTURE MATERIALS FOR AIR DEFENSE FORCES DAY

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[Unattributed materials for reports and talks on Air Defense Forces Day:
"Guarding the Motherland's Skies"]

[Text] April 10 is Air Defense Forces Day. This was established by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 10 February 1975 and since then has become a traditional holiday. The personnel of the Troops each year greet it with high indicators in carrying out the tasks confronting them, in improving their combat skills and in strengthening organization and discipline.

This year, the preparations for the holiday are being carried out in a situation of a high political upsurge and the labor enthusiasm of the Soviet people. Rallied closely around the Communist Party and its Central Committee and inspired by the decisions of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the materials of the joint ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, our nation's workers are unstintingly carrying out the plan of communist construction outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress and are taking an active part in the socialist competition to successfully fulfill the quotas of the 11th Five-Year Plan.

Great are the successes of our motherland in communist construction. Each day brings the Soviet people closer to the brilliant future of communism. The Soviet Union appears to the world as a powerful vanguard of mankind's social progress, a dependable force for international security and as a close, monolithically united family of socialist nations and nationalities. There is nothing stronger in the world than this family.

All the heroic history of our motherland confirms the constancy of the party's Leninist strategic line. This line is oriented at making the Soviet people live better year by year, that their labor bring evermore tangible results and that our socialist system evermore fully discloses its humane essence and its creative capabilities.

But the Soviet people must live and work in a very complex international situation. The NATO countries headed by the United States are endeavoring by any means to undermine the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the socialist

commonwealth nations on the world scene, to achieve military superiority over them and are strengthening confrontation with the USSR. Here the ruling U.S. circles are wagering chiefly on increasing their offensive combat might and are accelerating the arms race.

Over the last 3½ postwar decades, the United States has spent 2 trillion dollars for military purposes. At present, over just the next 5 years (1983-1987), they intend to spend for these purposes more than 1.6 trillion dollars. Here the lion's share of these colossal amounts is to go for the development of the strategic offensive forces and all types of nuclear weapons.

Quite recently, the American president approved a decision to deploy another 100 new MX intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. Along with this, production is to be started up on the so-called eurostrategic Pershing-2 missiles and medium-range cruise missiles with different types of launching. Actual preparations are already underway for their deployment in the Western European NATO nations. Military space systems are being developed. The arsenal of chemical weapons is being updated and significantly increased. The might of the combat-ready troop and fleet groupings is being increased. The effectiveness of conventional weapons is sharply rising. The network of military bases is being modernized as well as the installations aimed against the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth.

In essence, the large-scale U.S. and NATO troop and naval exercises are rehearsals for initiating and conducting nuclear war against the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

All of this shows that the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles at present most starkly evidences an adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their own selfish narrow interests.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government have taken every measure to achieve a lessening of tension and ensure peace in the world. In its foreign policy, as was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union intends to patiently and consistently seek out ever-new ways for developing mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems as well as ways to disarmament. We will also constantly increase our efforts in the struggle for a lasting peace.

At the same time, our party considers the ensuring of a suitable level of defense capability for the nation as its sacred duty. The aggressive intrigues by imperialism have forced our nation, along with the fraternal socialist states, to be concerned and to be seriously concerned with maintaining defense capability on the proper level.

The high combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces has been and remains a major factor in checking the imperialist aspirations for world domination. The Army and Navy possess everything necessary to deal a decisive rebuff to aggression from wherever it might arise.

The communist party and the Soviet people have entrusted the Armed Forces with the defense of the great socialist victories, freedom and independence of our

motherland. They are providing the Army and Navy with everything necessary for successfully carrying out this historic task. All the Soviet servicemen are aware of this concern, regardless of in what corner of our vast motherland they are serving and they are responding to this with intense military service.

"From us, it is demanded that we constantly study military affairs and continuously maintain on a high level our training and combat readiness to immediately repel aggression and decisively defeat the enemy under any conditions of starting and waging a war. This is our main task," pointed out the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov.

The Soviet military, in being profoundly aware of their patriotic and international duty, day in and day out are strengthening their combat readiness. The men of the Air Defense Troops are also making a major contribution to this important matter. They are proud of the fact that they have been entrusted with serving in units having a heroic history, that they can add to the glorious combat traditions by their concrete deeds and open up new pages in the Troops' chronicle. They are perfectly aware of their duties to the motherland and in their daily military service are constantly being guided by the party's demand to be in constant combat readiness and to vigilantly guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

In performing involved and responsible tasks, the personnel are steadily adding to the glorious traditions of the Air Defense Forces. These traditions arose in the far-off years when the air defense forces set up upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin repelled raids by enemy aviation on Petrograd, Moscow, Tula, Baku and other cities. Even then the personnel inscribed golden pages in the history of the Troops. In April 1918, the Red Army had around 200 antiaircraft artillery batteries and 12 air fighter detachments. Although at that time there was no ordered structure of air defense (only for the coverage of Petrograd was an air defense system set up which included 16 antiaircraft artillery batteries and 19 fighter aircraft) and coverage against air strikes for other major installations was organized solely for the period of immediate danger of air attack, the personnel of the air defense subunits successfully carried out the tasks posed for them and showed mass heroism. The pilots and antiaircraft gunners securely covered the troops on the battlefield and unstintingly repelled enemy air raids on the major centers of Soviet Russia. For combat accomplishments, the 2d and 3d antiaircraft batteries and an air fighter division were awarded the honorary revolutionary Red Banners of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], and hundreds of men were awarded high government decorations.

The Civil War ended victoriously. In peacetime the young socialist republic, the Land of Soviets, matured and grew stronger. The might of the world's first socialist state was created by the intense and inspired labor of the people who were united and led by the Communist Party along the path of socialist construction. New plants and factories went up, agriculture gathered force and new cities were built. But in the concerns of the great construction projects, the party never let its attention drop to the questions of strengthening the nation's defense capability, to improving the Armed Forces or raising their combat readiness.

The Air Defense Forces developed and grew stronger along with all the Armed Forces. They received new, most advanced equipment and in utilizing the acquired experience, improved the tactics of combat and increased their readiness to repel any enemy attack. Great importance was given to the ideological and political indoctrination of the personnel. The Communist Party and the Soviet government in showing exceptional concern for the development and strengthening of air defense, demanded that the commanders and political workers inculcate in the personnel a love for the motherland, courage and steadfastness, a readiness to overcome difficulties, to be ready to enter into a duel with a strong and perfidious enemy and to be able to conquer it.

During this period, new organizational forms and principles for the organization and use of the air defense forces were actively worked out and put into practice. For example, the nation's territory which was within the range of enemy aviation came to be viewed as a theater of military operations and prepared for air defense. The first Regulation Governing USSR Air Defense put into effect in 1928 by the Order of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs pointed out that air defense has the purpose of protecting the USSR against air attacks using for this purpose the resources belonging both to the military and civilian departments and the appropriate military social organizations.

In 1932, the leadership of the air defense system was entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs within which the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Defense Directorate was established. This, together with the air defense directorates set up in the military districts made it possible to provide direct leadership over the combat training of the personnel and to raise their capacity for decisive combat operations to a new, higher level. National air defense in fact became an independent part of the Armed Forces.

The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars], in showing constant concern for the strengthening of air defense and for providing the troops with a sufficient amount of weapons and equipment as well as highly educated and ideologically tempered personnel, demanded the maintaining of the highest level of readiness to carry out the tasks of providing a cover for the installations against enemy air strikes both in the border zone as well as in the interior of the nation's territory. This demand was emphasized also in the Decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK "On Strengthening USSR Air Defense." In accord with it, an order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense entitled "On the Dividing of the Territory into Air Defense Zones, Regions and Points" was issued. Each zone was to include air defense formations and units which carried out the tasks of covering the cities and installations. A number of other measures was also carried out aimed at improving the organization of air defense.

The thorough preparedness made it possible for the air defense forces from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War to successfully carry out the tasks confronting them. The correctness of the previously undertaken measures was affirmed. Technically well-equipped and trained to combat the strong enemy, the air defense forces not only withstood the strong strikes by the Nazi German air forces, having basically ensured the survival of the covered installations, but also caused the enemy significant losses.

The air defense personnel carried out difficult and responsible tasks in repelling raids by Nazi aviation against Moscow and the Moscow Economic Region, in the battle for Leningrad, in the operations to defend other major industrial and economic centers of the nation and to protect the rail and water lines of communications against air strikes.

History has preserved many examples of the true heroism of the defenders of our motherland's skies. The battles to defend Moscow have been inscribed in it as a special, golden page. The Nazis made numerous attempts to break through to the capital from the air. Nazi aviation made its first massed raid on 22 July 1941. Some 220 bombers approached Moscow, counting on attacking with impunity. The enemy encountered on its path an impenetrable barrage fire. Having lost 22 aircraft in the fierce engagement, the Nazis were forced to abandon their enterprise.

During the entire war, Nazi aviation made massed raids against the major rail and water lines of communications, station facilities and bridges, but it did not succeed in paralyzing the work of rail transport or navigation or disrupt the supply of the front with ammunition and food.

An exceptionally important role was played by the formations in the first operational echelon of the air defense forces to cover the rail and water lines of communications in the zone of the front.

In a combat situation, the air defense troops often had to carry out tasks involving the covering of ground forces. They showed mass heroism in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battles for the Dnepr and the Caucasus and in the crucial battles for Berlin. When the situation so required, the antiaircraft gunners by direct laying destroyed enemy tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry.

The Soviet Command skillfully organized the cooperation of the nation's air defense forces with the troops of the front. The solving of the urgent questions in this cooperation, that is, the organizing of a unified system of the air observation, warning and communications system and so forth contributed to the effective achieving of the goals of the strategic operations.

All the branches of troops and USSR Armed Services participated in destroying the combat equipment and weapons of the Nazi army. The air defense forces also made a significant contribution to the victory over the enemy. They destroyed more than 7,300 enemy aircraft, over 1,000 tanks, around 1,500 guns and mortars and much other equipment.

The fatherland rightly praised the glorious feats of its sons. Over 80,000 air defense troops received orders and medals and 92 of the most courageous received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The names of many who fell in battles have been entered in perpetuity in the rolls of the troop units.

The party political work carried out effectively in the units and subunits under any conditions and in any situation was an important means for mobilizing the air defense troops to successfully carry out the tasks confronting them, to strengthen troop morale, to instill in the personnel courage and steadfastness and to temper them ideologically. The commanders, the political workers,

the party and Komsomol organizations, considering the specific features of alert duty, the diversity of the air defense resources and the unique disposition of the units and subunits by all measures saw to it that each man understood the goals and nature of the war, the tasks confronting him, that he carried out his duty courageously and with all responsibility and showed high combat activeness.

The communists played a major role in instilling in the young soldiers courage and valor, the ability to overcome the hardships of frontline life as well as in uniting the military collectives. They conducted active explanatory work among comrades and fellow servicemen, sharing with them the joy of victories and the bitterness of failure and by personal example demonstrate how the enemy must be fought. They were the first to carry out the most difficult assignments, leading the others.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War has underlain the subsequent intense improvement of the Air Defense Forces. The Communist Party and the Soviet government, in showing constant concern for raising the defense capability of our socialist state, have increased the combat might of the Army and Navy, including the Air Defense Forces. This has been necessitated by the international situation which is characterized by intense enemy propaganda against the USSR as carried out actively by the imperialist states as well as by the intensity with which the air attack weapons have been improved in the capitalist countries. Military bases and staging areas have been created around the USSR and the other socialist states. All of this, naturally, could not help but cause concern and force us to adopt decisive measures to strengthen air defense in every possible way. Here consideration was given to the capabilities of the air attack weapons in the most developed capitalist countries. New air defense weapons were developed and its entire system improved. It has become deeper, multiecheloned and more maneuverable.

In the 1950's, the air defense fighter aviation was rearmed with jet fighters while the antiaircraft artillery received new antiaircraft artillery complexes. The VNOS [Air Observation, Warning and Communications] Troops received radar equipment and began to be called the Radio-Technical [Radar] Troops.

Substantial organizational changes also occurred at this time. The National Air Defense Forces became an independent Armed Service.

At present, the Air Defense Forces are supplied with everything necessary for successfully carrying out the tasks related to the prompt detection of an air attack, and to destroying the existing and future targets at various altitudes, in bad weather, with heavy enemy radio electronic countermeasures and at the distant approaches to the defended installations. The organizational structure of air defense makes it possible to successfully conduct combat operations in close cooperation with all branches of troops including antiaircraft missile, air defense aviation and radio-technical.

With the high technical equipping of the troops, a special role is played by the professional training of the men controlling the weapons, machinery, instruments and mechanisms, by their organization and discipline. For this reason, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations

show constant concern so that each man knows the weapons and equipment assigned to him perfectly, keeps them in an exemplary state and is able to control them under the most complex situation and to quickly take correct decisions.

The results of last year and the first months of the current one make it possible to conclude that the personnel of the Air Defense Forces are steadily moving from line to line in their combat improvement, they are constantly achieving ever-new successes in the socialist competition and are successfully carrying out the tasks confronting them.

The personnel of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Kutuzov and Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Smolensk Guards Air Defense Antiaircraft Missile Regiment under the command of Guards Lt Col V. Nechayev have worked intensely and fruitfully, they have successfully carried out the tasks set for them as well as the adopted socialist obligations and have achieved a further rise in combat readiness and a strengthening of discipline. The regiment's personnel has come out with a patriotic initiative to develop a socialist competition in the Air Defense Forces under the motto "To Raise Vigilance and to Dependably Ensure the Security of the Motherland!" For the men of the regiment it has become a rule that having won one goal, they set for themselves a new, higher one, in increasing the successes in the socialist competition, in carefully utilizing training time and in devoting all their efforts to mastering the equipment, to improving combat skills and to the struggle for thriftiness and savings.

The regiment's initiative has been widely supported in the Air Defense Forces. Following its example, all the collectives have actively joined the socialist competition. Many of them are presently gladdening the motherland with remarkable accomplishments in carrying out the most responsible tasks.

To learn to live and carry out one's military duty in a Leninist, communist manner, to be constantly ready to carry out the combat tasks, to stand alert duty in defending the air frontiers of the motherland vigilantly and with high evaluations, to shorten the time required to ready the equipment and weapons for combat, to carry out all training tasks with grades of "excellent" and "good" and the tactical exercises with field firing with a grade of "excellent"--this is the goal for the men in many subunits. The personnel have initiated an active struggle to increase the teamwork of the crews, the subunits and the combat control bodies, to study and introduce advanced experience and a high quality of repairs, as well as a competition for the title of the best specialist in the battery, battalion or regiment. Universities of technical knowledge, lecture series and technical circles are active in the troops, military-technical conferences and the exchange of advanced experience in the use and operation of equipment and weapons are being organized. All of this has made it possible for the men to effectively improve their professional knowledge and skills. Of enormous importance for the Air Defense Forces is the preparation of the subunits and units to destroy targets at all altitudes, including at maximum low ones, as well as when the targets employ all types of evasive maneuvers and intensive jamming. Considering this, the commanders of the antiaircraft missile units are teaching the personnel to skillfully select the moment of launching the missiles depending upon the nature and method of the target's actions and to accurately hit maneuvering aircraft in the upper and lower limits of the combat capabilities of the missile complexes.

Of great importance for increasing the combat readiness of air defense is the skill of the pilots in locating targets by various methods and the ability to counter groups of aircraft, including those covered by fighters and to hit the enemy on the first attack. The pilots are being taught this steadily and effectively.

Service in the Air Defense Forces is difficult and responsible. It demands from each officer, warrant officer ["praporshchik"], sergeant and soldier high special, physical and psychological preparedness. These qualities, as is known, do not arise spontaneously, but are formed in the process of combat and political training and by active and effective ideological work. The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations give great attention to the ideological tempering of the personnel, they indoctrinate the men in a spirit of modern demands, they constantly improve the forms and methods of ideological and political indoctrination with the men and work for a high level of it. Each measure should leave a noticeable trace in the conscience of the officer, warrant officer, sergeant or soldier and arouse in him a desire to perform his duty as well as possible and to devote all his energy to the assigned job. The organizers of party political work proceed from this.

The greater effectiveness of ideological and political indoctrination is significantly influenced by the involvement of the leadership in it, by the purposeful and active work of the agitation and propaganda collectives and groups, by the constantly strengthening ties with the local party and soviet bodies, enterprises and institutions, by regular meetings with the party and soviet leaders, the pacesetters in production and agriculture and scientists, as well as by excursions to plants and factories and to scientific research institutions.

The political studies of the warrant officers and the political exercises for the sergeants and soldiers are organized on a high level, while there are now more diverse forms for propagandizing the glorious combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Air Defense Forces, each unit, the successes of communist construction in our nation, the labor feats of the Soviet people who are carrying out the new five-year plan outlined by the party.

The ties of the personnel with the men of the air defense units and subunits from the fraternal armies are broadening and becoming stronger. In joint exercises, teamwork in actions is acquired while advanced experience is studied and actively introduced. The most rational procedures are worked out in servicing and employing the combat equipment and weapons.

All of this, naturally, helps to make each serviceman successfully develop in himself high moral-combat qualities, a desire to strictly observe the standards of communist morality, to value the honor of his collective, to strengthen friendship and military comradeship, to struggle for proper military order and for a thrifty attitude toward the equipment, weapons and other materiel.

Our motherland is successfully carrying out a gigantic program for economic and social development as outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress. It possesses powerful economic and scientific-technical potential as well as highly skilled and

ideologically tempered personnel. Soviet society excels in a healthy moral atmosphere and social optimism and a desire to make the greatest contribution to communist construction. For the air defense personnel this serves as a powerful source of inspiration and determination to achieve ever-new successes in carrying out the tasks confronting them.

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NEED FOR IMPROVED TRAINING FOR COMMAND PERSONNEL DISCUSSED

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[Article by Army Gen I. Gerasimov, Commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "To Increase the Effectiveness of Commander Training"]

[Text] The daily struggle to actually carry out the demands of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and to maintain the troops in constant readiness to immediately repel possible aggression and to decisively defeat the enemy under any conditions of its initiating of a war has become the main, determining direction in the military service and the competition of the men as well as in the organizational and indoctrinational work of the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs and party organizations.

The training results of last year and the first 3 months of the new training year confirm that weightier and more stable successes are achieved by those troop collective which are headed by competent, thoroughly trained commanders and where the level of officer professional training is higher. This is quite understandable. In any affair, and all the more in military affairs, a great deal depends upon the leader. Where the leader is up to the tasks, things go well. The effectiveness and quality of the combat and political training depend primarily upon the direct organizers of the training and indoctrinational process, that is, upon the commanders, political workers, staff officers and specialists of the branches of troops and services. Precisely they determine the quality of the mastery of the weapons and equipment by the personnel, their high combat training and discipline, that is, the complete preparation for modern combat.

The tasks of training and indoctrinating the personnel and improving the combat readiness of the units and formations are diverse and complex. In order to successfully carry them out, the officers must have a broad political viewpoint, they must master Marxist-Leninist methodology and firmly know the underlying concepts of the Communist Party and the demands of the USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Inherent to them should be a high sense of responsibility for the assigned job, competence, creative initiative, excellent organizational abilities, a feeling for the new, objectiveness and principledness in assessing what has been achieved. The political and professional maturity of the officer personnel

and above all commanders of all levels, is one of the indispensable conditions for high troop combat readiness. Commanders are rightly termed the creators and organizers of combat. It is very important that they be capable to actually justify their high purpose, that they be able to fight themselves and provide their subordinates with such knowledge.

War under present-day conditions, if the imperialists initiate it, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, will place incomparably higher demands on the men than all previous wars. It will require skilled actions on the battlefield under the conditions where the enemy employs weapons of mass destruction and other powerful weapons, the ability to endure enormous moral and physical stress as well as high psychological strength. It requires those methods of actions which would make it possible to deal the enemy a decisive defeat with fewer forces, and much else.

In considering all of this, the district military council, the political directorate and staff are paying the closest attention to improving the quality of commander training. The developing in the district command and political personnel of a profound understanding of the vital need to be closely concerned with solving the given problem has been aided by a discussion of this problem at meetings of the military council, commander assemblies, meetings of the party aktiv as well as a practical scientific conference. Certainly, it would not be an exaggeration to say that a predominant majority of the generals and officers from the district leadership, the commanders and chiefs of the political bodies, the staffs of the units and formations are closely involved with seeking out the ways, reserves and opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of commander training.

In accord with the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense, the district troops have done significant work to improve the organization and enrich the content of commander training and to give it clearer systematicness, periodicity and effective focus. By the common efforts of the officers from the staff and the political directorate and the combat training directorate, a rational balance has been sought in the theory and practice in various subjects of commander training and variations for a rational combination of all actually tested forms and methods for the training and indoctrination of officers.

After the Sixth All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries, the party committees and bureaus began to delve more boldly into the sphere of commander training. In being concerned with having the communists set an example and be responsible, they increased the demands placed on their training, they have generalized and disseminated advanced experience more effectively, they have responded more acutely and directly to the shortcomings and have worked steadily to eliminate them.

What changes for the better have occurred in commander training? If one considers that in the not distant past in certain units and formations of the district there were serious omissions, at present the number of such collectives has significantly declined. As a whole, the level has risen for the professional training of the officers, and the time assigned for this has begun to be used more productively. For every month the district works out a calendar plan for commander training and for the various categories of command personnel this sets the days and weeks of exercises in such a manner that the principle of the

"superior instructs the subordinate" is observed and that there be no hitches and overlaps in the measures carried out on the divisional, regimental and battalion levels. This calendar is utilized in the units and formations in planning commander training in considering the specific features of the tasks carried out by them, the nature and conditions of combat training activities. The methodological recommendations worked out by the district staff and combat training directorate help the leadership of the units and formations in more precisely planning and carrying out officer training.

The commander assemblies held in the district prior to the start of the training year have played a positive role in disclosing for their participants the tasks in the area of commander training and the demands placed on this. The assemblies generalized and examined in detail the advanced experience of the best leaders of commander instruction and a series of demonstration exercises and instruction-procedural drills were held in the course of which the unit commanders added to their knowledge and skills in planning, in the organizational methods and logistical support for the various forms of instruction. How to bring this instruction as close as possible to a real combat situation and how to teach the officers to take enterprising, bold and decisive actions or learn the art of close and continuous control of the forces was demonstrated to them, for example, at a demonstration tactical exercise involving field firing and conducted on the base of the tank battalion under the command of Guards Maj N. Koyankin.

At the subsequently held thorough analysis, the demonstrated method for preparing and conducting the exercises was recommended for introduction in the units. Here particular attention was paid to the organizing of combat. In particular, particular mention was made of the prompt setting of tasks for the battalion and the attached subunits of the various branches of troops, the providing of initiative and independence for the commander in working out a plan and organizing cooperation, a high pace of advance, the skillful use of weapons for hitting the most dangerous targets at maximum ranges and the immediate use of the results of fire strikes by a rapid attack of the subunits. Also pointed out was the well-thought-out organization of party political work which ensured the decisive actions of the personnel and the achieving of victory by them in training combat. The most experienced generals and officers spoke to the participants of the assemblies giving reports on the program and procedure of commander training.

In working directly in the units and formations, the generals and officers from the staff and the directorates as well as from the district branches of troops and services provided practical aid to the commanders and political workers in planning and organizing the professional training of the officers as well as in improving the quality of the exercises, the seminars, the tactical quizzes and group exercises.

In organizing the work of accelerating the professional development of the officers, we proceed from the view that the command and political personnel of the district are politically mature persons, with a strong communist ideology and the necessary ideological-theoretical, military-technical and pedagogical knowledge obtained in military schools and academies. The system of commander training which has come into being in the Armed Forces has made it possible for

them to constantly deepen this knowledge and to develop in themselves firm practical skills of carrying out service duties both in the position held as well as in a position a step higher. The entire question is to best utilize the rich opportunities of the given system so that the officers show a responsible attitude toward increasing the level of their ideological-theoretical and military-technical training as well as to improving the political, professional and moral qualities and organizational abilities.

In realizing that the task of improving the quality and effectiveness of commander training is carried out chiefly in the units and formations, the district military council, political directorate and staff exercise control over and provide specific aid for the leadership of the formations and units in the question of its personal involvement in the training and indoctrination of their subordinates, that is, in the systematic personal conducting of exercises with them. This provides an opportunity to more rapidly disseminate the experience of the advanced leaders, to make a check on the execution of the demands of the USSR minister of defense and the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces and to strengthen responsibility for shortcomings.

In the district there is a number of units where they show a serious and responsible attitude toward commander training and where its organizational and qualitative level is constantly being raised. Among such troop collectives one could put the units in which Officers V. Dudinov, N. Vlasenko, I. Spiridonov and others serve. With the existing differences and specific features of the experience acquired in these units, they have much that is in common and instructive for others. Above all, this is the practical focus of commander training and the rational use of collective and individual forms and methods of instruction in it. The unit commanders here are personally involved in organizing commander training. Together with the political workers and staffs, in relying on the active aid of the party organizations, they ensure precise planning and a differentiated approach to the instruction of the various officer categories as well as their comprehensive training as leaders and indoctrinators.

In remembering that profound ideological conviction and a broad ideological-theoretical viewpoint are the core of officer professional maturity, the designated units are properly concerned with their political growth. Lectures and reports are given regularly to the officers on the urgent questions of the theory and policy of the Communist Party, on the most crucial problems of the contemporary and greatly aggravated military-political situation in the world. These same questions are brought up at theoretical colloquiums and scientific-practical conferences.

A rise in the ideological and organizational-procedural level of officer Marxist-Leninist training has been achieved by the common efforts of the commanders, political bodies and party organizations. This has been aided by having the officers study the works of V. I. Lenin and the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the decisions of the 26th Party Congress of the CPSU Central Committee as well as the documents and materials from the joint ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Lenin's legacy and the general party ideas and demands, as a rule, are examined

in terms of the tasks being carried out by the units and the tasks in the practical activities of the officers. They are becoming more profoundly aware of their role and place in carrying them out. The constant broadening of the ideological-theoretical viewpoint of the commanders and political workers has told positively on their responsibility for the assigned job and has made it possible for them to isolate the chief questions in their work and to more effectively train and indoctrinate their subordinates.

Professionalism and a practical focus can also be clearly seen in these units in the questions of improving the tactical-weapons and military-technical training of the officers, with this training comprising the basis of field skills. Almost one-half of the time assigned for commander training is employed here for improving the tactical training of the officers and for acquainting them with the nature and particular features of modern defensive and offensive combined-arms combat. A majority of the commander exercises and drills is conducted in the field and at training centers. On the basis of the profound assimilation of the provisions of the troop regulations, the instructions and manuals on combat training and the recommendations of Soviet military science, the officers work out their practical skills in organizing combat operations and controlling their own, attached and supporting subunits and their fire in all types of combat. In the course of group exercises and in tactical quizzes conducted on the spot with the regular control and command equipment and a designated enemy, the commanders of the battalions, companies, batteries and platoons master the experience of effectively employing all types of weapons and combat equipment, organizing reconnaissance and cooperation among the men and weapons, and fire damage to various targets; with a rigid time limit they learn to quickly analyze and assess the situation, to take sound decisions and clearly give assignments to subordinates. Here proper attention is paid to instructing the officers in actions for the position a step higher than the one held, and this strengthens their interest in achieving high indicators for commander training and heightens the feeling of responsibility.

Of important significance is the fact that the leaders of commander training are endeavoring to strictly observe the principle of teaching what is required in war and to bring the exercises and drills as close as possible to the conditions of real combat. They are endeavoring not to hinder the creative initiative of the officers by excessive interference, but are encouraging them to seek out, to show boldness and decisiveness in the dynamic, rapidly changing situation of combat training.

The staffs have a large role to play in increasing the effectiveness of commander training. As the basic command and control body on which the commander relies in planning and organizing the training process and in providing supervision and a check on execution, the staff must ensure clarity and coordination in the work of all elements of the troop collective and provide the officers with advanced methods for conducting the exercises, training and drills. In this regard, the staff of the unit headed by Lt Col A. Yershov merits a good word. Here the approach to the training and indoctrination of officer personnel meets today's requirements. Commander training is planned not only in accord with the tasks being carried out by the unit as well as the instructions and recommendations of superior chiefs and superior staffs, but also considering the overall skill level of the various officer categories and the failings and shortcomings

which previously existed. As a rule, the subjects of the exercises, drills, quizzes and group exercises are those which the subunit commanders will later work out with their subordinates. Here particular attention is paid to the training of the exercise leaders. They are instructed and helped in clearly establishing the training goals and in taking a number of training questions which in the time assigned for the exercise can be worked out effectively.

It is also valuable that the field exercises, the drills and group exercises on the spot are preceded by demonstration and instructor-procedural exercises where the officers become acquainted with the advanced methods of organizing training and acquire practice in selecting and employing the most effective pedagogical procedures and variations for effectively utilizing training time and the equipment.

In checking on execution, the staff officers actively aid the combat training leaders in creating a professional-like and dynamic situation in the exercises and they generalize and then disseminate advanced experience. In particular, the subunit commanders have undoubtedly benefited from the experience passed on to them in the able organization of the exercises for the commanders carried out by Maj S. Kalinin.

The contribution of the political bodies and party organizations to the struggle for improving the quality of commander training in the district troops is becoming evermore tangible. A majority of our officers are communists. For this reason, party influence both on the organizers and leaders of commander training as well as on the trainees contributes to a more responsible attitude toward the job on the part of the men and hence to improving the work itself. The political bodies and party organizations, in participating in the elaboration and fulfillment of the commander training plans, in the process of this strengthen political, moral and legal indoctrination. They do a great deal to explain to the officers the party's policy and decisions, to develop their sociopolitical effectiveness, to have the commanders and political workers master the Leninist style of work and to increase the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training, combat training and the competition. Upon their initiative, the units and formations have set up permanent seminars, schools of advanced experience, lecture series on the questions of pedagogics and psychology as well as the practical training and indoctrination of the men. In studying here, the officers deepen their ideological-theoretical, military-technical and pedagogical knowledge and become acquainted with the last achievements of military scientific thought as well as the instructive examples and work methods of the leading commanders.

On this level, we would like to point out the active and effective work carried out by the political section and party organizations of the district staff and directorates and the political section and party organization of the staff and directorate of the formation where Lt Col V. Levada is the party bureau secretary and the party committee of twice order-winning outstanding tank regiment where Maj V. Chos serves. In carrying out the demands of the 26th Party Congress, the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the recommendations of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, they work steadily to have the communists set an example in service,

training, discipline and establishing in the officer collectives professionalism, responsibility, organization and implacability for shortcomings. For achieving this they employ party meetings and general officer assemblies, they hear reports and papers by the communists at the sessions of the party committees and bureaus, individual colloquiums, assemblies and seminars for commanders and political workers, secretaries and party activists, party assignments and other forms of party political work.

The party organization headed by Lt Col V. Levada, in working in close contact with the formation commander and chief of staff, pays particular attention to raising the level of operational-tactical, military-technical and procedural training for the officers and to improving the style of their activities in the troops. The party bureau exercises constant supervision over the independent work of the communists and over their fulfillment of the individual commander training plans and the socialist obligations and at the party meetings brings up the questions of the authority and responsibility, the activist position in life and the unity of word and deed of the CPSU members. As a consequence of this, more than 90 percent of the staff officers is high class specialists. A majority of them excels in a high level of staff work, efficiency, a feeling for the new and principledness. The staff communists take an active part in working out the procedural aids and recommendations, in generalizing and disseminating the experience of the leading commanders and political workers; they help the commanders and staffs of the units in organizing effective training for the officer personnel as well as supervision and checks on execution.

The party committee and organization of the twice order-winning tank regiment where for the third year running the personnel has initiated a socialist competition in the district has succeeded in creating in the party collective an atmosphere of professionalism and a focusing on major goals. It has succeeded in inculcating in the communist officers a high sense of responsibility for professional training and the carrying out of service duties. The party committee members and the party activists from the subunits, in themselves setting an example in performing party and military duty, have demanded from each communist a conscientious attitude toward service, toward the training and indoctrination of subordinates and toward social work. At one time, the party committee placed great demands on the CPSU member and deputy regimental commander for the rear services, Lt Col Yu. Miroshnikov, for oversights in logistical support for commander training in the field. On an individual level, the party committee closely analyzed the work style of the communists who were chiefs of the branches of troops and services and the subunit commanders and promptly corrected those who had permitted mistakes, negligence, weaknesses and oversimplification in the training process. All of this, of course, left its mark.

Troop practice has convincingly shown that where the tasks of commander training are carried out professionally by the common efforts of the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs and the party organizations and where the effectiveness of this training is high, the officers can skillfully organize the training and indoctrinational process, they can instill firm proper order and thoroughly prepare their subordinates for modern combat. It is quite natural that the units and formations mentioned above are successfully carrying out their training plans and programs as well as the socialist obligations and are leading in the competition under the motto "Increase Vigilance and Reliably Ensure the Security of the Motherland!"

Unfortunately, this is not the case everywhere. In individual troop collectives, the quality of commander training as yet leaves much to be desired. For example, in the units where Officers N. Minenko and V. Yermashov serve, as in the other units, commander exercises and drills are carried out and all forms of professional officer training are utilized, but the return from the training as yet, we must say frankly, has been low. In inspection checks of the subunits, individual commanders have shown poor knowledge of the military regulations and manuals as well as low tactical skill and they have been unable to organize reconnaissance or an effective fire plan or firmly control the men and weapons.

Why has this happened? Primarily because the tactical quizzes and group exercises on the spot are often carried out by routine following the customary plan. In the exercises a difficult tactical situation is not created requiring decisiveness and boldness from the commanders; there are many weaknesses, oversimplifications and conditionalities permitted. The commanders and political workers from these units have reduced the exactingness on the quality of preparing and conducting training measures and proper supervision is not exercised over the independent training of the officers. The commander training groups include officers with different training levels and this is not always considered in planning and conducting the exercises. There are also shortcomings in these collectives because the senior chiefs and superior staffs have not studied the state of affairs with sufficient profoundness, they exercise little checks on execution and do little to help the commanders and political workers from the units in establishing effective officer training. All of this has had a negative effect also on the combat training of the personnel and as a whole on field skills.

Certain party organizations also lack militancy, purposefulness and principledness on the questions of ensuring the vanguard role of the communists in commander training. For example, in the party organizations where N. Tomashov, A. Ivanov, V. Kuznetsov and I. Fedorayev are CPSU members, at the party meetings and sessions of the party committees and bureaus much is said about the need to strengthen party influence on the quality of commander training and decisions are adopted obliging the communists to "strengthen," "improve," or "raise" the level of work. But there is no check either on the strengthening or the improvement. Individual communist officers do not bother themselves with independent preparation, they are negligent about increasing their ideological-theoretical level and bring up the rear at the seminars on Marxist-Leninist training. Due to the fault of certain communist leaders, the training and drills for the officers are at times of poor quality, with oversimplifications and weaknesses. And there is no true party exactingness for all of this. Obviously, in the designated party organizations the proper conclusions have not been drawn from the instructions of the November Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that slogans and appeals alone will not get things moving, but specific organizational work is also required. Undoubtedly, this shows the insufficient leadership by the political bodies over the activities of the party organizations.

Of course, the military council and the political directorate have responded to such instances. Officers N. Minenko, V. Yermashov and others had to answer for the oversights in commander training at a session of the military council.

We focused the command and political personnel as well as the party organizations on increasing organization, discipline and responsibility of the leaders and on the effective use of all the reserves and opportunities for improving commander training. The district troops do have many such reserves and opportunities. Let me mention just a few of them.

Increased effectiveness from commander training is inconceivable without improved individual work. It is important that the commander and the chief of a political section in a formation be directly concerned with the professional development of the regimental commanders. In turn, the regimental commander and his deputy for political affairs must instruct the battalion and company commanders and the latter teach the platoon commanders. They are instructed in the course of combat training, becoming officers under conditions which require from them a profound knowledge of the nature of modern combat and the ability to organize and direct it.

It is important to more fully utilize the socialist competition in the aim of raising the operational-tactical, military-technical and special training as well as the educational skills of the officers and involve them in military-scientific, research and invention work. But what at times still happens? For years, a communist officer or an officer who is a Komsomol member may remain second or even third class, while his contemporaries have already become masters of military skills, but yet no demands are placed on such devotees of an easy life.

We must in every possible way strengthen supervision and the check on execution in light of the party's present demands and particularly supervision over the independent training of the officers where there is still the most drift and laxness which give rise to irresponsibility and the marking of time. Here it must be remembered that the essence of supervision is in vital organizational and indoctrinational work, in an objective assessment of the state of affairs and exactingness, in eliminating shortcomings and the practical organizing of the job.

The generalizing, dissemination and actual introduction of the positive experience acquired in organizing commander training in the leading units requires closer attention, the more active and purposeful efforts by the district command and political personnel as well as the party and Komsomol organizations. In this important question it is essential to firmly follow the ideas of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. This means to be stricter with those who underestimate the new and the advanced, to patiently help the officers in mastering effective work and leadership methods and introducing all that is valuable and useful in the training and indoctrinational process.

To put it briefly, there are many tasks awaiting their resolution in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of commander training. The district command and political personnel intends to carry them out steadily and professionally, seeing in the professional maturity of the officers not an end in itself, but rather the main means and condition for further strengthening the combat readiness of the troops. In the future, we will continue to work so that each

officer and his subordinates be thoroughly and effectively prepared to carry out the combat tasks, to repel possible aggression and to securely defend the state interests of the motherland.

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VIEWS OF U.S. 'GOALS' IN INDIAN OCEAN DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 83 (signed to press 18 Feb 83) pp 83-87

[Article by Maj V. Roshchupkin: "The Pentagon: Sights on the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] Six B-52 strategic bombers having taken off from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, the United States, set course for the Near East. After a long flight the "Flying Superfortresses" made a bomb strike against previously designated targets and having turned around, headed back. Soon the air over this bomb-rutted area of desert terrain was again rent by the roar of aircraft engines. Slipping across the yellow sands were evil shadows dropped by American C-141 military transports, and hundreds of paratroopers from the 82d American Airborne Division, one after another began landing on the "battlefield." Tactical aircraft patrolled in the skies, covering the landing.

This was one of the episodes from the Bright Star Maneuvers, a large-scale exercise of the American Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF), conducted by the Pentagon together with the troops of Egypt, Somali, Sudan and Oman on the territory of a number of Arab states at the end of October and the beginning of December 1981. Up to 15,000 soldiers and officers were involved in the designated militaristic actions which cost around 60 million dollars. Personnel and military equipment were ferried from the United States by the Military Air Transport Command. In-flight fueling was carried out and American air bases on FRG territory were used as intermediate airfields. In a similar manner, F-16 and A-10 aircraft were moved from the United States to Egypt. In Oman, American Marines from U.S. Naval vessels stationed in the Indian Ocean worked on an amphibious landing in the aim of "capturing an important strategic point in the Persian Gulf Zone."

Seemingly, the Bright Star Exercise would be a question of the past and we might forget this "star" which has already died in the militaristic firmament. But at the end of last year, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean again became an arena of actions for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces. On the territory of the Sultanate of Oman, 2,500 American Marines who are part of the RDF, the Pentagon's police corps, again rehearsed a landing. And again the air was shaken by the roar of the fighters and strategic B-52 bombers capable, as is known, of carrying nuclear weapons. The Reuters Agency announced that in this exercise with the code name of "Jade Tiger" they worked on combat tactics in the area in the event of the arising there of a situation "unfavorable" for the United States.

The exercises Bright Star and Jade Tiger have much in common. Both were conducted in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean and both show the broadened military cooperation of the United States with the region's reactionary regimes and the growing American military expansion in the Persian Gulf Zone and the Indian Ocean as a whole. However, the attention of foreign reviewers was drawn to certain differences between the exercises. While the Bright Star Maneuvers, as was emphasized in the press, were accompanied by outright threats against the region's states which did not wish to follow in the channel of Washington's aggressive policy, the Pentagon's military games on the eve of 1983 were conducted under a cover of strict secrecy.

The nuclear aircraft carrier "Enterprise" from the U.S. Naval Grouping in the Indian Ocean as well as AWACS aircraft participated in the Jade Tiger Exercises. It should be particularly noted that the AWACS aircraft, in addition to electronic espionage, are capable of observing ground installations and carrying out the functions of flying command posts for the simultaneous control of several combat operations from the air. These aircraft, as has been pointed out in the Western press, have another, much more evil purpose, and that is to guide American nuclear missiles to targets....

Thus, the recent exercises of the Pentagon's RDF in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean are the next step in escalating U.S. aggressive preparations in the region. As was pointed out by certain foreign observers, the Jade Tiger Maneuvers were a "rehearsal of potential aggressors." In actuality, judging from the publications in the foreign press and from admissions which highly placed representatives of the American military department make from time to time, direct aggression in the region is not excluded in the Pentagon's strategic plans. "The mission entrusted to us has a global nature, but the Persian Gulf is at the center of our attention," said the commander of the RDF with soldierly frankness. "I would feel confident," he boasted, "even if war commenced tomorrow."

It is very indicative that along with the commander of the RDF, Gen R. Kingston, the Jade Tiger Exercises conducted on the territory of Oman and Somali were watched by the commander of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific Zone, Adm R. Long. It is precisely in the Pacific Theater of Military Operations (the Pentagon's terminology--V.R.), on Okinawa, where are stationed the units of American Marines which are armed to the teeth and highly trained and which comprise one of the attack detachments of the RDF. The admiral, judging from everything, in the exercise was judging how in the event of the unleashing of American aggression the Marines would be shifted from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

The American strategists are feverishly seeking out an opportunity to rapidly increase the sea and air means of transport for shifting the RDF to the Indian Ocean. As initial measures in this area, the U.S. military department has planned to purchase 50 gigantic CX transport aircraft and 15 naval vessels. In addition, 270 heavy C-141A military transports are to be modernized. Various types of weapons and military equipment are being specially developed for the RDF including firearms, tanks, communications and rocket launchers.

In the aim of increasing the readiness of the RDF for combat operations, the American authorities are hurriedly broadening the network of naval bases in the Indian Ocean Zone. The Pentagon has worked out a five-year plan (1981-1985) for the "strategic development" of the Indian Ocean and one of the aims of this is to create numerous military staging areas in this part of the world. There are plans to "shift the emphasis in planning and the use of the armed forces...to Southwestern Asia and the Indian Ocean." A colossal amount has been allocated to carry out the plan, around 30 billion dollars. In ignoring the demands of the coastal states to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the United States in this area has already created more than 25 bases and military installations at which around 140,000 American soldiers are stationed. Without being satisfied with the already-existing bases in Australia, Egypt, Oman, Kenya and Somali which would be used to support the RDF operations, the United States is endeavoring to involve Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Bangladesh, Djibouti and Sri Lanka in its base strategy in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan has become an object of particular attention for the Pentagon. Large amounts of weapons and supplies are being received here with the marking "Made in the USA." A portion of the American weapons is made available to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who have dug in at 80 camps and bases on Pakistan territory close to the Afghan frontier. Here military training is provided for the counterrevolutionary bands which are dropped into Afghanistan for carrying out terroristic and sabotage actions.

The lion's share of weapons coming to Pakistan from overseas goes to the army units. Just recently, Islamabad has received from the United States armored personnel carriers, antitank missiles, self-propelled artillery mounts and light cannons. The foreign press has stated that the Islamabad military regime plans to equip several new army units with these supplies.

The American military deliveries to Pakistan started under a major military-political deal concluded between Washington and Islamabad. This was carried out in the summer of 1981 and envisaged the providing of over 3 billion dollars of military assistance to Islamabad. In addition to weapons and equipment for the ground forces, there are plans to deliver combat helicopters and other weapons, primarily 40 modern F-16 fighter-bombers. The first batch of these aircraft was received in Pakistan in January of the current year. Clearly all of this increases the military threat to the countries in the northern part of the Indian Ocean since the F-16 aircraft can carry nuclear weapons and Islamabad, as has been repeatedly pointed out in the foreign press, with U.S. connivance is working full force on developing its own atomic bomb.

In December 1982, the head of the Pakistani military regime, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, paid a visit to Washington. In the course of it a deal was concluded in accord with which the United States was to supply Islamabad not only with modern types of offensive weapons, but also, as foreign publications have emphasized, is actually closing its eyes to the Pakistani development of nuclear weapons.

Many foreign observers have pointed out that in arming Islamabad, Washington is endeavoring to primarily intimidate Delhi. Let us recall that in a comparatively short period of time, twice--in 1965 and 1971--weapons marked "Made in the USA" were used against India. Such a policy by Washington, as was stated

by the Delhi weekly SECULAR DEMOCRACY, has been caused by the conviction that it is impossible to involve India in the U.S. global strategy. Another journal, DEMOCRATIC WORLD, in developing the same idea, has written: "India refuses to play the role of a state through which the United States could realize its interests."

The U.S. ruling circles in essence are complicating the situation along the entire perimeter around India. The U.S. militaristic injections for Pakistan, in serving as an outright challenge to the security of India's land frontiers are only a portion of Washington's efforts in this area. Delhi cannot discount either the policy of the Reagan Administration of militarizing the Indian Ocean or creating nuclear stockpiles in its basin. The placement of nuclear weapons on an ever-greater number of islands, pointed out I. Gandhi, makes the sea frontier of India which is some 6,000 km long just as vulnerable as the land one.

During an official visit to India in 1982, the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, said that the Soviet Union understands well the concern of India caused by the increased tension on its frontiers. In this regard, he emphasized, one cannot help but mention that threat to the cause of peace which is created by the growing militarization of the Indian Ocean Region. This threat derives from those who have declared areas located thousands of miles from their shores as a "sphere of vital interests." These same forces have attempted to block the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. From them also derives the real threat to stability in this vast region of the world.

In turning Pakistan into a major strongpoint for military expansion in the region, the United States has endeavored to establish itself there and bring to bear political and military pressure not only on India. The moving of Islamabad to the forefront in the Pentagon's "geopolitical" plans is certainly largely explained by its proximity to Afghanistan against which, as is known, an undeclared war is being waged. However, for the American strategists Pakistan is of equal importance as a potential base for conducting subversive actions against sovereign Iran. From Washington, voices have been raised arguing for "putting a little fear" into this country the people of which overthrew the Shah's regime, the puppet of American imperialism and the former supporter of its interests in the Near and Middle East. As the English newspaper THE TIMES has pointed out, it seems that Pakistan will play for the United States the same role which at one time was assigned to the Shah's Iran.

In actuality, the wagering on Pakistan as one of the basic military-political staging areas for the United States in the Indian Ocean Zone is far from accidental. After the collapse of the SEATO and CENTO Blocs and the downfall of the Shah's regime, Pakistan, as foreign political observers have pointed out, remains the only country which has kept its treaty obligations with Washington under the "Cooperation Agreement" which was concluded in 1959 and has a clearly expressed militaristic nature. At present, "with the rise of a new era in American-Pakistani relations, it is possible to speak about more effective control of the Persian Gulf and other vitally important points for the United States in this area," stated the Pentagon journal ARMED FORCES JOURNAL unambiguously.

The shadow of the American eagle whose predatory glance is focused on the Persian Gulf is assuming an evil shape, covering more and more of the Indian Ocean. The peoples of the region were profoundly alarmed by the information which was made available to the Indian press that in January 1983, Pakistan began constructing American electronic tracking bases. These are designed specially to collect espionage information and support the military operations of the American RDF in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. What does this give the Pentagon? A great deal. In the first place, the possibility of constantly keeping the coastal states in its sights. Secondly, as the Indian newspaper NAV BHARAT TIMES emphasizes, to land an assault force in any point of the region without preliminary air reconnaissance. And assault operations by the RDF, judging from the Bright Star and Jade Tiger exercises, are being worked on at full force....

Washington is endeavoring to reinforce its military-strategic positions in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean under the pretext of the myth about the "Soviet military threat" to this region. On the Potomac they have unambiguously been talking about a desire to create a "strategic agreement" in the area running from Pakistan to Egypt and focused against the USSR.

The strategists from the Potomac consider the Sri Lanka port of Trincomalee a tasty morsel. From here it is only a hand's throw to India and to the other countries of Southeast and Southern Asia. With good reason the Pentagon is not adverse to gaining access to this port. As the newspaper WASHINGTON POST has written, the Sri Lanka ports could become an ideal anchorage for U.S. naval ships.

Diego Garcia Island is being turned into the central, connecting link in the sinister network of American military installations in the Indian Ocean. This island is becoming the most important U.S. outpost in the Indian Ocean and a multipurpose base for the American Air Force, Navy and RDF. Here they have created berths for nuclear submarines with nuclear missiles and underground fuel and ammunition dumps have been built. The runway of the airfield has been lengthened to almost 4 km so that it could be utilized by the B-52 strategic bombers.

Military construction on Diego Garcia Island has assumed particularly broad scope since the second half of the 1970's, that is, soon after the collapse of American intervention in Vietnam. According to the data in the foreign press, stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons are stored on Diego Garcia. The fact that the American military can use these weapons in the region is proved by the special exercises and maneuvers of the RDF units on U.S. territory. The actions of the personnel in these exercises are worked out with the simulating of nuclear explosions and the soldiers were in protective gear. Here are the data from the journal JOURNAL OF COMMERCE: the Nuclear Planning Administration of the U.S. Defense Department is studying the consequences of nuclear explosions "for regions outside Europe with the main accent on the countries of Southwest Asia."

Thus, one can clearly hear the "nuclear accent" in the militaristic scream of the "hawks" from the Potomac which in concert declare the Persian Gulf to be a "sphere of their vitally important interests." Let us remember that in

addition to the atomic submarines and the B-52 strategic bombers, in this region the 80 ground attack planes can also carry nuclear weapons. They are part of the two carrier-based groups which number around 20 fighting ships assigned from the formations of the 6th (Mediterranean) and 7th (Pacific) operational fleets of the U.S. Navy. Up to 180 combat aircraft are based as a total on the American carriers plying the waters of the Indian Ocean.

The second addition of the book "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [From Whence the Threat to Peace Arises] prepared by competent Soviet bodies and published by Voenizdat states that the reinforcing of this armada is to be carried out chiefly by shifting the interventionist RDF into the area of the Near and Middle East. In order to shorten the time for increasing the grouping of its armed forces for operations in the Indian Ocean, the United States is constantly keeping 13 depot ships at Diego Garcia loaded with heavy equipment and supplies. These supplies are designed for 30 days of combat operations.

On the first day of 1983, the Pentagon presented the peoples of the region with a "New Year's Present": on 1 January in the United States the so-called "Central Command" ("Centcom") was created with headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. The plan for its creation was examined and approved by President R. Reagan. The "sphere of action" of the new command encompasses the enormous area of the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea as well as 19 states in the region, from Egypt in the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east and to Kenya in the south.

Placed at the disposal of the "Centcom" are the RDF, a carrier-based group covering the approaches to the Persian Gulf, airborne units and tactical air subunits, military bases on Diego Garcia, in Oman, Sumali, Kenya and certain other countries. One cannot help but note the following circumstance. As was recently admitted by the U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, a major role in accelerating the creation of "Centcom" was played by the "Falkland experience" of Great Britain which was confronted with the necessity of quickly shifting large forces into the area of combat operations against Argentina.

Why has the American military so earnestly endeavored to establish itself in the Indian Ocean? Why are intensive military preparations being continued here by the United States and its apprentices and why are extensive demonstrations of force carried out such as the Jade Tiger Exercises? The above-mentioned Adm Long, without beating around the bush, has stated the Pentagon's viewpoint about this region or more accurately the "aiming point": "We will maintain a constant naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future due to the great importance of this region for the United States and its allies." A new world war, threatens the commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe, Gen B. Rogers, if it should start, would break out on the line of the Near East--Persian Gulf--Indian Ocean.

The main reasons for the increased attention paid to the region by the American politicians and strategists lie in the following. First of all, it is a very rich treasurehouse of natural resources. Around 65 percent of the known supplies of oil and uranium are concentrated here, more than one-half of the gold reserves and virtually all the diamond output in the capitalist world. Over the last decade, U.S. imports of oil from Southwest Asia have increased by

approximately 1.5-fold and have reached 34 percent of the total oil imports. American investments in the region exceeded 10 billion dollars. Each year some 800 million tons of oil are transported along the searoutes from the Persian Gulf and this supplies 60 percent of the demand of Western Europe and 90 percent for Japan.

Thus, many foreign reviewers sum up, control over the minerals and petroleum first of all as well as of the searoutes running across the Indian Ocean, under the conditions of the energy crisis which has encompassed the West, has made it possible for Washington to keep a close rein on its allies and apprentices, without mentioning the ensuring of its own economic interests, primarily the interests of the defense-related monopolies. The U.S. press has specifically announced the plans to occupy the oil-producing states of the region. The Pentagon recently confirmed that the "Centcom" and RDF are "automatically focused on the oil fields."

Secondly, the forward lines of the very acute clash between the imperialist states and the young independent states of Southern Asia, East Africa and the Indian Subcontinent, between neocolonialism and the movement for social and national liberation, between the forces of international reaction and the forces of progress and democracy as a whole run along the infinite expanses of the Indian Ocean and along the shores of many states washed by its waters. These lines are invisible, but the echoes of the fierce clashes on them--class, political and military--are constantly being brought to us by the mass information media.

Thirdly, American imperialism is endeavoring to utilize military expansion in the Indian Ocean in order to disrupt the established strategic equilibrium on a global scale, to create a staging area or at least the threat of an attack on the Soviet Union from the south. The foreign press has pointed out, in particular, that American submarines based at Diego Garcia are capable of launching high-powered nuclear missiles at objects located thousands of miles from them.

In actuality, certain areas of the Indian Ocean Basin are rather close to the USSR. But they are very far from the United States. For this reason, the Pentagon strategists feel that the Indian Ocean and particularly the Arabian Sea is geographically an ideal line for the operations of American nuclear powered missile-carrying submarines "in attacking the central part of Russia." Thus, the United States is endeavoring to turn this vast zone into a new forward base area which threatens the Soviet Union from the south.

Certainly the USSR cannot tolerate the fact that regions of our nation are under the Pentagon's sights and that the imperialist circles have threatened the security and independence of states in the region which are friendly to us. Solidarity with the nations which have freed themselves of colonial suppression and with the peoples defending their independence have been and remains one of the fundamental principles in Soviet policy, as the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized in his speech at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet Union, along with the other countries of the socialist commonwealth and the influential political and social forces of the entire world, are working actively against the militarizing of the Indian Ocean and for turning it into a zone of peace. In December 1980, the USSR made proposals to normalize the situation in the Persian Gulf. Another Soviet peace initiative envisages the extension of confidence-building measures over a significant portion of the seas and oceans, particularly to regions where the most active seaways pass. The Indian Ocean is also among such regions. The joint Soviet-Indian Declaration signed during last year's official friendly visit to the USSR by the Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi contains an appeal to eliminate all the foreign military and naval bases existing in this region and to prevent the creation of new bases. The attempts to increase foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean are decisively condemned by the declaration.

"The main thing," stated the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States recently approved in Prague, "is that all in fact recognize the legitimate right of the people of each nation to settle their own internal affairs independently, without intervention from outside and on an equal basis to participate in international life; that all respect the independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state frontiers and observe the principle of the rejection of the use of force or the threat of force; that no power attempts to carry out a policy of hegemony or establishes 'spheres of interests' or 'spheres of influence'."

The peace-loving position of the USSR and the specific steps of the Soviet nation aimed at improving the situation in the vast region from the Near and Middle East to Southeast Asia raze to the ground the absurd fabrications of imperialist propaganda about the supposed "military threat" to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In attempting to justify the Pentagon's military preparations in the Indian Ocean Basin by referring to the mythical "Soviet threat," the Western specialists in "psychological warfare" have suffered a fiasco. The peoples in the region where there are around 40 states with a total population of over a billion people are becoming more and more aware from whence the real threat to the Indian Ocean derives. They are acting decisively against the dangerous U.S. course which is fraught with the most serious consequences for the fate of peace not only in Asia, but throughout the world.

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SOVIET BOOK ON NATURE OF WARS, ARMIES REVIEWED

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[Review by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor and Honored Scientist of the RSFSR Ye. Rybkin of the book "Osnovy marksistsko-leninskogo ucheniya o voyne i armii (Bases of Marxist-Leninist Teachings on War and the Army), a textbook for higher military schools by V. V. Serebryannikov, Voenizdat, 1982, 175 pp]

[Text] The military publishing house has published a book by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Maj Gen V. Serebryannikov entitled "The Bases of Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army," intended for the higher military schools.

The book has four chapters. The first chapter examines war as a sociopolitical phenomenon. The second describes the social character and types of wars of the modern era. The third acquaints readers with the origins and essence of the army and the fourth with the content and structure of the state's military might and also the basic laws of war.

Characterizing the theme of teaching on war and the army, the author defines it as a specific area of Marxist-Leninist theory on society which views its subject--war and the army--through the prism of their development patterns, reveals their class-political essence and content and so forth.

The author begins the examination of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon with a brief description of the Leninist principles of the analysis of war. On the essence of war, he demonstrates its profound inner ties with politics. Of great interest are the ideas on war as a qualitatively special condition of society and on the demarcation between the concepts of war and military conflict where the borders between them are very mobile and sometimes hypothetical.

The sections in Chapter 1 which reveal the resources, root and derivative causes and the patterns of the emergence of modern wars merit attention. The author has defined with clarity the dialectic of the correlation between war and social progress and war and revolution.

Great attention is paid to the criticism of imperialism (particularly U.S. imperialism) as a source of wars and the main hotbed in which lurks the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Concluding Chapter 1 with an expose of the U.S. concept of "military superiority," the author cites 26th CPSU Congress documents which stress that the "prevailing military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO objectively serves to maintain peace in our world. We have not sought and will not seek military superiority over the other side. This is not our policy. But nor will we allow such superiority to be established over us. It is absolutely futile to make such attempts or to speak to us from a position of strength."

The book's analysis of the social character and types of wars in the modern era also begins by outlining the principles of the study and classification of wars. Of the various criteria, the sociopolitical criterion is first and foremost in full accordance with Marxist-Leninist methodology. Making broad use of Lenin's legacy, the author demonstrates the criterion of the social character of wars which makes it possible to subdivide them into two categories--the just and unjust. This criterion, in his opinion, reflects the causes, political content, means of waging and ultimate results of war and its influence on social progress. The inclusion of this criterion of the means of waging war is debatable, to say the least. Of course, offensive, defense, diversionary and other methods of waging war are linked with war's social character and are dictated to a great extent by its political aims, but cannot determine them. Thus, of necessity, the just war should not be defensive in the strategic sense. This was clearly said by K. Marx and V. I. Lenin.

The book also takes into account the fact that not all wars in history were or are entirely progressive or reactionary. Many have not only contradictory but even dual characters. That character can change and become its complete opposite. "A nationalist war can become an imperialist war and vice versa," V. I. Lenin wrote.

The pages which provide a typology of wars in the modern epoch merit special attention. The author points out that the concept "type of war" is distinguished by the fact that it indicates the connection between war and the specific historical conditions, basic social relations and contradictions of the epoch, as well as characterizing war as a whole as a unified process of bilateral confrontation.

The book examines four types of war and points out that they all correspond to the chief antagonistic contradictions of the epoch; between the two opposing sociopolitical systems--socialism and capitalism; between the proletariat and the working masses and the monopoly bourgeoisie and the forces of extreme reaction within modern antagonistic societies; between the peoples struggling for freedom and independence and the imperialist colonialists and neocolonialists; between the states of the capitalist system.

It goes on to point out that the presence of antagonistic contradictions in the modern world does not lead automatically to wars. A complex dynamic struggle is being waged around the trends which give rise to wars, the sources of which lie within imperialism. Socialism is the chief obstacle in the path of the forces unleashing wars. There are also a number of other social forces which oppose the aggressive aspirations of all sorts of reactionary circles, including in imperialist countries themselves.

The book views a possible world nuclear war between the two opposing sociopolitical systems as a disastrous phenomenon which would do irrevocable harm to all mankind. Only people with an irresponsible attitude toward the destiny of historical progress, the author emphasizes, can maintain that nuclear is "not so terrible" and certainly will not mean the end of civilization.

The CPSU and the Soviet government have repeatedly set forth their viewpoint on the inadmissibility of nuclear war as an instrument of politics. The Soviet Union has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

It should, however, be pointed out that, while rightly pointing to the change in the essence of wars--not only from the development of its political content, but also from the emergence of new types of weapons--the author has avoided answering the second part of the question. The thesis of now the creation of nuclear missile weapons has influenced the essence of war has remained undisclosed.

Unfortunately, no room has been found in this chapter or in the book generally for criticism of bourgeois teachings and, in particular, of militarist and pacifist views on the essence of war involving means of mass destruction.

The limited scope of the textbook does not permit any detailed criticism of these views, of course, nevertheless I believe that the bankruptcy of the fundamental contemporary bourgeois theories on war--naturalistic (particularly psychobiological and neo-Malthusian), religious (primarily Islamic and Judaic) and technicoindustrialist--ought to be exposed. The characteristics of contemporary U.S. geopolitical concepts, called upon to justify the principles of "geographical escalation" and the spread of U.S. "power pressure" in practically all parts of the world, should definitely be given.

When dealing with the current antiwar movement in bourgeois countries, emphasis must be placed on the ideological delimitation which is taking place in the sphere of the bourgeois consciousness as regards attitudes to war.

In describing civil wars and wars of peoples for their national independence, the author raises the question of assistance rendered to the struggling peoples from outside. In our time, the classes and peoples fighting for social and national freedom receive support from all progressive forces, and most assuredly from the Soviet Union which, like other socialist countries considers this assistance as the fulfillment of its international duty. The imperialists want the USSR and the other socialist countries to stop rendering assistance to the victims of aggression. The author writes, however, this will never happen, especially as the imperialists themselves have trammled the world with networks of various types of alliances and agreements on assistance to reactionary forces and regimes all over the world. The siding of the United States with Great Britain in the Anglo-Argentine conflict, and the extension of the reactionary activities of NATO to the South Atlantic once more convincingly exposed the true nature of this aggressive bloc.

Briefly discussing the possibility of wars between capitalist states, the author also mentions armed clashes between developing countries. These wars should,

obviously, be discussed in greater detail since they have become by no means accidental phenomenon in our times.

The reader will find the specific features of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland explained in the concluding part of the second chapter.

The question of the origins and essence of the army as the main and specific instrument of war and indispensable element of modern states in well argued and expounded in detail. The impact of armies on social processes has always been great and has intensified further in current conditions. The problems of the nature, purpose, role and position of armies in the life of society have become the object of acute ideological struggle.

The class essence of the army, stemming from the social role and nature of the state is revealed in a comprehensive and substantive fashion, and the diametrically opposed nature of socialist and bourgeois armies from this point of view is emphasized. While imperialist armies are an instrument of reactionary policy directed against the interests of progress, socialist armies uphold the interests of the most progressive society and serve a progressive and just policy. In this context: the false bourgeois doctrine of the political "neutrality" of the army propagandized by the exploiting class ideologists to cover up the true aims of the existence of their armed forces is exposed.

In this chapter, considerable space is devoted to the characteristics of the army of a socialist state. Such an army emerges naturally in the course of socialist revolution and serves to protect its gains. It can wage solely just liberation wars. There follows an account of the principles of the building of a socialist army, and specifically a detailed description of the CPSU's experience in setting up and exercising leadership over the armed forces of the Soviet state.

Much attention is paid to the differentiation between the reactionary predatory role of modern imperialist enemies, and the distinctive social role and class essence of the military formations of states which have liberated themselves. The latter vary on account of different sociohistorical orientations and are therefore divided into three groups: armies of countries developing along a noncapitalist path aiming at socialism; armies of countries which have embarked on the capitalist path; and armies of countries which have not defined a specific direction in their development.

Such a division is quite in order, but nevertheless inadequate. A deeply differentiated approach is required in examining the armies of countries which have embarked on the capitalist path of development. Thus, the functions of the armies of Chile and Mexico, India and Pakistan, Iran and Egypt and so forth are very different both as to their content and aims. Consequently, the armies of countries in this group require a more detailed classification within the group depending on the policy of the state and the correlation of class forces inside the country.

In the final chapter the reader will find material on a state's military strength which, as the book rightly points out, can be evaluated "only on the

basis of a correct understanding of the character of our epoch. The confrontation between the two social systems in the world arena and the fundamental, qualitative changes in military affairs." In other words, military strength is a relative concept. A particular state can be defined as strong or weak militarily only in comparison with a likely enemy.

In the book's pages devoted to the question of states' military strength, the reader will encounter many fresh thoughts on the categories of their defense capability--real maximum, necessary. The dependence of military strength on the social and state system and the correlation of forces in the world and also the defense potential of socialism as a whole are examined in detail.

The very factors (potentials) constituting the elements of a state's military strength are revealed within the framework of the final section devoted to the laws of the course and outcome of modern war. The author interestingly and substantively classifies the laws of war, putting forward his own independent concept, which merits support. It is simple and logical--which is what distinguishes it from many other concepts quite a few of which have already been expounded in our press.

Noteworthy points are made about the dynamic nature of the forces making up a state's military strength and about their dependence on the world revolutionary process and the evolution of the economic and spiritual potentials of social systems and states.

In conclusion, it must be said that our military reader has received a substantive book enabling him to comprehend the bases of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. It is underpinned by scientists' previous achievements and, at the same time, makes a definite contribution to propagandizing that teaching. The book's theoretical content is addressed to the practice of troop training and helps to improve the standard of the training of future officers and the political awareness of servicemen.

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MILITARY REGULATIONS AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE DISCUSSED

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[Editorial: "To Live and Serve According to the Regulations"]

[Text] Anyone first approaching the antiaircraft missile battalion headed by Lt Col N. Dontsov is involuntarily struck by the exemplary military order, the excellent bearing and smartness of the personnel. The eye is struck by this literally at every step, starting from the precise report and correct actions of the guard on duty at the checkpoint and the smart salute by the men in meeting superiors and ending with the well-kept territory of the military compound, the cleanliness and coziness of the quarters, by the order in exercises and by the strict rhythm of the entire organization of service by the missile troops. Even upon first acquaintance with the collective, it can be concluded that here they live and serve in accord with the demands of the military regulations.

This is actually the case. Not only the commander, but all the officers of the battalion view firm proper order as an indispensable condition for strong discipline, for successes in training and in the competition and ultimately in raising combat readiness. They are constantly concerned with implanting and maintaining this and with indoctrinating in the personnel a profound understanding of the vital necessity and high advisability of following the letter and spirit of the regulations everywhere and in everything. Here they are given great assistance by the subunit party and Komsomol organizations, using every form and method of agitation and propaganda work to increase in the eyes of the missilemen the authority of the regulations as invaluable compendiums of the standards of communist morality, the laws of military service and life and in fact ensuring the example set by the communists and Komsomol members in their unswerving observance. Such an attitude toward the regulations is undoubtedly one of the most important prerequisites for the steady successes of the collective. For 9 years running, the battalion has kept the title of outstanding and carries out all the combat training tasks on a high level.

It would be possible to give many examples showing this natural relationship. The combined-arms regulations for good reason are called a treasurehouse of wisdom and an unique short encyclopedia of military knowledge. They contain the Leninist ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland and the leader's legacy to the Soviet military as well as the policy of the Communist Party on

the questions of military organizational development and its demands on combat readiness, training and troop discipline and party political work. The wisdom of the military leaders who won major engagements as well as the battle-tested best combatant experience of many generations of defenders of the motherland are embodied in the terse articles and regulations.

Although there is the opinion that it is impossible to provide rules for all instances of life, it would be hard to find an aspect of military service which is not fully covered in the regulations. The duties and rights of officials and all servicemen, the relationships between them, the principles, goals and methods of training and indoctrination, the procedure for organizing troop service, the rules for conduct in the unit and outside of it, the basic content of party political work and the socialist competition, the routine and leisure of the personnel, the combat, political and moral qualities needed by the men--all of this is set out in the regulations. There is every truth in the sayings: "To live by the regulations is to serve the motherland faithfully" and "If you serve by the regulations you will win honor and glory." They, as is known, aptly express what has been deduced by practice and experience.

Put into effect in 1975, the Internal Service Regulations, the Disciplinary Regulations and the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces were approved by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Drill Regulations by an order of the USSR Minister of Defense. Consequently, they express the will and demands of the Soviet state. For precisely this reason, the regulations are termed a compendium of laws, the letter and spirit of which the servicemen must observe unswervingly. The moral standards and principles of communist morality incorporated in the general troop regulations have also assumed a legal force, that is, they are obligatory for execution.

The strict fulfillment of the regulations is an inseparable part in the overall task of conscientiously observing the Soviet laws and the USSR Constitution. At present, when the party is urging the Soviet people to show maximum organization and to establish exemplary order and conscientious discipline in all areas of work, the steadfast carrying out of this task on the part of the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs, the party and Komsomol organizations and all Army and Navy personnel has assumed primary significance. To fight decisively against any violations of party, state and labor discipline is a demand of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "We must have conscientious, worker discipline, a discipline which would move production forward," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov, at a meeting with Moscow machine tool builders. "We must fill out the struggle for discipline with a greater content and link it directly with the fulfillment of production quotas...."

The Army and Navy personnel have accepted the party's demands as a guide to action. They realize well that under the conditions of the real military danger from imperialism, the role of strong military discipline has grown immeasurably in maintaining the constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces to immediately repel possible aggression and decisively defeat the enemy. Military discipline is based on the awareness of each serviceman of his military duty and personal responsibility to defend his motherland. This starts by the

strict and precise observance by one and all of the order and rules outlined by the Soviet laws and troop regulations. Under Army and Navy conditions to add a greater content to the struggle for further strengthening discipline means to ensure the flawless execution of the official duties prescribed by the regulations on the part of each officer, warrant officer ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeant, petty officer, soldier and sailor and on this basis to improve field, air and sea skills and all-round readiness for modern combat.

Just as high combat readiness is impossible without strong discipline, so military discipline is inconceivable without strict proper order. "The entire way of life and service of the troops, the internal regimen and the standing of garrison and guard duty," pointed out the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "all of this should be organized in accord with the regulations and orders and here there should be no deviations or weaknesses. For this it is essential to see to it that all servicemen have a good knowledge of the regulations and strictly carry them out." Troop practices have convincingly shown that where the commanders, staffs and political bodies, in relying on the aid of the party and Komsomol organizations, carry out these demands effectively, the personnel considers the regulations as inviolable laws of military life and service. As a result, in such troop collectives the results of combat and political training are high and discipline is strong.

For example, this is how things stand in the artillery regiment where Maj V. Nedayvoda is the chief of staff. Here, the commander, the political worker and the staff skillfully unite and direct the efforts of the officers, the warrant officers, sergeants, party and Komsomol organizations at the complete solving of the problems related to maintaining firm proper order. In the unit they have organized a systematic study of the regulations by all serviceman categories and these demands are propagandized actively and effectively. The political exercises, the special-subject evenings, the talks, the materials of visual agitation, the wall newspaper and the broadcasts of the local radio--all of this is used to develop in the personnel a profound understanding of the role and significance of the troop regulations and the need to unswervingly carry out their requirements. The communist officers G. Grab, B. Adokhin, V. Nedayvoda, I. Sysyuk, A. Zhikin and many others, along with explanatory work, have taken practical measures to teach the men to live and serve by the regulations. For this purpose, instructor-procedural and demonstration exercises and drills are conducted in the regimen in carrying out the elements of the daily regimen, for preparing the daily detail, for the performing of duties by men going on guard duty and so forth. In constantly checking on execution, the commanders, the party and Komsomol organizations do not overlook a single instance of the violating of the requirements of the regulations, regardless of where this may happen--in the barracks, at field exercises or outside the unit. Due to such close, consistent and effective work the regiment has maintained firm military order and the personnel effectively has carried out the training plans and programs as well as the socialist obligations.

Actually, in the Army and Navy there is not a single unit or ship or subunit where as a whole life and service are not organized in accord with the regulations. This is that given without which the functioning of any troop collective, large or small, is impossible. The entire question is that in some collectives they are organized in strict and exacting accord to the regulations,

while in others deviations from them are often allowed. Certain servicemen do not fully or conscientiously carry out their duties and they deviate from the established procedure and rules. Individual officials do not take measures to check disciplinary violations and this in and of itself is a violation of the regulations. From such instances, ultimately a flippant attitude is formed toward the laws of military service and this inevitably entails flagrant disciplinary misdeeds and failures in combat training.

In the tank regiment in which Lt Col V. Orlov serves, as everywhere, exercises have been conducted on studying the regulations and at the dates stipulated by the guiding documents the officers and warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers take quizzes on their knowledge of the regulations. At the service meetings, the party and Komsomol assemblies, here there are many talks about the need to implant firm proper order. But regardless of all this, certain men, including individual communists and Komsomol members violate discipline. What is the reason for this? First of all, in the weak practical organization of the question and in the lack of constant exactingness and supervision. It is not enough to merely explain to the men that they should observe the requirements of the regulations. They must also be put under conditions of strict army order, truly proper organization of service, combat training and the entire way of army life. Precisely this is lacking in the regiment. Violations of the daily regimen and the wearing of the uniform in certain tankmen became a habit. Many of them lacked smartness, uprightness and attentiveness, particularly during field exercises, in servicing the equipment and in standing alert and guard duty. Such a situation cannot be justified by any references to particular or specific features in service activities. It is essential that everywhere and in everything a soldier feels himself a military person, that he proceed and act as the regulations and rules of conduct demand.

The commander is the organizer of firm order in the unit, on the ship and in the subunit. In using the powers and rights given him, he must carry out training, service, life and routine of the men in strict accord with the requirements of the regulations. The efficiency of the men and the developing in them of a need to measure their every step and action by the regulations depend upon the commander's exactingness and upon his ability to rely on his deputies and to direct the activities of the staff, the party and Komsomol organizations into the proper channel. Here it is important to remember that exactingness brings the desired results only in the instance that it is carried out systematically and is extended, without exception, to everyone and to all aspects of troop life. When this is combined with concern for the men, respect for their human dignity and with the greatest exactingness of the commander on himself and is reinforced by personal example.

In this regard, indicative is the work style of the commander of the nuclear missile submarine, Capt 1st Rank G. Tsvetko. For the officers and the entire crew he is an example of following the letter and spirit of the regulations. The commander's position is: all articles of the regulations are a law and they must be carried out not sporadically but regularly out of strength of conviction, authority and will power. Daily he personally investigates the organization of service and sees to it that everything on the boat conforms to the regulations, starting with reveille and morning inspection and ending with each sailor's fulfillment of his functional duties. For example, WO B. Postnikov

could not answer the question of where his subordinates were at a given moment and what they were doing. The commander proposed that he open the Naval Regulations of the USSR Navy and read Point 7 of Article 233. This point states that the person in charge of a work party must constantly know where his subordinates are and what they are doing. Officer S. Izmaylov was once inattentive and unresponsive to his subordinates. The commander reminded him of the corresponding article in the regulations and recommended that the party bureau secretary work to influence this communist. Such commander lessons, understandably, leave their trace. On the missile submarine firm proper order is maintained at the base and during the sea and ocean runs.

Platoons, companies, batteries, squadrons and equivalent subunits, where each man is in view, have the broadest opportunities to inculcate in the men a respect for the regulations as inviolable laws of life and service. Such subunits are under the command basically of young officers, yesterday's graduates of military schools. Many of them for fully understandable reasons lack the ability to correctly organize relations with their subordinates, to rely on the warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers or enlist the support of the communists and Komsomol organization. It happens that in striving for supposed authority, certain young commanders follow the path of becoming buddies with their subordinates, or, on the contrary, assume the stance of a too-strict, inaccessible superior, relying in everything on the authority given them and avoiding vital contact with subordinates and patient individual work with them. In order to exclude such phenomena, it is essential to carefully instruct the subunit commanders in the practices and methods of organizational and indoctrinational work. The senior chiefs, party and Komsomol organizations must give them every possible support in turning the subunits into centers of ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination.

It is hard to overestimate the role and importance of the most numerous detachment of command personnel, the warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers, in strengthening proper order. They stand closest to the soldier and sailor, they are constantly next to their subordinates and have an opportunity by personal example, persuasion and coercion, to develop in them the habit of living and serving strictly according to the regulations. They proceed correctly in those units and ships where the commanders and the political workers, together with the party and Komsomol organizations, are concerned that the junior commanders themselves thoroughly know the regulations, set an example of their scrupulous fulfillment and be guided by them in all their activities. Practice has irrefutably shown that in achieving this it is easier to establish proper relationships in the collective and also firm military order.

The unswerving carrying out of the requirements of the regulations is an important task of the staffs. Here serve the most experienced officers who, as a rule, have good Army and Navy experience. They help the commanders in working out and organizing the actual implementation of the comprehensive work plans for reinforcing proper order. The staff officers must exercise daily control over the organization of troop service, the entire training and indoctrinational process. They must deal firmly with instances of the violation of the daily regimen, the exercise schedule as well as shortcomings in standing garrison, patrol and vehicle-servicing duty. Unfortunately, on the regimental-level staffs certain chiefs of branches of troops and services, in working in the

subunits, at times play the role of narrow specialists, they are concerned with solving mainly purely technical questions and do not pay proper attention to the maintaining of proper order or the military bearing of the men. Here, undoubtedly, one can feel an insufficient influence on the style of their work by the staff party organizations. The party committees and bureaus must constantly see to it that all staff communists, without exception, become active supporters of military order, organization and discipline, that they objectively and strictly assess the state of affairs on the spot and make their contribution to indoctrinating the servicemen in a spirit of the unswerving fulfillment of the regulations and orders.

In ensuring firm order an exceptionally great role is played by the political bodies and primary organizations. As the executors of party policy and decisions in life, they just as much as the commanders are responsible for the state of affairs in the unit, ship and subunit. A majority of the political bodies and party organizations in every possible way supports the strong-willed and exacting commanders, they mobilize the communists to struggle for the precise and flawless fulfillment of the regulations and they do a good deal to unify the troop collectives, to create a healthy moral atmosphere in them and to form an implacable public opinion against the violators of proper order. For example, the party organizations where officers V. Kostev, I. Glukhov and N. Trofimov are party committee members exactly assess the contribution of each communist to strengthening discipline and organization and they constantly see to it that each party member is an egregious example of service and social activeness, resourcefulness, efficiency and responsibility and participates daily in troop indoctrination and in explaining to them the requirements of the oath and regulations.

At the same time, party organizations are still encountered where the questions of strengthening proper order are carried out sporadically, in a rush, where they do not have enough influence on all spheres of life and service of the men and overlook indoctrinational work with young officers, sergeants and petty officers. Certain party committees and bureaus do not place proper demands on the communists who have a poor knowledge and carry out the regulations laxly or permit the bending of disciplinary practices or the replacing of proper exactingness with coarseness and shouting.

The work related to the introduction of the military regulations into life is work with the men. Using all forms of political indoctrination, the commanders, the political workers and the party organizations must develop in the personnel a conscious attitude toward military duty and a profound understanding of the ideological basis and essence of the regulations and the need to carry them out in an exemplary manner in the interests of the combat readiness of the subunit, the unit and ship. The agitation and propaganda collectives and groups must make a greater contribution to explaining the laws of military service. At times a proper place is not assigned to this important question in the work plans of some of them. Judge advocate personnel must be more widely employed for the convincing and specific propagandizing of the regulations.

Here also there is a broad field of activity for the Komsomol organizations. It is important that the activists not limit themselves to conducting contests on a knowledge of the regulations or to discussing the question of the vanguard

role of the Komsomol members in carrying them out once a year at a meeting or session of the committee or bureau, as happens somewhere. Explanation and persuasion must be combined with constant individual work aimed at ensuring the example set by each Komsomol member in discipline as well as with increased exactingness against those Komsomol members who themselves permit a deviation from the letter of the regulation or assume a stance of outside observer when such a violation is committed in front of their very eyes. It is essential everywhere to see to it that the Komsomol members take a more effective part in the struggle for exemplary order.

The commanders and political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations must make fuller use of the indoctrinational opportunities of the socialist competition in the aim of further strengthening conscious discipline, organization and troop order. In summing up the results of fulfilling the obligations, it is essential to bring out the direct relationship between the successes achieved by the pacesetters and their conscientious fulfillment of the regulations. It is also essential to thoroughly analyze whether the competition participants which have joined the struggle for honor, dignity, proper conduct and military bearing are keeping their word. There must also be public condemnation for those men in whom promises diverge from deeds.

The diverse work of the command and political personnel, the party and Komsomol organizations involving the maintaining of firm order comprises an inseparable part in the struggle for further strengthening military discipline and raising combat readiness. This work cannot have a sporadic or seasonal nature. It pays off in real results only when it is done daily, on a planned basis and effectively. To constantly develop in the men an inner need to live and serve by the regulations means to ensure their zealous fulfillment of patriotic duty to securely defend the security and state interests of the motherland.

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IMPORTANCE, FUNCTION OF POLITICAL WORKERS DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lt Gen A. Agafonov, chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Authority of the Political Worker"]

[Text] An instance long ago comes to mind. After a meeting of the party aktiv in the garrison officer club, I was approached by a captain, the battalion deputy commander for political affairs [zampolit] who said that he had been done a wrong as the regiment was losing a young political worker to a higher position while he, having served several years there, had not been promoted although he had a positive efficiency report.

Judging from everything, the officer was sincerely convinced that he had been overlooked and preference has been given unjustly to another. I instructed one of the experienced workers from our political body to investigate this. He sought the advice of the commander, the party organization secretary, the staff officers and the communists and reached the conclusion that the choice of the candidate for promotion had been correctly made.

The "wronged" captain was described as intelligent in political and military terms, efficient and capable. But in terms of others he was rather dry and did not have much authority among the men. When the question of promotion was examined, the candidacies were compared not only in terms of the level of preparation and experience, but they also endeavored to see in the men those particular personality qualities which a political worker cannot do without. Certainly the collective respects him not only as a leader, but also as a person.

Let us open the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces where the duties of a political worker are set forth. The range of his service matters is broad. There is no question concerning the combat training and service of the men which is not within the viewpoint of the zampolit. And at present, the role of the political worker in the troops has assumed particular significance. This is caused by a whole number of factors.

The concern of our party to strengthen the defense capability of the nation and to raise the combat might and readiness of the Army and Navy is related to the

concern for indoctrinating in the men a profound communist conviction, ardent Soviet patriotism and a readiness to carry out a feat for the sake of the motherland. Here it would be hard to overestimate the role of the political worker as one of the immediate organizers of party political work aimed at developing the high political, moral and combat qualities in the men. The words voiced by V. I. Lenin will never grow old: "...Where political work is carried out most attentively in the troops...there is no laxness in the army, its order and spirit are better and there are more victories."

This Leninist thought as before has a timely ring for modern political workers. Above all because under the conditions of the exacerbated ideological struggle related to the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, the importance of conscious discipline and ideological maturity in the men has immeasurably increased. In establishing a communist ideology in the men, the political worker should master the entire range of forms and means of indoctrinational work and skillfully rebuff the attacks by our ideological opponents on socialist reality and our ideals.

High demands are also placed on the political worker by dynamically developing military affairs. Ever-greater importance is being assumed by troop skills, by the mastery of modern equipment and weapons and as a whole by combat readiness. The constantly modernized equipment and weapons as well as the evermore clearly expressed collective nature of military service demand a more constant improvement in the technical and other special knowledge.

Our political workers as a whole are up to this. Thus, a majority of those serving in the missile and tank units as well as in the special branches of troops are class specialists. Virtually every zampolit in a motorized rifle subunit can confidently operate the combat vehicles and shoot accurately while the political worker of an air squadron, regiment and division can fly modern types of aircraft. One out of every two ship zampolit can independently stand a running watch and control the ship. This is natural. At present, all the political workers are well aware that without a mastery of military affairs it is impossible to carry out party political work skillfully and effectively in ensuring high combat skill and readiness of the troops. The authority of a political worker in the collective depends largely how he masters military knowledge and how he is in work.

In all the stages of the organizational development of our Armed Forces, a major role has been played by the ideological maturity and morale of the personnel. Under the conditions of the appearance of new weapons of enormous destructive force, the importance of these factors has immeasurably grown. At present, the political workers must consider the more complex military-political situation as well as the socioeconomic changes in our country's life. There is one other important factor--the social make-up of a modern military collective with its higher-than-before level of general education and overall culture. Among the youth inducted into the Army and Navy there is an increased proportional amount of representatives of the urban population and primarily the working class. Today's serviceman is characterized by increased political activeness, by general literacy and by an increased feeling of his own dignity. In a word, the social, moral and psychological make-up of the troop collective is different and life poses evermore complex tasks for the indoctrinators.

For the political worker, all of this requires primarily high ideological and theoretical training, that is, a profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and party policy as well as the documents of the CPSU Central Committee and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy which define the areas of party political work. It means a mastery of the Leninist style of organizational activities aimed at increasing the level of military and political training for the personnel. But also indispensable for the political worker is a profound knowledge of military affairs and the principles of military pedagogics and psychology.

In a word, it is a question of today's level of professionalism. However, this is not all. We rightly feel that a political worker is the standard of communist morality. We are accustomed to look at him for our example of profound ideological conviction, crystal purity, high inner culture and order. We want to see in him the example of party principledness which organically is combined with a concern for people and a sincere respect for them. It cannot be otherwise. For it is a question of a political worker!

This is why we are particularly demanding about moral qualities. It is said that a person's words and deeds are the mirror of his soul. Ideological conviction and inner culture are inseparably linked to a person's conduct and are manifested in his way of life, manner of thinking and in dealings with others. Often it is precisely the high moral qualities of a political worker which are the crucial condition for his authority in the collective.

For example, the men like the zampolit of the motorized rifle regiment X, Lt Col A. Shibin. His concerned attitude toward the men, his sensitive understanding of the feelings and attitudes of others and at the same time his firmness of character, strictness and tenacity are not only an indication of pedagogical skill. This is something more. By his conduct, by his attitude toward service and by his way of life he has won the moral right to make demands on others.

In organizing party political work in the regiment, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich [Shibin] first of all himself takes an active part in it and by his example shows how he wants the indoctrinator or propagandist to be. He is demanding in encountering any manifestations of dishonesty, irregularity or laxness. But he is patient if it is a question of a mistake made out of inexperience and without fail helps eliminate it. His justness derives from high moral qualities and an activist position in life. If the political worker urges the others to master military affairs, it is not a question of mere words. The officer himself is an excellent shot and drives a combat vehicle.

Lt Col Shibin is always among the men, in the classrooms, in the field and in the club. He knows their concerns and needs. In a simple and understandable manner he will explain a disputed question and takes an interest in what news a soldier is receiving from home and whether he frequently writes his parents. These are not visits and talks out of duty, but rather a profound inner need. Anatoliy Mikhaylovich lives for his regiment and devotes all his soul to his work. The strict party exactingness of the political worker dictated by a sincere concern for the job and for man merely strengthens his authority in the collective.

Precisely such qualities, it seems to me, not only best describe a political worker, but also bring him true satisfaction from what he is doing. A person who lives according to the high laws of our morality cannot help but have respect from those around. Authority and recognition are the highest recommendation of a political worker and the best guarantee that he is on the right trail. Ultimately, this is the basis of his service growth.

The process of the development of a political worker is not simple. Nevertheless, it can be controlled and improved. Where the political bodies and party organizations consider the particular features of this process, there are results. It is a question not only of the existing forms of training such as Marxist-Leninist training, seminars, theoretical and practical scientific conferences and colloquiums, as important as they may be. Along with this, the senior comrades must daily assess what the political worker has done and constantly analyze his activities. Although at times little noticed, such support for good ideas and concrete deeds and a prompt, tactful cautioning against mistakes and confusion help him in more rapidly acquiring not only experience, but also to form an activist position in life.

A Leninist approach to the recruitment and placement of personnel and their indoctrination has been and remains the determinant for all our state's personnel policy. The 26th Party Congress paid enormous attention to this question. The personal qualities of a leader and the political and moral criteria which guide him, as was pointed out at the congress, are of particular importance for the activities of the collective and for achieving high socially useful results.

It is pleasant to note that many of our political bodies and party organizations have taken a significant step ahead improving the recruitment and indoctrination of the personnel. Recently, in the formation where Lt Col A. Vodop'yanov is the chief of the political section, we studied the question of how work with the political personnel is being carried out. We were pleased by the well-thought-out system of training and exchange of experience and noted that both the chief of the political body and the other workers of the political section had a sufficiently complete understanding of each political worker as an individual. Where did they gain these data? Here it has become a habit and a rule to conduct the work directly in the subunits, holding confidential talks with the servicemen and studying their ideas and needs.

It is no accident that when they thoroughly investigated the question of the promotion of young political workers, objectivity could be seen in the assessment of each of them. For example, when it was proposed that one of the company zampolits be promoted to a higher position, the political section thoroughly discussed his candidacy. Was his political level high? What class specialty did he have? How did he shoot and drive a vehicle? What obligations had been assumed by the company communists and how were they being carried out? What was the level of discipline in the subunit? What was the role of the political worker in improving the quality of political studies? Along with this they also analyzed the officer's personal qualities including his principledness in combating shortcomings, his ability to self-critically analyze his own work, to find a common tongue with the men, to analyze their needs as well as his desire to creatively utilize the various forms of indoctrination....

In a word, they were checking to what degree the man conformed to the modern concept of a political leader.

Unfortunately, such an approach to the indoctrination of political workers has not been established everywhere. One chief of a political body for a long time complained that he had been "let down" by the subunit zampolits and that there was no one to promote to even a battalion. However, a study of this question showed that here they had been little concerned for preparing a reserve and above all they little studied the capabilities of the men and did not support their initiative in work. Certainly, even a temporary taking over by the company political worker for the battalion zampolit who was going on leave, of course, with the corresponding help would have given him a great deal. The political body, in essence, created the problem for itself, having overlooked constant individual work with the men, their systematic training and indoctrination directly on the spot and in practice. Clearly, such a position can only do moral harm both to the question and to the young political workers themselves.

Mistakes in the indoctrination of political personnel in being made sometimes because of insufficient competence and most importantly due to a lack of proper attention to the men from the leaders are felt in different ways. It must be recognized sadly that at times a person on whom great hopes were put and to whom much was entrusted suddenly "trips up" and stops developing as an officer and as an individual.

...At one time Maj V. Belanovskiy appeared to be an energetic, active political worker. He was ready to take on a new, interesting job and could attract in others. In a word, showed hope and could have developed into a good political worker. But he did not justify these hopes. His confidence imperceptibly began to develop into overconfidence, his principledness into impoliteness and his ability to lead others into good deeds into stubbornness. His loss of self-control more and more frequently led him to inadvertently insult a person and belittle his dignity.

Could senior comrades have stopped him on time? Undoubtedly they could. But for this it would have been necessary to spot those changes which had just emerged in his character and actions. Unfortunately, they remained unnoticed. Ultimately a person who, as no one else, should have guarded morality began to resort to methods unworthy of the title of a political worker such as distorting the true state of affairs in the collective, the deceiving of comrades and so forth. Clearly Maj Belanovskiy had ceased meeting the requirements of a political worker.

Of course, ideological and moral maturity is not inherent in a person from the very beginning and is not passed on along with genes. It is developed. In the family, at school and in the collective where he works and serves. The formation of a political worker, like any officer, also to an enormous degree depends upon what political and moral atmosphere reigns in the collective and primarily in the party one. Here do professionalism and principledness, criticism and self-criticism find respect and how do the communists approach the problem of the moral indoctrination of the officers, particularly the young ones? Are moral standards declared or are they actually established in life?

Today one would probably not find a political body or party committee which did not have extensive plans for political, military and moral indoctrination. Special exercises and seminars are devoted to the comprehensive approach. Lectures are given on indoctrination subjects. This is all for the good. But, unfortunately, not everywhere are they able to organize practical work in the area of indoctrinating high moral qualities in the men. Frequently, the discovered negative phenomena are discussed only in a narrow group of people. They are not publicized even in the party meetings. Ultimately this blunts a sense of personal responsibility in individual comrades, including the political workers, for the results of indoctrinational activities and for their personal conduct in the collective.

Instances of the violating of the regulations by individual political officers cause a feeling of annoyance and perplexity. Certainly they undermine the authority of the men who should be an example of organization, discipline and the unswerving execution of the oath and regulations. At present, the importance of these qualities is particularly great as is the responsibility put on each Soviet officer, and particularly the political leader.

The political worker, particularly the young ones who are just gaining experience, are not served to the best by those leaders of political bodies who in settling the question of promotion or transfer give affirmative recommendations to those officers who have shortcomings in service and daily conduct. Need it be proven what harm is done to the moral indoctrination of political workers even by individual instances of such unobjective recommendations and efficiency reports.

At times one notes with surprise that a young political worker who arrived in a regiment or on a ship comparatively recently has begun to take on not the best qualities. Often the reason for this is a strange one-sidedness in assessing his activities. For example, theoretical preparation and the ability to speak in front of others are noted. Then a political worker who shows external smartness and adroitness appears in a good light. But such qualities as respect for others, principleness, the ability to keep one's word and responsiveness remain overlooked. But certainly without them it is impossible to imagine a political worker.

It is not surprising that such a tendency in the evaluating of personnel as a whole and the political personnel in particular can disorient a person and cause him to adjust to this imperfect group of demands. Thus it happens that over the years a political worker is certified in the most affirmative manner although there have long been no grounds for this.

Thus, Maj A. Kim was very flatteringly described by his previous chiefs as professional, efficient and punctilious. In the major's office, tables and graphs had been hung up which showed that he was thoughtfully analyzing the state of affairs. But in talking with officers and communists a detail came out: the men were not fond of turning to this political worker either for advice or for aid. One of the officers who was acutely in need to have a domestic question settled, said: "No, I will not go to him." It turned out that behind the facade of apparent well being there was concealed an isolation of the political worker from the needs and concerns of the men and concern for his

own prestige and not the interests of the job prevailed at times in his efforts.

One can still encounter such political workers who spare no effort to represent themselves in the best light. And the fact that these character traits are not promptly spotted and that work is tacitly encouraged not so much for the interests of the job as for a good report leads ultimately to serious problems. It is always more difficult to treat an illness which has gotten hold. At the outset of work some negative changes in the character of a subordinate may be scarcely expressed and easily corrected. But we know what can happen after several years....

It is essential to promptly help a person look at himself from outside and assess his place in the collective. Let me give an example. The appointment of Maj Yu. Abashin to the position of regimental zampolit occurred during a difficult period. Without interrupting the training process, the personnel had to improve the training facilities and organize the quarters. Seemingly Abashin withstood this test. And probably the conversation held soon thereafter in the political section for him was a complete surprise. The senior comrades, having listened to the report of the political worker said that with all the positive that he had done recently there was something troubling them. In his character there had appeared a dangerous complacency, a feeling of infallibility and a disregard for the opinions of others. This could serve as a serious reason for his distancing from others. Had he not begun to forget that the right to lead could be won only by the most profound respect for others, by a sincere interest in their affairs and not by emphasizing his official position? They reminded him that for a political worker there was nothing more terrible than to become conceited, to believe in one's own infallibility and to recognize only his own opinion. The thorough discussion in the political section caused Abashin to reflect and to change his style of work and attitude toward others. We feel that such a conversation promptly carried out became a good moral lesson for a person who generally speaking was well prepared and energetic.

This is very important--both the pedagogical wisdom, the paternal concern of superiors and the effectiveness of the entire training and indoctrinational system for the officers in the military collective. However, as is known, development occurs much more rapidly if it is based upon the inner moral strengths of the person himself and on his aware desire to improve. Certainly indoctrination is dialectically connected to self-indoctrination. They complement one another.

Self-indoctrination of a political worker is particularly important for his growth and development. The person who feels that this is solely his personal concern is profoundly in error. No, this is far from the case. Concern for the self-improvement, for the high moral make-up and example set of an officer is caused by the importance and complexity of those problems which he must solve and by the interests of troop combat readiness. Of course, service itself and the carrying out of numerous tasks also indoctrinate the political worker. For example, in being concerned with developing a Marxist-Leninist ideology in the men, he at the same time himself is ideologically enriched and deepens his political knowledge. Along with the commander in preparing the

subunit personnel for the severe testing of modern combat, he strengthens his own character. But still real success is achieved by the one who initially clearly sets out his own "initial parameters": the training level, position in life, and shortcomings (both those about which comrades speak as well as those noted in the efficiency report).

All the further activity of the officer in developing his own necessary qualities depend upon how correctly, objectively and self-critically the self-analysis is made.

...Thus it happens that no matter what the subject of discussion--indoctrination or self-indoctrination--it inevitably is tied to the question of the political worker's service growth. This is completely natural just as is the officer's desire to advance up the service ladder as he acquires professional knowledge, skills and experience. But it is a different question of what means are chosen by a person to achieve the goal and whether or not he has been correctly oriented by that environment in which he lives and serves and by senior comrades. A great deal also depends upon what criteria are followed by the workers of the political and personnel bodies in assessing the activities and capabilities of the officers. Their word is particularly weighty. It is important only not to permit hurried promotions or unsound shifts caused not so much by the interests of the matter as secondary considerations, by organizational, in the words of V. I. Lenin, business, by an administrative itch which gives rise to an absurd reshuffling of political personnel.

All our personnel policy should be aimed, as was pointed out at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, at having in the crucial areas persons who are politically mature, competent, enterprising and possess the necessary experience, organizational abilities and sense of the new.

Proceeding from this, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev has constantly emphasized that the interests of the matter demand strict observance of the Leninist principles of successiveness in work, systematic concern for the correct employment of experienced personnel, and the prompt promoting and training of young, energetic and promising officers who are capable of being a moral example in the military collective.

Unfortunately, it frequently happens that in a promotion a person is recommended only positively, without a single shortcoming. But when he is removed from a position as incapable, then there are more than enough ominous tones. Undoubtedly such a palette is not suitable for the certifying of people. A person should be judged from all aspects and the evaluation should be completely objective. It is far from sufficient to note only the organizational abilities of an officer and his professional intelligence. It is equally important to consider whether he is able by all his activity and activist position in life to mobilize the men to carry out the tasks and to do intense labor. Certainly behind each decision taken by us is the fate of a man and behind the fate of a man is the fate of the cause.

It is a great honor to be a political worker, but it is also a great responsibility. For what is he primarily valued? For profound ideological conviction, party loyalty, for a close link with the masses and the ability to agitate by his personal example. This must be well understood by everyone who carries the high title of political worker.

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INFLUENCE OF MILITARY LIFE ON PERSONALITY VIEWED

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[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Lt Col A. Zyuskevich: "Military Service and the Shaping of the Spiritual Needs of the Individual"]

[Text] Mature socialism is a society of real humanism. "We possess great material and spiritual opportunities for the ever-fuller development of the individual and will increase them in the future," pointed out the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress. "But at the same time, it is important that each man be able to utilize them rationally. And this, ultimately, depends upon what are the interests and needs of the individual."

Our party sees in the active and purposeful forming of high moral demands and interests in the Soviet people one of the urgent tasks in indoctrinating the new man. This task is carried out in the family, in institutions of learning and in labor collectives. The Soviet Armed Forces are also a recognized school for the communist indoctrination of the youth and their spiritual maturation.

At the basis of a majority of man's actions and deeds lie his needs. For this reason the content, direction and level of development of needs (and their corresponding interests) make it possible to judge the spiritual richness of an individual as well as the degree of its social activeness and civil responsibility.

In accord with the basic spheres of human activity, needs are usually divided into two closely interrelated groups--material and spiritual. This link is manifested in the fact that any material need also includes elements of spiritual needs such as cognitive, moral and aesthetic. At the same time, the satisfying of a majority of spiritual needs is impossible without material goods such as printed products, the radio, television, cultural-educational and training institutions and so forth. For this reason, one must not oppose spiritual needs to material ones.

Needs are characterized not only by a close interrelation, but also by substantial differences. For example, spiritual needs in their origin and sequence of satisfaction are derived from material ones. Before being concerned with science, politics or art, a person should eat, drink, clothe himself, have

housing, that is, satisfy his material needs which are always restricted to the capabilities of social production. In this instance, we are speaking about rational material needs, that is, those which are objectively determined by the production development level and by the sociopolitical and spiritual life of society and contribute to the harmonious development of the individual.

Spiritual needs do not have such limits in their development and satisfaction. These encompass the inner world of man and are closely linked to his interests. In knowing the spiritual interests of an individual, it is possible to rather accurately judge the needs reflected by them.

The structure of social and individual conscience makes it possible to establish several basic varieties of spiritual needs for the individual: ideological which determine man's attitude toward the surrounding world; political which consist in a permanent interest in political ideas and theories, events and phenomena and in a desire to take an active part in sociopolitical life; cognitive which include a desire for knowledge and the use of it in practice; moral related to the mastery of moral standards, principles and rules of conduct and the forming of the moral ideal; aesthetic reflecting the gravitating of man to the beautiful, to communing with nature and art and to the development of an artistic viewpoint and taste.

The forming of human needs--both material and spiritual--is determined by a general sociological law which V. I. Lenin called "the law of increasing needs." The essence of this law is that each new level in the development of society's productive forces objectively causes an increased level of human needs.

Only an optimum combination of material and spiritual needs can ensure the harmonious development of the individual. But it is not as easy to achieve such a combination as it seems at first glance. The problem is that many types of material needs arise almost automatically in following the increased production capabilities, the appearance of new goods and the changes in fashion. Spiritual needs are another matter. Their formation requires effective, painstaking indoctrinational work by many of society's social institutions. For this reason it is important that the increased prosperity be accompanied by an enriching of the inner world of man and by the forming of a correct understanding of the purpose and sense of life. Otherwise, increased material prosperity can become a source of petty bourgeois psychology, Philistine views and ideas. We, the people of a new world, reject both the preaching of poverty and asceticism as well as the cult of consumption, the Philistine psychology for which a penny, in the apt expression of Gorky, is the sun in his skies. Material goods for us are not an end in itself, but rather a prerequisite for the all-round development of the individual.

A socialist society endeavors to satisfy all the reasonable, socially necessary needs of man. The USSR Constitution particularly emphasizes that the highest goal of social production under socialism is the fullest satisfying of the growing material and spiritual needs of man. Our party and state give constant attention to carrying out this task. The 1983 USSR State Economic and Social Development Plan and the 1983 USSR State Budget, as reviewed by the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and approved by the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet envisage an increased level and improved structure

for the consumption of material goods and services, better living and domestic conditions for the population and an easing of labor in the household. There is to be a further improvement in medical aid and recreation for the Soviet people and the raising of children as well as the creation of better conditions for active human labor.

A whole series of measures is aimed at the development of socialist democracy, at increasing worker initiative, at broadening their participation in management, at the greatest possible development of the socialist competition and at forming reasonable needs and aesthetic tastes in the population. The measures outlined by the 26th Party Congress to develop television and radio, publishing, to improve the work of the cultural and educational institutions and to further mass physical culture and sports should also contribute to the more complete and diverse satisfaction of spiritual needs.

A person's spiritual needs and interests develop over his entire life. However, a majority of them is most actively formed in youth with its heightened susceptibility, emotionality and thirst for knowledge. Precisely in this period, service in the Armed Forces comes for a larger portion of the Soviet youth. In their ranks the young man becomes not only a military specialist and a defender of the socialist fatherland, but also a citizen-soldier, a person with developed spiritual needs and a broad political and cultural viewpoint.

The indoctrinational role of the socialist army was first set forth in the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Program adopted by the Eighth Party Congress and its resolution on the military question. Even at that time, the task was posed of "bringing the barracks closer to the military school, and making it a center not only of purely military studies, but also general education and political indoctrination." This Leninist idea underlying military and political training and mass political and cultural-educational work during the first years of the existence of our Armed Forces, was turned into a powerful factor for the ideological-political, moral and cultural growth of the Soviet citizens. This has been particularly characteristic for the present development stage of the Army and Navy, when military service operates as a most important component in the entire system of the political, labor and moral indoctrination of the youth. The army school, in indoctrinating new generations of Soviet soldiers, prepares for the motherland men who are morally and physically strong and with a high awareness of social duty. These qualities are essential not only for the soldier, but also for any citizen of our nation.

The successful shaping of the spiritual needs for the personnel in the Armed Forces has been positively influenced by the opportunities which have increased significantly in a developed socialist society for satisfying the material needs of the Soviet people, including the servicemen. In recent years, in many military compounds, well equipped barracks, messes, sick bays, tearooms, stores and other facilities have been built to replace the old ones. The food, uniform supply and medical support have been constantly improved. The physical plant for ideological-indoctrinational and cultural-educational work has been significantly increased. The Army and Navy has organized a broad network of ideological institutions which make it possible to effectively shape the spiritual needs and interests of the servicemen.

In the districts, groups of forces and fleets, the officer clubs, the soldier and sailor clubs, the song and dance ensembles, the orchestras, dramatic theaters, museums and sports clubs also help in successfully carrying out these tasks. The Army and Navy libraries make a major contribution to developing the spiritual needs of the men. Their holdings number 120 million copies of books. Each year, more than 100 new feature films and up to 250 documentary and popular scientific films are sent to the troops.

The level of general educational, cultural and professional training of the commanders and political workers, in having increased significantly in recent years, has also had a substantial impact on the shaping and development of the men's spiritual interests. They are the able mentors of the army youth and experienced indoctrinators whose life is totally dedicated to the training of the armed defenders of the motherland.

Thus, we have every objective opportunity to successfully shape the spiritual needs and interests of the servicemen and achieve, as the party demands, a further strengthening of the indoctrinational role played by the Soviet Armed Forces.

Sociological research in the troop collectives has shown that military service has a most intense impact on the development of the cognitive, ideological, political and moral years. The constantly more complex weapons and military equipment being received by the troops and naval forces place exceptionally high demands on the cognitive abilities and interests of the personnel. Thus, the volume of information which must be received and processed by a tank driver, an aviation mechanic or any junior specialist at a missile complex presently is 2-3-fold more than the amount of information which the soldiers mastered in prewar times and for certain categories of servicemen, 5-7-fold more. For this reason, under present-day conditions it is important not only to have more profound knowledge than before in the servicemen, but also to foster an understanding of the need for its constant broadening, adding to and updating. The work of developing the cognitive needs and interests of the personnel must be organized considering this.

At present, a profound knowledge of the particular features of the operated equipment and weapons and of the essence of the physical processes occurring in the machinery and mechanisms of the principles of the interaction and functioning of the latter is of important significance in daily military service. A serviceman who possesses high skills and firm scientific knowledge, who has a constant interest in this and endeavors to extend it can more completely take into account the action of objective laws and is able to perform his duties with maximum efficiency.

The development of the cognitive needs and interests of a man is largely determined by his attitude toward his own combat specialty. A person who is not interested in the job which he performs can scarcely be expected to master it completely. For this reason, there must be purposeful explanatory work by the commanders, political workers and party activists which would show each serviceman the importance of his military service and personal contribution to ensuring the combat capability and readiness of his collective as well as instill pride for his specialty and a responsibility for mastering it.

Army and Navy service provides broad opportunities for creative activities in this area. Where they are fully utilized, a majority of the soldiers and sergeants is satisfied with their specialty and endeavors to increase their professional skills. This encourages them to show activity in mastering the weapons and equipment, it encourages a broadening of the range of knowledge and abilities and develops cognitive interests.

At the same time, it is no secret that a portion of the personnel is not satisfied with their specialty and feels no need to improve in it. Most often this is explained by the monotony of the duties performed, by the impossibility of fully utilizing the previously acquired knowledge and experience as well as by the absence of conditions for showing boldness, purposefulness and initiative. We feel that on the level of the subunit or unit these factors could be significantly eliminated or minimized. For this, it is important to have not only a more profound study of the spiritual needs and interests of the men and more fully consider the individual capabilities of the personnel in assigning them to one or another position, but also to create the necessary physical plant for fruitful training and provide the appropriate moral atmosphere in the collective. As was emphasized by M. V. Frunze, all instruction must be so organized as to vitally interest the men as well as arouse and develop their love for military affairs and a desire to improve themselves.

Political studies hold a crucial role in forming the personality of the Soviet citizen soldier and in developing his ideological, political and moral needs. The existing programs of Marxist-Leninist officer training, political studies for the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] and the political exercises for regular servicemen make it possible to provide all the Army and Navy personnel with firm knowledge on the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, CPSU domestic and foreign policy and communist morality. The regular study of new materials of an ideological-political nature not only broadens the viewpoint of the men and leads to an understanding of the need and value of ideological knowledge, but also evokes a desire to be guided by this in practical activities.

An analysis of the attitude toward political training shows that the basic mass of students endeavors to profoundly master the knowledge obtained and shows great interest in it. At the same time, a certain portion of the soldiers and sailors does not evidence a vital interest in political exercises. What is the problem here? This is largely explained by the insufficient procedural preparation of the individual group leaders and by an inability to conduct the exercises in an attractive manner, without platitudes and rote formulas. In the course of the talks and seminars the leader is not always able to evoke an interested exchange of opinions or a discussion or link the questions being discussed with the life and activities of the subunit and unit. The use of training devices and works of literature and art in the political exercises and the referring to our glorious revolutionary, military and labor traditions are frequently a weak point.

Whatever concrete goal is being pursued by the exercise leader, he should always endeavor to arouse an interest in the problems being studied as a whole, he should constantly seek to evoke in the men a thirst to know everything, to understand everything and he should teach them to think creatively and assess the events occurring in the world from class positions.

The process of the forming of an individual and his spiritual needs occurs primarily in the subunit collective. Precisely here the soldiers and sailors, the sergeants and petty officers perform their direct functional duties. Here their instruction, indoctrination and recreation are organized. However, only the collective in which there is a situation of mutual respect and confidence, exactingness and concern for the men, principledness and responsibility can have a positive effect on the individual. Only under such conditions are the moral-political and social qualities of the personnel honed and tempered and their spiritual needs and interests correctly shaped and improved.

Proper firm order in the subunit or unit helps to develop such an important moral need under army conditions as the need for self discipline. It is no accident that in answering the question "What did army service provide you?", the men first of all emphasized such qualities as discipline, inner assuredness, efficiency, and a feeling of personal responsibility for performing one's duties.

The example of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists has a very great effect on shaping the needs and interests of the individual. The following of this example is one of the methods for assimilating moral values and for reinforcing positive images of conduct and an attitude toward official duties in the conscience and habits of the men. For this reason, the ensuring of the example set by senior comrades is one of the effective ways of forming the spiritual needs and interests of the army youth.

I involuntarily recall how strongly I and other school graduates during the first year of our officer development were influenced by the battalion commander, Col K. Greshnov. In the full sense of the word, he was an example not only of an attitude toward service duties, but also of high spiritual culture, diversity of interests, tact and benevolence. We wanted to imitate him in every possible way, even to the point of his way of talking. Many of his traits became a part of virtually all of the battalion officers over time.

Opposite examples are also encountered. The underdevelopment of spiritual needs in individual servicemen has created in their conscience a vacuum which is filled by needs of a different sort, most often by empty pastimes and acquisitiveness. In and of itself the desire to have a well equipped apartment, fine furniture and a motor vehicle is completely understandable and justified. But only up to a point where it does not become an end in itself, blocking out all other aspects of life. If this does occur, we inevitably run up against a consumer psychology and Philistine views. Unfortunately, people are always found ready to imitate such a way of life, particularly if a superior sets a similar negative example.

The socialist competition is an important means for developing ideological and moral needs. With good organization, this makes it possible for each person, in the words of V. I. Lenin, to show himself and to develop his abilities and evidence talents. The struggle to fulfill the socialist obligations is inevitably linked to the expression and development of a person's awareness and all his better qualities.

It would be possible to give many examples of the effective influence of the socialist competition on developing the spiritual needs and interests of the personnel. In the opinion of many men, the growing strength of the competition has helped them become even more united, to rise to a new level of self-awareness and burn with a common desire to defend the subunit's honor. It teaches them not only to be concerned for the personal result, but also for the success of a comrade, to assess one's labor dispassionately and to be just in recognizing the accomplishments of the pacesetters. Of great importance for correctly shaping the spiritual needs and interests of the men is the creating of a definite public opinion toward those who do not try to master the heights of military skill and by their attitude toward service let down the entire collective. Certainly, the commander, the political worker, the party and Komsomol activists should direct this process which requires pedagogical skill and tact from them.

No matter how rich and diverse in content the immediate activities of the servicemen are, a significant portion of their spiritual needs and interests is satisfied and developed outside of this activity, that is, in free time. Many soldiers devote their leisure to reading artistic literature, to self-education, to musical endeavors and participating in sports. The role of art is particularly great in increasing the spiritual needs of the individual. But our point is the following. As sociological research has shown, the interests of a larger portion of the young officers, warrant officers, soldiers and sergeants are focused in the sphere of such types of art as the movies and light music. The more difficult types such as classical music, opera, ballet and fine arts as yet have not become properly widespread among the personnel.

One of the reasons for such one-sidedness is the insufficient aesthetic education of a certain portion of the soldiers. What is incomprehensible, unfamiliar or difficult may not arouse an interest or become a need. As K. Marx correctly pointed out at one time, if you wish to enjoy art, you must be an artistically educated person. Our soldiers can make up for many failings in their aesthetic viewpoint by self-education. In this, they can also be substantially aided by the cultural universities, the amateur musical collectives and circles, the fine arts studios and literary associations of which there are many in the troops and fleets.

We must also point up one other problem. Not everyone still knows how to value and rationally utilize his leisure in the interests of his harmonious development. At times, one observes with regret how certain young officers thoughtlessly and monotonously spend their free time. And the reason for this is more often in the inability to organize one's leisure and to select the better ways and methods for satisfying spiritual interests. We feel that the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations should help such persons in finding the correct way to realize their needs. Rational needs can be formulated only in rational activity.

Well organized leisure is an important reserve in developing the spiritual needs and interests of the individual. The improved quality and effectiveness of mass cultural measures and the use of the diverse forms for involving the personnel in amateur artistic activities--these are just several areas of work in shaping the spiritual needs of the men where the indoctrinational

opportunities are still far from realized. The following example shows that this is actually so. It is generally recognized that the museums of combat glory have a strong emotional impact on the soldiers and sergeants in regular service. After coming out of a museum, each man begins to perceive his honorable and responsible duty to the motherland differently, more awarely and with a pride for his predecessors and he endeavors to continue the traditions of the senior comrades. But, as practice indicates, this form of military patriotic indoctrination is not fully utilized by certain commanders and political workers. Moreover, at times soldiers and sergeants can be encountered who never visited their unit's museum of combat glory.

Thus, during the period of service in the Soviet Armed Forces an intense process occurs of improving the cognitive, political, ideological and moral needs and interests of our youth. The fuller utilization of the favorable opportunities found in the Army and Navy for forming and developing these will help in further increasing the level of military and political training and will be one of the essential conditions for further strengthening the indoctrinational role of military service.

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LECTURE MATERIALS FOR IMPROVING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 83 (signed to press 4 Mar 83) pp 23-30

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Col V. Gorbunov:
"High Combat Training of the Personnel--A Most Important Component in Combat Potential"*]

[Text] Our Armed Forces possess powerful combat potential which represents a strong fusion of high technical equipping, military skill and unshakable morale. The ability of the Army and Navy to quickly and most fully realize this potential for repulsing possible aggression is reflected in their combat readiness. In turn, the latter, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, is determined primarily by the quality of the field, sea and air skills of the personnel, by the degree to which they have mastered the weapons and military equipment, by the level of moral-political tempering, discipline and organization of the troops and naval forces, and by the art of their control.

The Communist Party has shown constant concern for harmoniously developing and improving all the components in the combat potential of the Armed Forces. In solving the fundamental questions related to the technical equipping of the Army and Navy, it in no way has made a fetish of the role of military equipment as such. The party considers that man has been and remains the main force in war. During the age of nuclear missile weapons as never before, the outcome of the war will be determined by people who have mastered the weapons and military equipment, who are tempered morally and physically and who are totally dedicated to their socialist motherland.

Combat and troop skill is a specific concept and at the same time a relative one. Its content and assessment criteria change in accord with the development of the means and methods of armed combat and with the increased standard demands placed on the person servicing the military equipment and employing it in

* The article is recommended for use in studying the subject "High Combat Skill of the Personnel and Their Mastery of the Weapons and Military Equipment--A Most Important Component in the Combat Potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

combat. Hence, the constant pertinence of a scientific, creative approach to studying the basic factors and trends which determine the process of improving troop activities as well as the effectiveness and quality of the entire system for training and indoctrinating the personnel.

Under the conditions of the duel between the two opposing social systems and the arms race which has been initiated by imperialism, military affairs remain that sphere of social life where the most recent scientific and technical achievements find their most rapid and widest employment. In turn, as was pointed out even by F. Engels, the introduction of more advanced types of weapons brings about noticeable changes and at times revolutionary breaks in the methods of conducting combat operations.

In what basic areas is scientific and technical progress now influencing the development of military affairs? In the first place, there has been an improvement in the technical means of waging war; secondly, the preparation of man to master the new weapons and to fight in modern combat; thirdly, the reorganization of the Army and Navy and the development of military art and the methods of controlling the processes of armed combat. Obviously, none of the designated areas can be viewed in isolation from the others, for they all interact as elements of a single system.

Soviet military science correctly rejects the scholastic disputes going on in certain nations over what is more important on the battlefield, the men or the equipment. Rapid scientific and technical progress, in making it possible to create unprecedented types of weapons, has not only not repudiated but even more convincingly confirmed the rightness of Lenin's view that modern warfare, like modern equipment, requires "high quality human material," for the most perfect weapon is useless "with the lack of persons capable of knowledgeably utilizing the most modern, advanced military equipment" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 9, pp 155, 156).

Although the role of man in war, both in the past and at present, is decisive, one cannot help but see that with the development of military equipment the specific content of this role has substantially changed. Thus, even comparatively recently, man in a combat situation was one of the basic sources of mechanical energy. He erected fortifications by hand, he moved artillery weapons, he fought with a bayonette and rifle butt in close combat and so forth. But with the appearance in the armies and navies of an enormous amount of powerful motorized combat and auxiliary equipment, intercontinental missiles, supersonic aircraft, nuclear submarines and other very complex types of weapons, the role of man as a force which itself blazes the path to victory has become something of the past. It is no accident that even the very term "manpower" has almost disappeared from the military lexicon. Certainly, physical energy and the muscle power of a man are still essential in combat, but now in a new quality, predominantly for controlling combat equipment.

Under present-day conditions, new qualitative particular features have been acquired by the criteria in accord with which the level of troop skill is measured. In the first place, in the event of a surprise attack by the aggressor, the Army and Navy personnel must repulse it, using those abilities and skills which were gained in peacetime. This obliges the military personnel even now

to ensure the necessary level of combat readiness and to teach each man to fight according to modern rules.

Secondly, in forming troop skill it is essential to consider that in our times this predominantly has a collective nature and is comprised of the able and coordinated actions of many specialists, their high organization and flawless efficiency. In this regard the importance of troop discipline increases even more and its traditional limits are substantially broadened. Now this organically includes so-called technological discipline, that is, the strict and precise observance of the established conditions for operating the technical systems, maintaining the set conditions for operating the weapons and military equipment, the procedure for carrying out repairs and so forth.

Thirdly, certain tried principles of troop training and indoctrination have acquired a new content. Thus, the principle of teaching what is necessary in war under conditions as close as possible to combat reality now includes: the preparing of the troops for rapid, decisive surprise actions using all the resources; the ability to conduct combat at any time of the day and under the conditions of constant radio electronic countermeasures, the carrying out of operational and tactical tasks with a great dispersing of the units and sub-units, the combining of fire and movement, frontal attacks with energetic actions deep in enemy positions; the ability to hit targets on the first round, the first rocket launch or the first attack in air and sea combat. All of this can be achieved only at a price of enormous tension on the spiritual and physical forces of the personnel.

The qualitative changes in the technical equipping of our Army and Navy as well as in the political and cultural level of the personnel are reflected in many characteristics of military skill. In analyzing the professional activities of the Soviet soldier, with full justification it can be concluded that there is within the "man--military equipment" system a number of essential, permanent linkages which express the conformity of the standard indicators of military service to the nature and development trends of the scientific and technical revolution.

For example, military technical progress, in placing growing demands on the military specialist, his knowledge, skills, moral-psychological qualities, gives rise to an objective need for more skillful, masterly activities. In turn, high combat skill, in becoming a generally recognized standard of military activity creates a real opportunity for the accelerated introduction of scientific and technical achievements into the area of military practice.

It is also valid to say that in troop skill, both aspects of the military-technical revolution are fused together, that is, the spiritual which is manifested in the increased theoretical level of military professional knowledge and the material expressed in the use of various technical devices which increase the effectiveness of military labor. This linkage is most apparent in the process of controlling the troops and complex combat facilities. The receiving and processing of information, the taking of decisions and equally the maintenance of modern combat, power and transport equipment are inconceivable without the use of electronic computers and control devices.

In emphasizing the importance of high combat skills and the ability to fight in a modern way for achieving victory over a strong, well-armed and trained enemy, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov pointed out that the mastering of the science of winning has never been a simple and easy matter. But now, when the fire and strike power of the Army and Navy has immeasurably increased and when the nature of combat has changed fundamentally, it has become a much more complex thing to achieve high field, air and sea skills and this requires enormous daily efforts by all the personnel.

Since this important practical task concerns each serviceman, it is wise to examine certain theoretical ideas which disclose the essence and content of the concept of "troop skill" and the relationships of its component elements.

Troop or combat skill is usually the name given to the professional preparedness of the personnel which allows it in the best manner to utilize the existing resources to carry out the set training or combat tasks. In other words, the essence of skill for each soldier or each troop collective is to take from each type of modern weapon all that its design permits and to make maximum use of its combat capabilities.

In examining troop skill as an integral phenomenon, all aspects and facets of which are closely interrelated, we are right in isolating that facet which reflects the social sense of military service and the class-political focus of the entire training and indoctrination system for the Soviet military. In using the words of A. V. Lunacharskiy, our ideal is not to "train" a person for one or another specialty, but precisely to make him a "fighter for humanity." Communist conviction and a high awareness of patriotic and international duty--here is what primarily comprises the core to the personality of our soldier, moves him to conscientious service and engenders an affection for a military profession, a desire to achieve its heights and to become a master of a combat specialty.

In this context one cannot help but mention the attempts by bourgeois ideologists to foist off on us the false and essentially provocative thesis according to which under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution, all types of human activity, including the military profession, lose their social motives. The military ideologists and politicians of the West have endeavored to speculate on the externally similar processes occurring in the armed forces of the capitalist and socialist countries, in particular, the increased proportional amount of engineering and technical personnel and the higher military professionalism of all the personnel. Here they intentionally ignore the class-political essence of the given processes and, consequently, those motives which encourage increased individual and collective military skill in the armies of the opposing social systems.

Under the conditions of the present-day scientific and technical revolution which is of a global nature, not only are the socioideological motives in human conduct not being "devalued," but, on the contrary, our communist ideology is becoming an evermore active and powerful force in the fight against the old world and in the construction and defense of the new world. Precisely Marxism-Leninism and its scientific methodology provide the key to understanding the complex processes in the development of modern military affairs, including the

trends and prospects for the improving of the military skill of the Soviet servicemen.

Weapons and equipment have already reached such a level where their combat employment require not traditional mechanical operations and not even simply experience and skill, but a definite system of special knowledge and procedures. While previously the basic flow of scientific knowledge, to put it figuratively, "went in one ear and out the other" of the commanders and engineers, at present science is becoming an evermore important part in the understanding and practical activities of all the personnel, raising their professional skill to a qualitatively new level and broadening the possibilities of mastering the most complex equipment.

Even in the middle of the 1930's, in emphasizing the unconditional necessity for the full mastery of all that equipment which the army was receiving, M. I. Kalinin voiced the profound idea that the men should always be ahead of the equipment and that the army in mastering the given equipment should be above it in its knowledge and in its ability to utilize it. At present, we are perfectly aware that the most modern and most advanced combat equipment cannot be sufficiently dependable and effective if the level of knowledge employed in troop labor is below the level of the knowledge "embodied" in the given equipment. Moreover, the military professional training of the officers and all the personnel should be a dynamic factor which continuously outstrips the equipment and thereby encourages its further progress.

Thus, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, for the first time in all the history of military affairs, not merely has the role of the "human factor" in modern warfare increased, but primarily those qualitative characteristics of it which express the level of scientific education and intellectual development. Certainly, the effectiveness of troop mastery depends not only upon the amount of scientific knowledge among the military specialists, but also upon their ability to realize this knowledge in a very professional manner in the process of military and political training and actual combat operations.

Military professional culture is an indispensable element in skill. In the given instance it is a question of culture as an unique synthesis of professional skills and social responsibility. A soldier's profound understanding of the need to carry out the duties assigned to him in an exemplary manner and a responsible attitude toward carrying out the special military tasks also give rise to a feeling of moral satisfaction with the achieved results and a desire for new heights of skill. It is equally natural that a soldier who is recognized as a master of his job will always and everywhere endeavor to act conscientiously, accurately, skillfully and intelligently.

Professional activeness is one of the evidences of true mastery. Initiative, creativity, the exceeding of combat standards, innovation and rationalization--here is a far from complete list of the manifestations of this activeness. A master soldier is characterized not by the usual "secondary educational" share of the collective labor performed by him, but rather by a maximum personal contribution to the common cause. It is no accident that the basic number of

inventions and rationalization proposals by the servicemen involves such daily tasks as the operation and repair of combat equipment and weapons and the improving of the training facilities.

In recent years, the Army and Navy have begun to pose more acutely the questions of increasing the technical level, class skill and responsibility for the strictest fulfillment of the regulations, instructions, technical rules and standards. For this purpose, technical conferences, assemblies of specialists of different categories and contests for the title of the best have been widely employed. These measures are carried out, as a rule, directly in the training centers, at the ranges and airfields with the specific demonstrating of the advanced work methods and procedures on the regular equipment.

The organizing of military technical propaganda has become an important area of party political work. For example, many units and formations regularly give information on the development of equipment and weapons and the advanced experience of their introduction, operation and combat employment is effectively generalized and disseminated. Universities of military-technical knowledge have been organized for the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"]. Various technical circles operate directly in the subunits. Life has shown that with the proper organization of military-technical propaganda it can become an additional reserve for increasing the military skill of the personnel.

Military skill has a comprehensive nature. Since its elements form a single chain, there should not be any weak links in it. In other words, in order that a soldier's skill is dependable and trouble-free under any conditions, it is essential to approach its formation in such a manner that there actually is a unity of military-professional and moral-psychological training. Here each commander and political worker, in organizing training and indoctrination, should consider the particular features of modern warfare and be fully aware of the "safety margin"--combat, ideological and moral--which is now needed in training the defenders of the motherland.

Our nation's constitution clearly outlines the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the peoples, that is, to securely defend the socialist fatherland and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor. Here each word is invested with the most profound sense and has direct bearing on the content of military skill and its criteria.

What does it mean to be ready to deal an immediate rebuff to any aggressor? It means, in the first place, to ensure professional superiority over the strongest, technically highly equipped, perfidious and experienced enemy. With good reason the Communist Party has oriented the military personnel at achieving maximum results in combat and political training as well as maintaining discipline and vigilance at the highest limit. In improving combat readiness, it is important to constantly follow the appearance of new weapons, equipment and new tactical procedures for the probable enemy in order, when necessary, to parry them with our own highly effective methods and procedures of combat. The skill and moral tempering of our soldier should be such that in any event we will get the upper hand, even if the enemy has numerical or technical superiority in a specific combat situation.

The practical development and improvement of military skill is a complex and many-faceted task. Its successful execution is aided by Soviet reality itself, by the nature of our social and state system and by the just and noble goals of defending the socialist fatherland.

In contrast to the harsh discipline and bribery, as the basic methods of training the professional soldier in bourgeois armies, the Soviet school of military skill, in concentrating on the training of the citizen soldier, uses those ways and means which ensure the cognitive activity of the personnel in the mastery of the weapons and equipment and stimulate a desire to acquire the qualities needed for skillful actions in modern combat. Thus, under army conditions, the party's idea is actually realized of evermore completely uniting the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of socialism.

The great advantage of socialism is the creative activeness, initiative and enthusiasm of millions coming "from below," from the very depths of society. The most vivid manifestation of the independent activity of the masses is the socialist competition which has become a permanent part in the life of the Armed Forces. At the present stage, this is inseparable from the military-technical revolution and more and more is concentrated around the problems of the effectiveness and quality of combat training. Thus, in the previous training year, the improvement of technical and special training for the Army and Navy personnel was carried out under the motto "A Higher Level of Mastery for the New Equipment." This important direction in training and the competition was aimed at achieving a qualitative shift in the scope and depth of technical knowledge and practical skills among the servicemen, arming them with advanced procedures for the operation and combat employment of modern equipment and teaching them to skillfully carry out the arising tasks in any situation, as close as possible to combat reality.

The active, mass struggle for high combat readiness, for leading formations and excellent units, ships and subunits reflects the inherent needs of military practice when the mastery of the weapons and combat equipment has ceased being the privilege of a relatively narrow group of specialists and has become a generally recognized standard in the activities of the troop collectives as a whole.

The commanders, the political bodies, the staffs and party organizations have acquired great experience in directing the competition. This experience shows that with the skillful organization of the competition, in a short period of time it is possible to noticeably raise the level of combat skills and make the "secrets" of troop skill available to all the personnel. In speaking about "secrets," we have in mind those new, most effective procedures, methods and improvement which are utilized by the experts of the military specialties and advanced troop collectives and which have not yet been picked up by their comrades in arms.

The natural tendency for an increased role for military skill in the combat potential of an army and navy presupposes an ongoing improvement in all forms and methods of military technical training. It is equally important to support this training by a good ideological and moral atmosphere. Certainly an

expert is not merely an able and experienced soldier. This is a person who loves his job and knows its price. To demonstrate to a young soldier the high social sense and beauty of military service means to help him more quickly become involved in the intense training, to develop an affection for his combat specialty and to more surely reach the heights of mastery. Precisely on this basis, as practice shows, the soldiers and sergeants, the sailors and petty officers develop the most profound, lasting incentives for military professional growth and the necessary combat and moral-psychological qualities are formed.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly drew attention to the fact that danger is a vicissitude of war and that in a war a person is constantly surrounded by dangers. New weapons have greatly broadened the spectrum and scope of dangers which a soldier may encounter in the frontline zone or deep in the rear. This is why, in assessing the level of military skill and its combat reliability, it is essential ahead of time to make an "adjustment" for the effect of the moral-psychological factor. It must be considered that even the threat of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction can cause nervous tension which may impede not only the complex professional skills, but also the most elementary actions of the personnel. From this derives the task of constantly increasing the "safety factor" in the combat skill of our personnel and developing in them boldness, steadfastness, self-sacrifice and the capacity to maintain a cool head in extreme situations.

Teaching the troops the ability to operate under conditions as close as possible to combat reality presupposes an uninterrupted unity of military-technical, weapons and tactical training with the moral-psychological tempering of the men. In this regard the problem of professionalizing psychological qualities, that is, their conformity to the needs of a specific combat specialty, assumes particular acuteness.

It is perfectly apparent that each Soviet soldier should be bold, decisive and cool-headed. At the same time, one cannot help but consider those additional stresses on the mind and feelings which are specific to the various types of combat activity. For example, for the missile troops these stresses are related to the particular responsibility and necessity of receiving a large amount of information as well as clarity and accuracy in working on the combat equipment. A pilot needs the ability to orient himself well in the air situation, a high reaction speed, independence in taking decisions and strong will. Skillful actions by airborne troops are inconceivable without the mastery of many types of weapons, the capacity to fight in the enemy rear and so forth.

An imperative of our times is a scientific approach to troop training and indoctrination. It is important for each officer not only to know what he must teach his subordinates, but also how to do this practically in taking into account that situation in which the soldier may find himself, what factors can affect him in combat and what specifically must be developed in his character and psyche so that he is able to hold out in any difficult conditions and successfully carry out the combat task. At present, indispensable for a leader of exercises and drills is a profound knowledge in the area of military affairs, military pedagogics and psychology as well as the ability to anticipate real

combat situations and bring the combat training situation as close as possible to these, approaching the solution to arising problems creatively.

It is not easy to understand modern equipment and master the procedures of its combat employment. An experienced commander or political worker always considers the unique psychological shock which can arise in a young soldier upon first acquaintance with the mighty and complex equipment. Frequently, a more experienced soldier or sailor, in encountering difficulties, may lose his customary confidence and begin to doubt his ability to rise to the heights of combat mastery. Here an individual approach to the men is important. For one it may be enough to show approval with a paternal word, another may need specific advice and a third may need additional study. It is always wise to carefully investigate the reasons which have given rise to various difficulties in mastering the equipment and the methods of its combat employment.

It is inconceivable to teach the troops in a complex and intense situation and under conditions as close as possible to actual combat without the posing of evermore difficult tasks. But this in no way means that any difficulty is to the benefit of combat skill and strengthens character. Training practices indicate that our men are understanding of difficult assignments and inputs and they stubbornly overcome the "enemy" resistance and the objective hardships of field and combat life. A completely different moral-psychological effect is engendered by the difficulties which run counter to the logic of combat or which are the result of erroneous decisions or insufficiently thought-out planning and support for the exercises and drills. This is why each officer should constantly improve his professional training, serve as a standard of combat skill for his subordinates, achieve an instructiveness of the exercises and combine proper exactingness with concern for the men in the broadest sense of this word.

The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, drew the attention of the officer personnel to the linkage of the effectiveness of troop training and indoctrination with the level of military discipline. High organization and firm order are the basis for the prompt and accurate realization of the training plans and for maximum results from each exercise. At the same time, even individual manifestations of disorganization can lead to serious failings in combat and political training. Consequently, the stronger discipline is in a subunit, unit or ship, the higher the effectiveness and quality of the training and indoctrinational process. Of course, there is also feedback here: the better organized the training and indoctrination of the men are the more it influences the strengthening of discipline. This dialectical dependence should always be considered by each officer in his activities.

The problem of further improving troop skill has been raised by life itself. It conforms fully to those ideas on defense questions which were put forward by the 26th Party Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In responding by deeds to the paternal concern of the party and people for strengthening the combat potential of the Armed Forces, the Soviet military are constantly mastering the weapons and equipment entrusted to them, they are honing their combat skill and strengthening discipline and organization in their ranks.

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ROLE OF PARTY IN RAISING TRAINING PERFORMANCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 83 (signed to press 4 Mar 83) pp 43-48

[Article by Lt Col V. Kutrovskiy, deputy chief of a formation's political section: "A Heightened Reaction"]

[Text] Let me start with the fact which actually caused me to take up my pen. During the very first days of the training year, we learned that in a number of subunits of regiment X, exercises in weapons training and the driving of combat vehicles had been carried out with poor quality. For example, this was the case in the battalion where Capt G. Fiterer served. Here one could particularly see shortcomings in the organization and conduct of the exercises and drills and these told on the results of the combat training for the tank troops. In the summing up of the socialist competition, the battalion was in last place.

We began an investigation. We spoke with the commander, the political worker and the activists. One explained the shortcomings by the fact that new personnel--officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers--had arrived in the subunit. Until they shaped up there supposedly would be a bit of trouble. Another referred to the inputs which life dealt. Still another found some, in his view, convincing arguments.

But what actually had happened?

As it turned out, the reason for the poor quality of the exercises and drills was to be found in the insufficient procedural training of the officers, that is, the company and platoon commanders. The training program envisaged the carrying out of instructor-procedural exercises for them. This was done. But how? The comrades to whom the organizing of these had been assigned had not taken care that the exercises be carried out on a high procedural level. They approached their preparation formally, and did not supervise how they were carried out. In a word, a measure was done for the sake of mere appearances. But later this reflected on the quality of the training.

The influence of the moral atmosphere prevailing in the battalion was also felt. The men did not feel responsibility for the overall success and were not properly motivated to struggle for a further rise in combat readiness.

Certain officers (unfortunately, there were also communists among them) reasoned approximately thus: the year is just starting, if we have overlooked something, we can make it up later on....

When we were working in the unit, we realized that something similar had happened last year. Then, in this unit there had been a sort of shakiness and instances of weaknesses and oversimplification in combat training. A party assessment was not promptly given to them and necessary measures not undertaken for eliminating the shortcomings. As a result, in the final exercises many subunits received only satisfactory grades.

I also recalled a recent meeting of the formation's party aktiv. Speaking at it was Maj M. Pis'mennyy, the party committee secretary from that regiment. Yes, the secretary admitted, there had been many flaws in the work of the unit party organization. Its influence had declined on certain aspects in the life of the troop collective. Individual communists did not set an example in training and service. There were comrades who overlooked deviations from the troop regulations and did not show principledness and concern for the cause of the collective. "We are aware of these shortcomings, we know about them," said the party committee secretary summing up in his speech.

Those present, it must be admitted, were not very satisfied by this speech. Why had the failings in training and service been possible? What was the reason for the low responsibility of the party members and candidate members? What had prevented the party committee from creating an atmosphere of implacability toward shortcomings in the collective? The secretary did not try to answer these questions. The opinion was formed that the unit party organization had not drawn conclusions from the past. As they say, the lesson had been in vain.

Of course, we analyzed what had occurred. We held certain communist leaders responsible for the shortcomings in service activities. We suggested to the party activists what their failings had been and helped them organize ideological indoctrination and organizational work. We recommended that the demands be increased on the communists who tolerated shortcomings and hushed them up and we advised that reports be heard regularly by the party members and candidate members on their fulfillment of service and party duties. Time showed that there had been a definite return from the measures undertaken.

But something was bothering me. Why in such instances did it inevitably require intervention "from above"? Why did the party organizations wait for these pushes? Why do not all party collectives respond sharply to shortcomings in combat training and service and to the fact that combat readiness in a unit or subunit has declined albeit slightly? Certainly the responsibility of the communists, their principledness and party concern for the state of affairs in the troop collective should be apparent where success is determined in carrying out the combat training tasks, as nowhere else.

A heightened reaction.... As is known, V. I. Lenin responded with great implacability to various violations of legality, the established order, party discipline and oversights in work. He demanded the immediate rectification of mistakes, the elimination of shortcomings and the adopting of the strictest

measures against the guilty parties. He felt that the communists must be approached with particular exactingness. "A person is not worthy of the title of a party member," wrote Lenin, "if he does not know how to demand and secure from his underlings the fulfillment of their party obligations...." Our party has constantly focused its members at an active struggle against those who permit deviations from the generally accepted standards and rules and requirements of communist morality.

We have party collectives where an atmosphere of true exactingness has been created, where they respond sharply to instances of violations of the party and military regulations and where they constantly indoctrinate in the communists a feeling of responsibility for the state of affairs in the unit or subunit. Here is a concrete example. The subunit party organization which is headed by Maj V. Kharchenko is marked by high activity, principledness and militancy. In being in this collective and becoming acquainted with its deeds each time one is convinced that here the communists respond sharply to instances of various violations and in everything are guided by party principles.

I recall that once there were more frequent instances of the violating of military discipline in the subunit. How was this expressed? Certain soldiers and sergeants were late to formation and had a sloppy appearance. "That is only a detail," some might argue, "scarcely worth the attention." However, the party organization did not overlook this. The question of the personal contribution of the communists to the strengthening of military discipline was raised with all acuteness at one of the party meetings. There was a principled, useful conversation. There was a rebuff to the comrades who did not see any harm in "minor" infractions of military discipline, who closed their eyes to shortcomings in disciplinary practices, who overlooked omissions in the organization of internal service and did not carry out painstaking, individual work with the men. In the course of the collective advice giving, the communists outlined measures aimed at strengthening military discipline in the subunit. The party bureau established unflagging control over their implementation. Reports were heard by those comrades who had not paid proper attention to individual work with subordinates and who had tolerated infractions of order. The party communists organized an exchange of experience with the leading commanders and the young officers. These and other measures helped to increase the communists' responsibility for the situation in the collective and to create an atmosphere of great exactingness in it.

Or the following example. The party organization of the unit where Officer A. Gavrilov is one of the party bureau members, decided to review the question "On the Examples Set by the Communists in Improving Technical Training." There was a need for this. Facts had shown that in certain subunits of the unit close attention had not been paid to the questions of technical training for the specialists. In particular, the men had not sufficiently studied the equipment of the combat weapons. Individual platoon commanders assumed that the main thing was to teach their subordinate correct actions on the equipment. But in order to utilize it skillfully, it is essential to have firm knowledge the foundation of which is laid in the process of painstaking, systematic training. But this training was not properly organized. At times, it was replaced by ordinary "coaching" on the equipment. And what caused a good deal of concern for the commander and the party activists was that even some of the communists evidenced a flippant attitude toward technical training.

A sharp discussion was held at the party meeting. Now it can be said that this was all in good time. The sharp response to the shortcomings, the effective measures worked out by the meeting and the organizational work of the communists aimed at carrying out what had been planned--all of this made it possible to increase the level of troop technical training.

The examples which I have given, I feel, convince one of how important it is for the party organization to see the shortcomings in the bud and not to allow them to grow. It is essential to see to it, as was pointed out in the report at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, that each party organization, party committee and party bureau promptly discovers the shortcomings and assesses them from a principled viewpoint. Precisely under such a condition can the party organization effectively influence all aspects of life in the troop collective. We are endeavoring for this to be profoundly understood in each party organization. The question of exactingness, principledness and the responsibility of communists for the constant rise in combat readiness are taken up at the meetings of the party aktiv, the seminars of the party organization secretaries and the meetings of the unit and subunit political workers in the political section. In working on the spot, we help the men create an atmosphere of exactingness and implacability for shortcomings in the collectives. But all our efforts do not always produce the desired results.

Sometimes one works in a party organization and the initial impression forms that the collective responds sharply to failings in various comrades and shows exactingness towards the violators of discipline. Reports by the party members and candidate members are heard at the party meetings and sessions of the party committee or bureau. Seemingly strict demands are being placed on the violators. And as strange as it may seem, exactingness is shown, but the state of affairs does not change.

Again, let me give a specific example. During the last training year, repeatedly the communists in the unit where Officer M. Nagumanov serves had been criticized for the fact that they little helped the commander in improving organization and establishing proper order. Unfortunately, during the current year things changed little here in comparison with the past year. The unit has violations of military discipline. If one speaks about this with the party committee secretary or other party activists, they merely shrug their shoulders. Supposedly they are doing everything possible, the questions of strengthening discipline are discussed at meetings and sessions of the party committee and punishments are imposed on communists who commit deviations from the party and military regulations....

Yes, in fact, here they frequently discuss how organization can be increased and discipline strengthened. But it is not a question of posing questions, rather that each time they find ways inherent in a party organization for approaching a solution to the urgent problems and outline the most effective procedures and methods of party influence on the state of affairs in the collective. The unit party organization has been unable to do this. Certainly the procedures and methods of party action are well known. For example, there is the personal example of the communist in training and service. This is an

effective means for raising the effectiveness of party work and the key to strengthening party influence on the carrying out of tasks in the area of military and political training. It is precisely the example set by the CPSU members and candidate members in military discipline that the unit party organization has not achieved. In just the last few months, several communists have received party reprimands. On the one hand this means that the party organization has shown exactingness. But in a number of instances the reprimands have been a delayed response to the violations and ineffective blows.

Not so long ago, the party commission under the political section approved a decision of the party organization to expel Capt P. Lunev from party ranks. This officer frequently hit the bottle and did not always show up for work. Certainly a person who insults this title cannot be a communist. But Lunev, as they say, did not reach this point all at once. The communists could see that the man was straying from the correct path. However, they did not respond promptly and did not straighten him out.

The political section did not overlook these instances. They became a subject of thorough discussion at the seminars for the party organization secretaries and at meetings in the political section. Here we would emphasize that a great deal depends upon the principled position of the party organization and upon its ability to influence its members using party methods. We would also suggest how to increase the effectiveness of the influence on the men and give specific recommendations.

The instance which I mentioned above leads one to reflect about the following. A strict demand and exactingness presuppose not only a prompt response to the shortcomings, but also the constant development and improvement of criticism. It sometimes happens that in one collective there is no shortage of critical comments at the meetings and sessions of the party committee and bureau. However, the criticism at times is of a general sort and unfocused. The communists talk about the shortcomings, but are often silent about the guilty parties. And so it happens that the arrows are sharp, but miss the target.

Not long ago I was at a meeting in the party organization of a battalion under the command of Maj V. Selishchev. The subunit is considered a lagging one. Last year, the motorized rifle troops did not achieve the planned goals. At present, they are having problems fulfilling the socialist obligations. The commander and the party organization are not sufficiently concerned with the development of the socialist competition. It has not become the flesh and blood of the training and indoctrination process and has not become an effective means in the struggle for high combat readiness. The main reason is that certain officers have a formal approach to organizing the socialist competition. They sum up the results irregularly, they do not publicize the results and do not disseminate advanced experience. The facts on this score are known. One would think that at the meeting the communists would have carried out a sharp, demanding conversation and placed strict demands on the guilty parties. However, one comrade spoke and then another, but no one asked the main question of why the communists were not in the vanguard of the competition and why were individual party members and candidate members unprincipled in assessing instances of a formal attitude toward carrying out the socialist obligations.

"We still are not working enough," "we have comrades who are little concerned," "we must give more attention"--said the speakers. But what, one might ask, is the benefit from such comments and how can they influence the outcome of the matter if they are not directed to specific persons, if they do not touch the heart and soul of a person, if they do not excite him and do not impel him to self-critical analysis and energetic actions?

In organizing the training and indoctrination of the party aktiv, we focus the party organization secretaries and the members of the elective bodies at paying more concern for developing criticism and self-criticism and, in being guided by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, in all the party organizations to establish a spirit of self-criticism, intolerance of shortcomings. At the seminars for secretaries, when we are at the party organizations, we draw the attention of the men to this important question. An atmosphere of exactingness in a party collective depends largely upon the position and personality of the secretary. The leader of the communists must possess high political, professional and organizational qualities and in every way be up to the party's demands. He should set an example of principledness and a heightened reaction to deviations from the CPSU by-laws.

We have a majority of such secretaries but, unfortunately, there are also comrades who have good ideological and theoretical training, not bad organizational skills, however they lack principledness and boldness in raising difficult questions.

Here I recall the following instance. The political section received a warning that the communist leaders from one of the battalions were being insulting and rude to their subordinates. The facts were confirmed in a check. In actuality, Officers A. Andreyev, V. Losev and V. Burko were not truly concerned with the indoctrination of their subordinates, they had forgotten about an individual approach to the man and emphasized rule by the book. Moreover, they gave way to shouting and insulted the soldiers and sergeants.

The party organization secretary, Officer V. Shcherbakov, had known about all of this. But he did not do anything to influence Andreyev, Losev and Burko. And since the secretary himself did not properly respond to the shortcomings, the other communists made it appear as if nothing special was happening. In a word, the party organization was not up to things.

After the intervention by the political section, the appropriate measures were taken and a party assessment given to what had occurred. We discussed what had happened at a seminar for the party organization secretaries and analyzed how the recommendations of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries were being carried out and, in particular, the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense on the secretary's work style as stated in his report at this conference. There was an instructive conversation about the role of the party secretary in creating an atmosphere of implacability for shortcomings in the collective as well as about a Leninist style of work.

In my comments, I would like to share my thoughts about the following. Frequently, one can hear the definition that party work is work with people. Certain party activists do not tire in repeating it. But at times, they forget

something, the lack of which simply makes party work impossible. I have in mind attention to people. Attention and concern for them. Instances are encountered which do show that individual communists do not know the needs and interests of the servicemen and are inattentive of their wants. There have been instances of a bureaucratic approach to settling questions involving the satisfying of the needs of the men.

A letter from Pvt A. Dudakov was received from the unit where Maj M. Pis'menny is the party committee secretary. The soldier stated that the men of the unit were not being provided with proper supplies. We instructed Officer V. Filippov to make an investigation on the spot. He later reported that the facts had basically been confirmed and that measures were taken.

A little time passed and again a complaint from this unit. Again about the poor supply of uniforms. Again there was an investigation. It turned out that previously in the regiment there had been instances of an inattentive attitude toward the needs of the servicemen. Irresponsibility had been shown by the communists who in the line of duty were ordered to be concerned for the men and improving their everyday life. But what about the party organization? It had not responded to these shortcomings.

And here the political section had to intervene. We held the guilty parties responsible. We pointed out to Filippov his formal investigation following up on the letter. We helped the party committee and party organizations of the subunits in forming an atmosphere of exactingness and intolerance of shortcomings in the collective. We recommended that the party organization discuss the question "Attention to Personnel, Constant Concern for Them--A Duty of Each Communist." We also advised that colloquiums be held with the party members and candidate members on the CPSU By-Laws and the materials of the 26th Party Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Nor did we forget to follow up on how our recommendations were being carried out.

We teach, but we also learn from the senior comrades who offer valuable lessons. Here is one of them.

Once we superficially investigated a conflict situation. WO V. Kislenko had not vacated his apartment which he had been granted for temporary use. Officers M. Maksimovich and V. Lopatkin, without troubling themselves with an investigation, demanded that he immediately vacate the apartment. And in order that this order appear "impressive" it was sent to the building where Kislenko lived and the soldier went "for help." Kislenko complained to the superior political body. Soon thereafter we received a letter from them which pointed out to us that we must not overlook violations of the law and established procedures and proposed that measures be adopted against the guilty parties.

This letter took a unique lesson for us. It must be admitted that we made this look at a moment when "billeting" passions had become heated. I think that had we had more complete information about what was happening in the unit collective and had known the men better and responded immediately to what had happened, possibly the conflict may not have existed.

The professional training of the officer personnel. The strengthening of discipline. The improving of ideological indoctrination. The steady mastery of new equipment.... There are many urgent questions in the troop collectives of the division's units and subunits. In solving them a major role can and should be played by the party organizations and their heightened response to the slightest deviations from the requirements of the military regulations. The 26th CPSU Congress demanded more principledness. This demand now as well remains the crucial thing in our work.

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MATERIAL FOR POLITICAL LECTURE OF NEED FOR INCREASED COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 83 (signed to press 4 Mar 83) pp 75-81

[Unattributed article: "To Be In Constant Combat Readiness"*]

[Text] The purpose of the exercise on the given subject is to help the men more profoundly understand the complexity of the international situation and the demands of the CPSU and its 26th Congress to constantly maintain the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces on the proper level and to increase vigilance. In the course of the exercise, it is important to thoroughly bring out the provisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the party Central Committee documents on the aggressive essence of imperialism, the objective need to further strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state and the tasks of the soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers stemming from the party's demands, that is, to honorably carry out their patriotic and international duty and to securely protect the historic victories of socialism.

Six hours are allocated for studying the subject. Of this time, it is recommended that 2 hours be used for a lecture (narration), 2 for independent study and 2 hours for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration) it is essential to examine the following questions:

1. The aggressive essence of imperialism. The increased international tension.
2. The concern of the CPSU for strengthening the nation's defense capability and improving its Armed Forces.
3. To increase in every possible way combat readiness and vigilance, to strengthen discipline--the duty of every soldier.

It is advisable to commence the exercise with a brief introduction. In it, it is essential to point out that the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, in carrying out the decisions of the historic 26th CPSU Congress, are continuing to increase their successes in fulfilling the tasks confronting them. All their activities are being carried out under the beneficial effect of the decisions of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the

* Material for political exercises on the subject "Constant Combat Readiness--The Chief Demand of the Communist Party and the Soviet People on the USSR Armed Forces."

materials of the joint ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Here a profound analysis was made of the domestic situation of our country and the present-day international atmosphere, and all its complexity was emphasized.

The ensuring of a lasting peace and the defense of the right of peoples to independence and social progress are unchanging goals in our foreign policy, said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In the struggle for these goals, the party and state leadership will act according to principle, consistently and judiciously. At the same time, it was pointed out that the Soviet Union is closely following the development of events on the international scene and the aggressive intrigues of imperialism; it is maintaining the combat readiness of its Armed Forces on a proper level.

1. The Aggressive Essence of Imperialism. The Increase in International Tension

The taking up of the first question must start by recalling that the 26th CPSU Congress described the present international situation as complex and marked primarily by an intense struggle between two currents in world policy. On the one hand there is the course of checking the arms race, strengthening peace and detente and defending the sovereign rights and liberty of the peoples and, on the other, the course of undermining detente, intensifying the arms race, a policy of threat and intervention into others' affairs and the suppressing of the liberation struggle. The congress stated that there would be a further increase in the might, activeness and authority of the Soviet Union and the other socialist commonwealth nations and pointed out that the revolutionary struggle of the peoples had been marked by new victories.

In the 1970's, the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress pointed out, the elimination of the colonial empires was actually completed. The congress also pointed out that the sphere of imperialist rule in the world has been narrowed while the internal contradictions in the capitalist countries and the rivalry between them have grown more intense. There has been a sharp rise in the aggressiveness of imperialism and primarily American.

Under the conditions where the storm clouds were gathering on the international horizon by the beginning of the 1980's, the Soviet Union struggled consistently to eliminate the military threat, to preserve and deepen detente and in practice developed mutually advantageous cooperation with a majority of the world's nations. Along with the other peace-loving states and with the realistically thinking circles in the West, it continued to fight against the arms race.

At the same time, at the congress it was pointed out that at present the struggle to lessen the threat of war and to check the arms race has assumed particular significance. The problem is that rapid and profound changes are occurring in the development of military equipment. Qualitatively new types of weapons are being developed, types which can make control of them and hence,

a coordinated limitation of them, an exceptionally difficult matter if not impossible. The new stage in the arms race is undermining international stability and greatly strengthening the danger of an outbreak of war.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the policy of the aggressive imperialist circles has already led to a significant rise in international tension. In this regard the 26th CPSU Congress has noticed increased activities among the enemies of detente, the limiting of weapons and the improving of relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries. Adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their narrow selfish interests--this is what is particularly apparent in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles. In demonstrating complete disdain for the rights and aspirations of peoples, they are endeavoring to depict the liberation struggle of the masses of people as a manifestation of "terrorism." They have truly set the task of attaining the unattainable, that is, to erect a barrier on the path of progressive changes in the world and to regain the role of the controllers of human destiny.

The most reactionary circles, particularly in the United States as well as in England, the FRG, Japan and other imperialist countries, have undertaken a fierce attack against detente and are endeavoring to even further exacerbate the international situation and return international relations to the times of the "Cold War." In pursuit of this, they have frequently endeavored to utilize economic ties with the USSR as a means of political pressure. The noticeable exacerbation of ideological warfare is also a fact. For the West, this does not come down to a clash of ideas. Here they have put into action an entire system of means designed to undermine the socialist world and to bring it down.

The imperialists and their supporters are systematically conducting hostile campaigns against the socialist countries. They blacken and distort everything that is happening in these nations. For them, the main thing is to turn people against socialism. Our class opponents are learning from their defeats and are acting with evermore refinement and perfidiousness against the socialist nations.

The imperialist states which are members of the aggressive NATO bloc have set out on the path of active material preparations for war. Military expenditures are growing unchecked in these countries. Over the three and a half postwar decades the United States alone has spent 2 trillion dollars for military purposes. At present, over the next 5 years--1983-1987--alone, they intend to spend for these purposes over 1.6 trillion dollars. Here the lion's share of these colossal amounts is to go for developing strategic offensive forces and all types of nuclear weapons.

Quite recently, the American president approved a decision to deploy another 100 new MX intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. Along with this production is underway of the new so-called Eurostrategic Pershing-2 missiles and medium-ranged cruise missiles which can be launched from different carriers. As was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in speaking at a meeting of the party aktiv in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, at present practical preparations are already underway to deploy these in the Western European NATO nations. Space military systems are also being developed. The arsenal of chemical weapons is being modernized and

significantly increased. The power of the combat-ready groupings and fleets is being raised. The effectiveness of conventional weapons is increasing sharply. The network of military bases and installations aimed against the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth is being modernized.

American military doctrines stemming from the strategy proclaimed by Washington of "direct confrontation" are also aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and establishing American world domination. These doctrines include a broad range of aggressive concepts from the making of a massed first nuclear strike to the conducting of "limited" and "extended" nuclear wars. But the essence of all of them is to destroy socialism as a sociopolitical system.

Finally, the new "crusade" against communism announced by the American president is also aimed at achieving world domination by the United States. Here the aim is to politically isolate and economically weaken the USSR and its friends. For this, an economic and ideological offensive has been undertaken against our nation and the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

Aggressiveness lies in the very nature of imperialism and in the capitalist method of production. "Imperialism....," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "in terms of its fundamental economic properties, is marked by the least peaceableness and love of freedom and by the greatest and ubiquitous development of the military" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 248).

The aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed. Under present-day conditions this is apparent in the most diverse forms. Imperialism has unleashed local wars, it has organized all sorts of military provocations, it has increased the arms race and is endeavoring to alter the balance of forces in its favor. As was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, the imperialist circles think in categories of rule and coercion vis-a-vis other states and peoples. The monopolies need foreign oil, uranium and nonferrous metals and so the Near East, Africa and Indian Ocean are declared to be a sphere of U.S. "vital interests." The U.S. military machine is actively penetrating there, while billions of dollars are being spent on establishing new military bases there as well as expanding the already existing ones. In order to share expenses with others and at the same time to more closely tie its NATO partners to itself, the United States is seeking to enlarge the functions of this aggressive bloc and is making every effort to draw scores of other states into its military preparations and to further ensnare the world with a spider web of bases, airfields and weapons dumps. This is being justified by nothing more than the "Soviet military threat," a myth which is actively being disseminated by bourgeois propaganda.

A military threat does hang over the United States as it does over all other nations of the world. But its source is not the Soviet Union and not its mythical military superiority, but rather the arms race itself initiated by the imperialists and the international tension maintained by them.

In characterizing the militaristic aspirations of monopolistic capital at the present stage, it is essential to point out that the imperialists are endeavoring by all means to impede the growth of the national liberation struggle

throughout the world. At the 26th CPSU Congress it was pointed out, for example, that they had endeavored to seek reprisal against the people's revolutions in Angola and Ethiopia by using internal counterrevolution or aggression from outside. Imperialism initiated a true undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This created a direct threat to the security of our southern frontier as well. Such a situation forced the USSR to provide military aid to Afghanistan which the friendly country had openly sought.

The imperialists do not like the growing independence of the liberated nations. By thousands of ways and means they are endeavoring to tie these countries to themselves in order to more freely dispose of their natural riches and to utilize their territory for their aggressive strategic plans. Here the old method of the colonialists of "divide and rule" is widely employed.

In completing the material of the first question, it is essential to emphasize particularly that as a whole the policy of the aggressive imperialist forces and their supporters has led to a significant heightening of international tension. It is important to make each student aware that the intrigues of imperialism require constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of the defense capability of our state and all the fraternal socialist countries.

The intended aggravation of the international situation by imperialism and the attempts of Washington again, like decades ago, to speak to us using the language of the "Cold War," are clearly a hopeless ploy. In the past, no one has succeeded in intimidating the Soviet Union and this is all the truer now. It possesses proper restraint and dependable defensive might.

2. Concern of the CPSU for Strengthening the Nation's Defense Capability and Improving Its Armed Forces

In bringing out the content of this question, it is important to show the complexity of the international situation in which the Soviet people must carry out the plans of communist construction. The policy of the aggressive imperialist forces and their course of undermining detente and strengthening preparations for war have sharply aggravated international tension. The threat to peace since World War II has never been so serious as now. The reactionary circles of the imperialist states, primarily the United States, have initiated a political, ideological and economic offensive against socialism and have brought the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level. They have intended to disrupt the existing military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance.

The greater activity by the reactionary circles of the imperialist states and their increasing military might have forced the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth nations to show unflagging vigilance and ensure their security.

"The aggressive intrigues of imperialism," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "have forced us along with the fraternal

socialist states to be concerned, and to be seriously concerned, with the maintaining of defense capability on the proper level."

The USSR Armed Forces have constantly felt the close attention of the CPSU to national defense. The party has worked out a military (and also military-technical) policy and military doctrine, it has directed the life and activities of the Army and Navy and has led the development of Soviet military science and military art, the training and indoctrination of the military personnel and all personnel, the development of international ties with the armies of the fraternal socialist nations and the strengthening of their combat cooperation. In carrying out this work, the CPSU has unswervingly been guided by Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and the Leninist teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland.

The military-technical policy of the CPSU is aimed at the predominant development of the most progressive weapons systems which meet the needs of modern warfare, the rapid improvement of military equipment and the introduction of full automation in troop command and control. In elaborating such a policy, consideration has been given to the trends in military doctrines, the state of industry and transport, scientific and technical progress, and the levels achieved in the logistical support for the armies of the probable enemies. There has been a scientifically sound equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces with combat equipment and weapons, the improving of their organizational structure and a correct balancing of the services and branches of troops and naval forces. The carrying out of this task has required the concentration of large scientific-technical energy and material-production resources in the defense industry.

Due to the concern of the party and state, the defense might and combat readiness of our Army and Navy have risen to a new level. A further qualitative improvement in the Soviet Armed Forces is being carried out. In terms of their technical equipping, they now fully meet their historic purpose and are capable of successfully carrying out any tasks which the Communist Party and the Soviet government pose for them.

The Army and Navy possess nuclear missile weapons, supersonic missile-carrying aviation, nuclear missile-carrying submarines, radio electronic and other modern military equipment. A new step ahead has been taken in the combat improvement of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The Ground Forces are developing continuously. The Air Defense Forces and Air Forces possess high combat qualities. The might of our Navy has increased. The rear services of the USSR Armed Forces and Civil Defense continue to improve. The Border and Interior Troops have undergone further development.

At the same time, it must be particularly emphasized that no matter how great the military-technical capabilities of the Army and Navy are, their main force lies in the personnel who operate the military equipment and weapons. The major changes occurring in our society's social structure have been reflected positively in the qualitative features of the personnel. Now the Armed Forces are manned by youth who have a high level of overall development, good knowledge and labor skills and diverse interests. At present, almost 100 percent of the men in the Armed Forces has a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary

education. The share of servicemen with a higher and secondary education is now around 80 percent. The number of communists and Komsomol members in the Army and Navy ranks has increased. They are more than 90 percent of all servicemen.

The changes in the social make-up of our Armed Forces have contributed to a further strengthening of the inner unity and moral-political solidarity of the personnel. Due to the concern of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, our Armed Forces possess officer personnel who are dedicated to the party and the motherland, who are mature and highly trained in political, military and technical terms.

A characteristic feature in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage is the further strengthening of their unity with the people. Our Army and Navy have enormous affection and support among the Soviet people.

One of the basic directions in the Communist Party's activities to strengthen the Army and Navy has been the greatest possible intensification of party political work and communist indoctrination of the personnel. V. I. Lenin considered party political work a powerful means for the ideological-political indoctrination of the Soviet military and for ensuring the high combat readiness of the troops as well as one of the obligatory conditions for victory over the enemy. "Where political work is carried out...most carefully in the troops...", pointed out V. I. Lenin, "there is no laxness in the army, its order and morale are better and there are more victories" (PSS, Vol 39, p 56).

Under present-day conditions, the demands on the moral-political preparation of the Armed Forces personnel have increased immeasurably. The role of party political work has grown even more. Its chief aim is to mobilize the Army and Navy personnel to carry out Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland and to fulfill the requirements of the Communist Party on the questions of strengthening national defense capability and increasing the combat capability and readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The CPSU has always given and does give enormous importance to raising the level of ideological work. The establishing of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for the Soviet nation and a readiness to come to the defense of the victories of socialism in the minds of the workers and primarily the younger generation, has been and remains one of the party's main tasks.

Ideological and political indoctrination in the Army and Navy is organized considering these demands. This is aimed at indoctrinating in the men wholehearted love for the motherland, steadfastness, courage, a conscientious attitude toward the assigned job as well as at developing an activist position in life in each of them.

One of the important tasks in ideological work at the present stage is to explain the materials of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the joint ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation

of the USSR and the speech at it by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in addition to the tasks posed by the party for the USSR Armed Forces and for each serviceman.

In ideological indoctrination an important place is held by establishing the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for our motherland and a readiness to come to its defense at any moment in the minds of each officer, warrant officer ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeant and petty officer, soldier and sailor.

In concluding the second question, the propagandist should point out that the CPSU and the fraternal communist and workers parties in the socialist nations, in being guided by Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, have shown constant concern for steadily strengthening the military-political unity of the socialist commonwealth. The Warsaw Pact is a defensive organization of the European socialist states set up to defend socialist victories against imperialist encroachment. The main goal of the military-political commonwealth of fraternal peoples is under the conditions of the existence of the two opposing systems, to ensure the complete security of the socialist nations, to securely defend the most progressive social system against the intrigues of imperialism, and to ensure the necessary external conditions for the successful construction of socialism and communism. The Soviet Union considers as its international obligation the ensuring of the dependable defense and security of the entire socialist commonwealth as its international obligation.

By the joint efforts of the CPSU, the communist and workers parties in the other socialist nations, a secure system of military-political cooperation has been set up and the basic areas of its further strengthening have been outlined. These areas include the coordinating of efforts by the allied nations over the questions of strengthening defense, the organizational development of the national armies, joint measures and the exchange of experience in operational-tactical and combat training, the elaboration and introduction of advanced troop training and indoctrinational methods, mutual aid in training the military personnel for all types of armed services and branches of troops and cooperation among the political bodies of the allied armies.

The Warsaw Pact securely serves the interests of peace and socialism. All the activities of the Warsaw Pact are a vivid example of the mutual aid among the peoples of the socialist commonwealth in all areas of their life and activity. As long as the imperialists threaten the socialist nations with war and are engaged in an arms race, our nation, along with the other Warsaw Pact members, will strengthen this military-political union. Its strengthening is a dependable guarantee for protecting socialist victories of the peoples as well as the cause of peace, democracy and progress.

3. For the Greatest Possible Increase in Combat Readiness and Vigilance, for Strengthening Discipline--The Duty of Each Soldier

In taking up the third question, it is essential first of all to remind the students of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress on the USSR Armed Forces to be in constant combat readiness and to vigilantly guard the peaceful, creative

labor of the Soviet people. This demand has been and remains fundamental in the life and activities of the troops and focuses them on steady and purposeful training, the improving of the combat skill of each man, at increasing vigilance and strengthening organization and order. Here it is essential to point out that the admonishment of V. I. Lenin on the need for vigilance, constant combat readiness and strong military discipline in the Army and Navy have been viewed by all generations of the Soviet military as a vital, compulsory thing. This can be seen from the numerous examples from the times of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars as well as the subsequent development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Some of them should be given at the exercise. It is important to emphasize that in the battles against the enemy, our troops have set examples of military skill, steadfastness and loyalty to the motherland. During the Great Patriotic War more than 7 million men received orders and medals and more than 11,600 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and heroism. The names of around 300 servicemen who have been entered in perpetuity on the rolls of the units and ships for unprecedented bravery and courage each day are read out at the evening inspection.

The Armed Forces have celebrated their 60th anniversary with good successes in military and political training. The ranks of outstanding men, class specialists and masters of military affairs have grown significantly while field, air and sea skills of the personnel have improved. The modern weapons and combat equipment have begun to be employed more effectively.

In the struggle for new heights in combat mastery, broad opportunities have been opened up under the conditions of the developing socialist competition under the motto "To Raise Vigilance and Securely Ensure the Safety of the Motherland!" In actively participating in it, the soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers and officers endeavor to use each day of combat training, every hour and every minute for improving military skill and for mastering the weapons and equipment. They are fulfilling the assumed obligations and are working to strengthen discipline and organization.

The tasks posed by the USSR Minister of Defense for the new training year are complicated and responsible. In order to successfully carry them out it is essential to have high organization, discipline and tenacity on the part of each man. "We are required to constantly study military affairs," emphasized the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "and to constantly maintain on a high level our preparation and combat readiness to immediately repel aggression and decisively defeat the opponent under any conditions of initiating and waging a war. This is our main task." In pointing to the particular, crucial significance of a further rise in troop combat readiness, the minister pointed out that all our service, all our thoughts and actions should be subordinate to carrying out this task. Through its prism it is essential to judge both combat training, the standing of internal and guard duty, the state of troop discipline, the conduct of the men on and off duty as well as party political work. In a word, all our activities.

A modern war places incomparably higher demands on the men than all previous ones. It requires able actions on the battlefield under the conditions of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction and other powerful weapons, the

ability to endure great spiritual and physical stress, high psychological strength and those methods of action which would make it possible to deal a decisive defeat to the enemy with smaller forces, as well as much else.

Combat readiness is the most important indicator for the ability of the Army and Navy to deal an immediate rebuff to the aggressor and this is a concentrated expression of their combat might. Combat readiness is that state of the Armed Forces where they are capable at any moment and under the most complex conditions to repel and thwart aggression from wherever it might arise and with whatever means and methods the enemy might use.

Combat readiness can be high and increase day by day only when each soldier in his post at the job assigned him will carry out the tasks posed for him energetically and with a feeling of responsibility.

The exercise leader must emphasize that the combat readiness of any unit consists of the combat readiness of the subunits and individual men. For this reason, each soldier, sailor, sergeant and petty officer must assess all their deeds and actions from the standpoint of their impact on the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship. Each soldier should constantly bear in mind the question: how did he today carry out his duty and the military oath sworn to by him and did he do everything to increase combat readiness.

The men of the Army and Navy are profoundly aware of the enormous responsibility placed on them by the party, the government and all the Soviet people for securely defending the motherland. They see their duty in honorably carrying out Lenin's legacy, constantly raising vigilance and combat readiness and strengthening military discipline. They are studying military affairs effectively and are steadily mastering the complex combat equipment and weapons. They are aided in carrying out the tasks of combat training and service clearly and with a sense of responsibility by communist ideological loyalty and by the high qualities of patriots and internationalists who are ready to surmount any difficulties in the struggle for the interests of the Soviet fatherland. The political consciousness of the personnel combined with combat skill and the able mastery of the modern methods and means of armed combat is the basis for the strength and invincibility of the Soviet soldier.

It is essential to explain to the listeners what the demand of being in constant combat readiness means for them in practice. For a soldier or sailor this demand means that he should possess high political awareness, profoundly understand his personal responsibility for the defense of the motherland, be a master of military affairs and always ready to effectively carry out the tasks posed of defending the victories of socialism against the encroachments of any aggressor. He must constantly improve his field, air and sea skills; he must unswervingly maintain discipline, organization and proper order in the subunit; he must firmly know his service duties and be able to act skillfully in the most difficult situation of modern combat. Combat readiness cannot be of a temporary or seasonal nature or remain stagnant on a certain level. It must be constantly increased and improved. The efforts of all the Army and Navy personnel are directed at carrying out this task.

The Soviet military is sacredly carrying out Lenin's demand to be on guard and to constantly increase their revolutionary vigilance. This is manifested in their strict execution of the provisions of the military oath, the troop regulations and their functional duties. The highest manifestation of vigilance in the Soviet military is a constant readiness to defend our multinational Soviet state and the entire socialist commonwealth.

It would be desirable if the propagandist would describe how the personnel of the subunit and the students in the group are carrying out the plans for military and political training and the adopted socialist obligations. He should describe the leading men who have devoted all their energies to study and mastery of the equipment and who exactly assess their deeds and actions. He should give examples indicating the courage, industry and tenacity of the personnel in the struggle for the high combat readiness of the subunit. Here it is very important to point out that what has been achieved by the men is only a step on the way to new heights in combat improvement; the unutilized reserves should be pointed out and the students directed toward conscientious military service.

To speak about increased combat readiness means also to bring up the greatest possible strengthening of military discipline. This always has been and remains an important component of combat readiness. The stronger the discipline, the higher the organization and order in the subunit and unit, the more successful the successes in combat training and in improving the professional skill of the men and the more confident the progress in the socialist competition.

These demands on military discipline are constantly growing. There must not be any, even the slightest deviations from proper order in the Army and Navy collectives.

In explaining the importance of strong military discipline, one must particularly emphasize that the present stage in the development of the Armed Forces and the interests of maintaining combat readiness have raised to an unprecedentedly high level the need for precise organization in literally everything, the observing of vigilance and the unswerving execution of the requirements of the military regulations, the instructions and orders of commanders and superiors. Using specific examples from the life of the subunit or unit, the propagandist should also point out how essential it is to have discipline and vigilance in standing alert duty, guard and internal duty. It is important to help the students more profoundly understand the increased significance of organization and efficiency under present-day conditions and be aware of the need to precisely observe the requirements of regulations and the military oath and the unfailing fulfillment of military duty.

The CPSU and the Soviet government highly value the intense labor of the personnel of the Armed Forces and their achievements in carrying out the difficult tasks confronting the Army and Navy. This places many obligations on us. Primarily to strengthen the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces day by day, to devote all our forces and experience to improving professional and political knowledge and to strengthen discipline and organization.

From the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress, on behalf of all the personnel, the delegation from the USSR Armed Forces stated: "...Let our enemies know that the terrible weapons which our motherland has given us are in dependable and able hands. The missile troops and motorized rifle troops, the tank and artillery troops, the aviators and sailors have mastered the first-rate equipment, they are steadily learning to fight under the most difficult combat situation and are ready to deal a crushing rebuff to any aggressor...." This is a solemn vow by all the Armed Forces personnel and this is also a solemn vow by each man of loyalty to the party and people.

In completing the material on the subject, the propagandist must conclude that the successes of the Soviet people in communist construction and the wise domestic and foreign policy of our party which has constantly followed the course elaborated at the 26th CPSU Congress have evoked among the Army and Navy personnel, like among all the Soviet people, a high patriotic upsurge, a new wave of enthusiasm and a desire to carry out the tasks assigned to them with dignity and honor. The defenders of the motherland are fighting steadily and with all responsibility to strengthen the might of the fatherland and to achieve high combat readiness of its Armed Forces.

During the hours of independent study, it is recommended that the students study the ideas in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress dealing with the questions of the international activities of the CPSU and attention is drawn to the need for further strengthening the nation's defense capability and improving the Soviet Armed Forces. It is also essential to thoroughly study the speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on 22 November 1982 and his report "Sixty Years of the USSR" at the joint ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. It is recommended that the students learn well the content of the speech given by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at a meeting of the party aktiv from the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District.

In the seminar exercise (conversation), the following questions must be discussed: 1. Why is imperialism a source of military danger? 2. What are the demands of the CPSU on the armed forces? 3. What is the essence of the tasks involved in further strengthening the nation's defense capability and improving the Soviet Armed Forces? 4. Under present-day conditions what does it mean to be in constant combat readiness. 5. What are the tasks of the personnel in mastering the weapons and military equipment, in strengthening organization and discipline and in the struggle for new achievements in the socialist competition?

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COMMENTARY ON U.S. DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN NATURAL RESOURCES

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[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences, Lt Col N. Karasev: "Plundering for the Use of Militarism"]

[Text] As a result of the growth of the national liberation, anti-imperialist struggle of peoples, in the 1970's, the liquidation of the colonial empires was actually completed. The strengthening and development of real socialism and the outstanding achievements of the socialist nations in all areas became a most important sociopolitical catalyst in this natural process. "Our successes in socialist construction, the historical victory over fascism and the flourishing of all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in his report "Sixty Years of the USSR," "served as a powerful stimulus for the liberation struggle of peoples."

But each step and every success on the path of strengthening national independence among the former colonies and semicolonies did not come and are not coming easily. Their turning toward progressive and economic changes has occurred under an intense struggle against the imperialist "hawks." This has become particularly exacerbated now, when in the West the most militant groupings which have been blinded by rabid hate for socialism and the national liberation movement have raised their head. This class hate and fear of finally losing the previous positions of unchallenged dominance in the world are gaining over a feeling for reality and sometimes simply over common sense.

Recently in Washington a so-called program for democracy and public diplomacy was proclaimed with great pomp. Its essence is that the United States is endeavoring to establish its "right" under the pretext of "defending democracy" to massively intervene into the affairs of other states, primarily the developing ones. The global subversion organized by Washington, as was pointed out in the TASS Statement issued on this question, is an attempt to put a pseudoideological basis under the U.S. imperialist, expansionistic policy in all areas--military-strategic, political and economic.

The U.S. imperialists, in endeavoring to achieve military supremacy over the USSR, have not abandoned the hope of expanding the economic warfare against the socialist nations and the entire socialist commonwealth. By thousands of ways

and methods they are endeavoring to bind the young national states to themselves in order to more freely dispose of their natural riches as well as their territory in the interests of their aggressive plans.

Recently, Washington and its NATO allies have been giving evermore importance to the young developing nations as a most important source of resources and raw materials which could be utilized for militarism. Here the Asian, African and Latin American nations which are rich in these resources are viewed on both sides of the Atlantic through the prism of "grand strategy."

After World War II, fundamental structural changes occurred in capitalist resource utilization. In the 1950's through the 1970's, the share of the developed capitalist nations in the known mineral reserves of the nonsocialist world declined significantly: from 36 to 12 percent for oil, from 94 to 87.5 percent for uranium ore, from 80 to 77 percent for lead and from 82 to 75 percent for zinc ore. Certainly many of the resources in the capitalist world go for the needs of military production.

In the last decade there has been an absolute decline in the production of the major strategic materials within the imperialist powers, including the United States. For example, in the second half of the 1970's, vanadium production there declined by 46 percent, the mining of nickel declined by 17 percent, bauxites by 15 percent, titanium by 10 percent, zinc by 7 percent and copper by 6 percent. Thus, there is a clearly expressed tendency for a decline in the share of the United States in the total volume of the world output of strategic materials. Under the conditions of the extended economic crisis, the proportional weight of the United States in the world mineral output as a whole continues to decline.

Consequently, the problem of mineral resources, and particularly the nonreplenishable ones, at present is one of the most acute in the American economy. However, in and of itself this does not provide grounds to assert, as was done, for example, by G. Grey, chairman and chief executive officer of the corporation United Technologies: "We are in a very dangerous dependence upon overseas producers." The U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger has begun speaking about America as an "insular state" which is extremely dependent upon the imports of strategically important raw materials. In artificially fanning hysteria about the "poor America," overseas propaganda has not forgotten to throw in the notorious caveat about the "hand of Moscow."

Of course, for industrial production any nation requires a significant amount of resources, including diverse raw materials. If one speaks about the civil economy of the United States, at present it remains one of the best supplied states in the world in terms of minerals. In the assessment of American specialists, just the reserves stockpiled in the nation are so great that even with a complete halting of imports these would suffice for a long time for normal economic development.

But this is not the question. The U.S. reactionary ruling circles have linked the presently existing situation for mineral resources not to peaceful economic development in the nation. First of all, they are looking through the range-finder of aggressive imperialist policy. A solution to the problem of

industrial materials is totally subordinate to military-strategic tasks. Hence, the pitch of passion around the resources of the liberated nations.

In intending to carry out the crazy idea of achieving world domination, the White House is continuing to increase the arms race. The unrestrained militarization has necessitated a colossal increase in military expenditures. According to the estimate of the progressive American economist V. Perlo, by the middle of the current decade the federal military allocations will be 500 billion dollars annually.

What does the swelling of the military budget mean on the economic level? Above all, an expansion of the production of weapons, military equipment, supplies and other means for the needs of the armed forces. Co-workers from the American Data Resources research firm have compared the production levels which should be reached in 1986 by the 50 sectors participating in the output of military production with the maximum production levels achieved by these sectors previously. What is the result? It turns out that the "all-encompassing" militaristic program of R. Reagan requires an unprecedented increase of production in many key sectors producing military products. For example, the production of aviation engines and semiconductors should be 47 percent higher than the former maximum levels, for guided missiles the corresponding growth will be 48 percent and for computers 67 percent. According to the figures of the well-known American economist C. Schultz, over the next 4 years, the total share of the output of weapons and military equipment in the gross national product (GNP) in the United States will reach 30 percent.

Hence, the story comes full circle: an aggressive foreign policy course--an arms race--increased military allocations--greater militarization of the economy. Thus, in 1975, the total production volume of end military product in the United States in cost terms, according to the estimates of V. Perlo, was 27 billion dollars, while in 1972, the figure was 19 billion dollars. Understandably, weapons are not made out of air and their increased production requires an increased delivery of raw products and materials. Even by the middle of the 1970's, the amount of military utilization of mineral raw materials in the United States had risen by 3-4-fold in comparison with the years of the Vietnam adventure. In 1980, the output of end military product had risen to 50 billion dollars. In other words, it was double the 1975 level. At the same time the military-economic utilization of strategic raw materials had reached an enormous scale. Approximately 50 percent of the nickel consumed in the United States, 30 percent of the aluminum, 25 percent of the zinc ore and 20 percent of the copper were used for producing military equipment and weapons.

This tendency has grown even stronger under the impact of the structural changes occurring in the American Armed Forces and in military development as a whole. The administration of R. Reagan is channeling enormous funds into the accelerated development of new types of weaponry, into a further improving of nuclear missile and air force strategic forces and into modernizing the naval component of strategic might, the aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines. Precisely these weapons systems are among the most material- and energy-intensive. They are responsible for 70 percent of the total amount of

raw materials and fuel used by the U.S. defense industry and Department of Defense. As for the armed forces, particularly aviation and navy, they are major consumers of liquid fuel. Of the total volume of oil products delivered to the Pentagon, around 62 percent is "eaten up" by the air force and 15 percent by the navy.

It is no surprise that almost simultaneously with the advancing of a 5-year weapons program, R. Reagan sent to Congress a message which urged a sharp rise in the stockpiling of military industrial raw materials. How were these stocks to be replenished? Mainly at the expense of the developing countries, Washington had decided. The report pointed to the need of increasing the existing resources of strategic materials for "supplying U.S. military efforts for an extended period of time."

We would point out that the United States began to stockpile military strategic raw materials from the national liberation areas even at the peak of the Cold War. Precisely then, according to the recommendations of a Special Presidential Commission a decision was taken to create mineral stockpiles sufficient for ensuring the operation of industry over a 5-year war. During this time the United States has created--basically from resources of former colonies--gigantic stockpiles of rare earth minerals, ores, metals and chemicals.

Having set out on the path of increasing the arms race, the American imperialist circles are now enlarging the stockpiles of military-end raw materials on a significantly broader scale. The amount of strategic oil reserves has increased sharply. By the middle of the 1980's, the United States intends to have 135 million tons of liquid fuel. Here the main role in creating the reserves of "black gold" for the armed forces has been allocated to sources lying far beyond the United States, that is, in the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In order to encourage the plunderous operations of the oil monopolies in the interests of its own global plans, Washington has introduced for them state subsidies (up to 35 dollars for each imported ton). Similar benefits and subsidies have been provided for the suppliers of other strategic materials used to replenish the strategic military reserves.

The Reagan Administration during the very first months in power additionally stockpiled 2,600 tons of bauxites with an increased aluminum content for military production. The supplies of other military-end metals and minerals have constantly been added to. As a total from 1981 through 1985, the White House has planned to turn over to the American monopolies 21.9 billion dollars for increasing the strategic material reserves. For 1981, 15 billion dollars worth of such materials had already been concentrated in the "defense stockpiles" of the United States.

Military strategic resources comprise the predominant share of the minerals imported from the liberated nations into the United States. These supply 98 percent of the manganese and cobalt consumed in the nation, 95 percent of the chromium, 91 percent of the aluminum raw materials, 86 percent of the tin, 72 percent of the nickel, 59 percent of the zinc, 53 percent of the tungsten and 44 percent of the oil.

Here, in benefiting from its dominance on the world capitalist markets, the United States has unabashedly plundered the natural riches of the developing nations by unequivocal exchange. By strong pressure they have secured a significant decline in the prices for raw materials from the young states at the same time that they increase the prices for their industrial products. As a result, the prices for raw materials exported by the liberated nations in 1982 were 13.5 percent lower than the 1981 level and 26 percent lower than the 1980 level. However, prices for industrial goods imported by the former colonies continued to grow.

The imperialist plunder of the strategic raw materials in the developing nations has not been restricted to economic methods. Taking cover behind the "necessity" of strengthening its national security, the United States has been behaving as if it as before was the complete master of the natural riches in the liberated states. Washington has been particularly unceremonious in terms of certain Latin American countries. For example, in the 1970's, it officially declared the bauxite reserves in Jamaica to be an American strategic supply.

The intrigues of American imperialism in the region of the Persian Gulf represent a growing danger for the entire world as this area has been declared by the Washington administration as a sphere of U.S. "vital interests." Since the second half of the 1970's, many highly placed American representatives have repeatedly stated that for ensuring control over the oil deposits in the Near East as these determined the security of this nation, the United States was ready to resort to military force in the Arab region. Things have reached the point of creating the special Rapid Deployment Forces which are equipped with modern technology and weapons, including the B-52 strategic bombers.

The shifting of U.S. naval forces to the approaches of the Near East has become a new element for demonstrating the "military force" procedures. In the region of the Persian Gulf the Pentagon has concentrated a very large armada of ships. The direct military penetration of the United States into a number of Arab states has been growing.

Having obtained staging areas for the Rapid Deployment Forces in the Sinai and Lebanon, the United States has announced the formation of a new military command, the central ("Centcom") which officially began to operate on 1 January 1983. Its sphere of action includes 19 sovereign Asian and African countries. According to a statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, "Centcom" and the formations of American armed forces under it "are automatically focused on the oil fields of the Near East and Persian Gulf.

In the postwar period, there has been a fundamental change in the structure of world capitalist agricultural production. The share of the developed capitalist nations in the production of basic food products in the total volume of the nonsocialist world has become predominant. The question arises: does agricultural raw material from the liberated nations play any role whatsoever in the economic (including military economic) development of the imperialist states? Undoubtedly it does. The liberated nations at present are providing around one-half of the total volume of agricultural product for the capitalist world. A large portion of the working population from these countries is employed in the agrarian sector of the economy. The imperialist states and primarily the

United States is endeavoring to preserve this situation, regardless of the cost. They are doing everything to turn the agrarian sector of the former colonies into their own "truck garden." As well the agricultural products from the young states are also widely employed for supplying the American Armed Forces.

In addition, the developing nations are now the basic suppliers of such types of strategic agricultural raw materials as natural rubber, jute and cotton for the military production in the imperialist states. The agrobusiness monopolies have gotten their hands on a significant portion of the agricultural lands in the young states. For example, in the Philippines predominantly military-end agricultural products sent to the NATO nations are grown on 55 percent of all the arable area.

The enormous state expenditures involved with the continuously growing military allocations has served as the main reason for the currency crises, the imbalance in international payments, the unforeseen budget deficits and state debts. In the U.S. alone, this has exceeded a trillion dollars. Within the arsenal of means by which the imperialist powers plan to overcome or mitigate the exacerbated currency and financial crisis, important military-economic significance has been given to attracting financial resources from the national liberation zone. The problem is that in recent years, in a number of the young states, primarily in the Near East, the financial resources have increased significantly. As a result of the nationalizing of the foreign companies and the sharp increase in world oil prices in 1973-1974, the income of the oil producing states which are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has increased substantially.

But a majority of the developing countries possesses limited opportunities for the productive use of the foreign exchange earnings in their country due to the insufficient economic and technical levels. Many of them invest the surplus capital in the banks of the imperialist powers, into stocks of international monopolies, into land and government bonds in the Western nations. According to data in the foreign press, in 1981, the total amount of so-called petrodollars used for these purposes since 1974 reached 350 billion.

The main recipient of the financial assets from the oil producing nations has been U.S. imperialism, where 70 billion dollars had been accumulated by the start of 1982. The American banks, in addition, control a significant portion of the financial deposits by the OPEC countries in Great Britain where over 50 billion dollars have settled in the bank safes. The petrodollars pumped out of the young states go primarily into further increasing the arms race.

There also are many channels of unconcealed, outright militaristic use of financial resources from the developing countries by the United States. This is primarily weapons trade. In possessing the capability of producing modern systems of combat equipment, the imperialist powers, primarily the United States have turned foreign military trade into a powerful "pump" which pumps foreign exchange out of many foreign colonies. Certainly in contrast to normal international trade, the exporting of the basic types of weapons to the young states, as a rule, is paid for not in goods, but rather by foreign exchange. While the Western European NATO states sometimes receive oil for their weapons, the United States prefers only cash. There was a time when the "golden shower"

from the sale of weapons to the developing countries covered up to 65 percent of the U.S. overseas military expenditures.

Recently, the amount of monetary resources used by the United States and plundered through the export of weapons has immeasurably increased. The amount of exported weapons has been constantly growing. In the second half of the 1970's there was an "explosion" of military trade between NATO and the developing countries. While in the 1960's, for example, over the entire decade the total volume of military trade between them was approximately 1.5 billion dollars, from 1976 through 1980 the U.S. alone annually exported weapons totaling 12-15 billion dollars to the liberated states. By the beginning of the 1980's, with the coming of the Reagan Administration to power, this indicator exceeded 20 billion dollars.

At present, at least 25-30 percent of the U.S. weapons production is paid for from the financial resources of former colonies. This precisely is the proportional amount of U.S. military exports to the liberated countries in the total volume of American output of combat equipment and weapons.

Here also we must add the benefits that are not only financial, but also technical and economic. The increased amount of militarized trade with the young national states is used by the United States for increasing the production run of the weapons, for checking their increased cost, for maintaining the mobilizational readiness of the defense industry and its reserve capacity as well as for maintaining skilled personnel.

And how can one disregard the military-political factor? Certainly through weapons deliveries, the United States in one way or another ties certain Third World countries to its military chariot and forces them to follow the militaristic, aggressive course of Washington. The global strategic plans of American imperialism envisage the use of the human resources from the liberated states. Of course, times have changed and the United States and the other NATO countries cannot use them as freely and unrestrained as they once did. But they do not want to abandon the cheap manpower as well as the enticement of using foreign soldiers as "cannon fodder."

The plan revealed in 1978 for nuclear war by the United States and its NATO allies against the USSR under the code name of "Dropshot" envisaged the use of 14 divisions from the Arab states. In a secret memorandum from the U.S. National Security Council adopted in the summer of 1969, there were plans to send a land army some 150,000-strong from the Shah's Iran for establishing imperialist orders in the Near East region. During the period of the aggravation of American-Iranian relations in 1979-1980, the then Egyptian Sadat repeatedly promised to provide "cannon fodder" to the United States if it would decide to intervene militarily against Iran. At present, Washington is seriously contemplating the possibility of using the large Pakistani army as a regional policeman of imperialism. Moreover, foreign publications show that the Pakistani troops are to be directly incorporated in the American Rapid Deployment Forces.

One of the most important spheres for utilizing the resources of the developing countries in the militaristic preparations of imperialism is the shifting

of labor-intensive production to Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, one of the major Pentagon suppliers is General Electric and this firm has scores of enterprises not only in the manufacturing sectors of industry, but also in the mining sectors in the Third World regions. McDonnell Douglas, General Motors, Northrop, Exxon and others have been just as active as this American firm. Abroad they subject up to 15 million persons of the indigenous population to fierce exploitation. The following data show what benefits this brings to the weapons fabricators. The average annual outlays for manpower calculated for one employee in the affiliates of American international monopolies in the developing nations are 3-4-fold less than the outlays at the base enterprises located in the United States. The work week at the plants of the Western firms in the former colonies is 8 or 9 hours longer than at the enterprises of the same firms in the industrially developed countries.

One other method of plundering the young states for militaristic purposes is the so-called "brain drain" from the liberated nations. American recruiters "hunt" in the former colonies chiefly for nuclear engineers and physicists, mechanics and electricians, physicians and aeronautics specialists. As a result, from 1960 through 1980, the United States succeeded in exporting over 300,000 various specialists from the national liberation regions. As a whole, more than one-half of all the professional workers in the United States in the area of natural sciences, engineers and physicians is from former colonies. Many of them "work" directly for the Pentagon. If it is considered that in the United States itself the training of each specialist costs at least 45,000 dollars, the total net profit from this refined plunder would reach billions.

However, Washington has not been satisfied by this. At present, within the framework of the notorious program for democracy and public diplomacy, the task has been set of creating a sort of "fifth column" in the liberated countries. For this, in particular, they have proposed training the leadership for the young states who then, upon coming to power, could be the supporters of U.S. imperial interests.

Thus, the unchecked arms race unleashed by American imperialism, the deepening of internal and external contradictions within capitalism, the structural shifts in the world capitalist utilization of resources have led to the large-scale plundering of the liberated countries, predominantly for the use of imperialist militarism. "The young nations which have been liberated from colonial suppression," stressed the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in his report "Sixty Years of the USSR," "are now living through a difficult period of national establishing and social development.... Numerous traps set out by the neocolonialists threaten these still vulnerable nations."

However, the active and decisive struggle of the Soviet Union, the other nations in the socialist commonwealth and all the progressive forces in the world to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, the unswerving support by them for the liberation and equality of peoples have made it easier for the former colonies to move toward true independence. The further deepening of the world revolutionary process is an objective pattern in the development of mankind. In spite of the desperate attempts by imperialism headed by the United States to check

the ongoing movement of the peoples along the path of social and national liberation, this process is irreversible.

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